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INTRODUCTION 
“Given the bloated dockets that district courts have now come to 
expect as ordinary, the role of the magistrate in today’s federal  
judicial system is nothing less than indispensable.”1 
Almost twenty-five years have passed since Justice Stevens wrote these 
words. Justice Sonia Sotomayor recently reaffirmed the importance of the 
                                                        
1  Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Virgin Is-
lands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
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United States magistrate judges in her majority opinion in Wellness Interna-
tional Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,2 where she wrote: 
Congress has also authorized the appointment of bankruptcy and magistrate 
judges, who do not enjoy the protections of Article III, to assist Article III courts 
in their work. The number of magistrate and bankruptcy judgeships exceeds the 
number of circuit and district judgeships. And it is no exaggeration to say that 
without the distinguished service of these judicial colleagues, the work of the 
federal court system would grind nearly to a halt.3 
Indeed, the organization of this conference, Magistrate Judges and the 
Transformation of the Federal Judiciary, with numerous distinguished contrib-
utors, further highlights the significant role that United States magistrate judges 
play in the operation of the federal district courts.  
This conference provides us with an opportunity to share our perspectives 
on how the authority and utilization of magistrate judges have expanded over 
the past quarter century. By happy coincidence, this conference occurs twenty-
five years after several events that profoundly shaped how magistrate judges 
exercise their authority and are utilized throughout the district courts. As senior 
attorneys for the Judicial Services Office in the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts (Administrative Office), we have had a unique opportunity to ob-
serve the evolution of magistrate judge authority and utilization in the federal 
district courts that arose directly from those events.4 
Part I of the paper will discuss several twenty-fifth anniversaries that oc-
curred in 2015 and 2016 that proved to have a major impact on the expansion 
of magistrate judge authority and utilization. Part II will examine in depth nu-
merous Supreme Court and circuit court cases that reflect how magistrate judge 
authority expanded over the past twenty-five years. Part III will discuss how 
magistrate judge utilization has expanded in the same period. 
I. 25TH ANNIVERSARIES 
In 1990 and 1991, several events occurred that had a significant impact on 
the federal magistrate judges system and led to the expansion of the magistrate 
judge authority and utilization throughout the United States district courts. The 
final report of the Federal Court Study Committee in 1990, the enactment of the 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, and the issuance of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in Peretz v. United States5 in 1991 are discussed below. 
                                                        
2  Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). 
3  Id. at 1938–39 (footnote omitted). 
4  The authors would like to thank James Duff, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S 
Courts, Laura Minor, Associate Director, Department of Program Services, and Michele 
Reed, Chief, Judicial Services Office, for graciously giving us the opportunity to participate 
in this conference and to write this paper.  
5  Peretz, 501 U.S. 923. 
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A. The Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 
Congress created the Federal Courts Study Committee (FCSC) in 1988 as 
an entity within the Judicial Conference of the United States.6 Congress in-
structed the Committee to “recommend revisions to be made to laws of the 
United States as the Committee, on the basis of such study, deems advisable.”7 
Chief Justice Rehnquist appointed the FCSC’s fifteen members.8 Twenty-five 
years ago, on April 2, 1990, the FCSC issued its final report.9 This is the first 
anniversary we will discuss. 
Although the FCSC’s final report made several recommendations concern-
ing the federal magistrates system,10 two recommendations had particular sig-
nificance for the development of magistrate judge authority and utilization in 
the years to come. First, the FCSC recommended that “Congress should amend 
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) to allow district judges . . . to remind parties of the possi-
bilities of consent to civil trials before magistrates.”11 Noting that the existing 
language of § 636(c) specifically prohibited district judges and magistrates 
from discussing consent with parties after they received the initial consent no-
tice,12 the FCSC recommended allowing district judges and magistrates to fur-
ther advise parties and counsel of the right to consent later in the case, while 
mandating that parties be told there would be no adverse consequences if they 
refused to consent.13 This proposed amendment to the Federal Magistrates Act, 
                                                        
6  Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4644 (1988). 
7  Id. § 105, 102 Stat. at 4645. 
8  See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 31 
(Apr. 2, 1990). The Committee was chaired by Circuit Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit; other notable members of the FCSC included Senators Charles 
E. Grassley from Iowa and Howell Heflin from Alabama, Representatives Robert W. 
Kastenmeier from Wisconsin and Carlos J. Moorhead from California, Circuit Judge Levin 
H. Campbell, Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner, Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, District Judge (now Circuit Judge) José A. Cabranes, 
District of Connecticut, and District Judge Judith N. Keep, Southern District of California. 
Id. at 193–96. 
9  See id. 
10  The full history of the proposals submitted to the FCSC by the Committee on the Admin-
istration of the Magistrates System (Magistrates Committee) and the complete list of the 
FCSC’s final recommendations concerning the magistrates system are set forth in 
MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A GUIDE TO THE 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 79–87 (2009) [herein-
after LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
11  See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 79. 
12  The relevant language in § 636(c) stated,  
the clerk of the court shall, at the time [an] action is filed, notify the parties of their right to con-
sent to the exercise of such jurisdiction. . . . Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the magis-
trate shall attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil matter to 
a magistrate. 
Id. at 79–80. 
13  Id. at 80. The specific statutory language suggested by the FCSC stated, “Thereafter either 
the district judge or the magistrate may again advise the parties of that right but, in so doing, 
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enacted in the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, relaxed the civil consent 
provision and cleared the way for innovative methods that would be utilized by 
district courts to encourage litigant consent to disposition of civil cases by mag-
istrate judges.14 
The second significant recommendation of the FCSC was to request that 
the Judicial Conference “authorize a study of the constitutional limits of United 
States magistrates’ possible jurisdiction and catalog their duties.”15 In particu-
lar, the FCSC stated that “[s]ome district courts have been reluctant to expand 
the role of magistrates because of confusion over magistrates’ constitutional 
and statutory authority.”16 Noting with concern that the Supreme Court’s deci-
sions in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,17 
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,18 and Gomez v. United States19 had raised 
“serious questions about what matters non-Article III judicial officers may han-
dle,” the FCSC further stated: 
District judges should have available an analysis of the legislative history of 
the Magistrates Act and a list of those duties which bear “some relation to the 
specified duties,” as Gomez dictates. . . . This study should include all cases and 
statutes (in addition to 28 U.S.C. § 636) that discuss duties magistrates may per-
form, so that the district court will have a full compilation of the magistrates’ 
statutory jurisdiction, with a description of the presumption of validity and 
standard of review by the district court.20 
After receiving the FCSC’s recommendations, the Judicial Conference au-
thorized the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System 
(Magistrate Committee) to conduct a study of the magistrate judges system and 
compile a catalog of magistrate duties.21 The Magistrate Committee distributed 
                                                                                                                                
shall also advise the parties that they are free to withhold consent without fear of adverse 
substantive consequences.” Id.  
14  Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 
§ 308, 104 Stat. 5104, 5112 (1990); see also infra Section I.B.1.b.ii. 
15  FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 80. 
16  Id. 
17  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
18  See Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
19  See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989). 
20  FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 80. 
21  MAGISTRATE JUDGES DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, A CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY 1 (1993) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS]; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 86, 91; Philip M. Pro & Thomas C. 
Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magis-
trate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1503, 1522–23 (1995); see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, 1991 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: ACTIVITIES OF THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE 66–67 (1991). 
The Magistrate Judges Committee appointed a special subcommittee, composed of District 
Judge William T. Hart [Northern District of Illinois] (Chairman), District Judge Barbara J. Roth-
stein [Western District of Washington] and District Judge Frederic N. Smalkin [District of 
Maryland], to supervise the project. The study [was] prepared by the staff of the Magistrates 
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the first part of its study, the Inventory of United States Magistrate Judge Du-
ties (the Inventory), in December 1991, with updated editions issued in 1995, 
1999, and 2013.22 The Inventory provides district courts with a quick guide to, 
and catalog of, the types of duties that magistrate judges may perform under 
statutory and case law as suggested by the FCSC. In June 1993, the Magistrate 
Committee published the second part of its study, A Constitutional Analysis of 
Magistrate Judge Authority (Constitutional Analysis), which “analyzes various 
Supreme Court and circuit court opinions examining the constitutional limits of 
magistrate judge authority [and] reviews pertinent Supreme Court opinions dis-
cussing the authority of other non-Article III judicial officers, including bank-
ruptcy judges.”23 The third part of the study, A Guide to the Legislative History 
of the Federal Magistrate Judges System (Legislative History”), constituted the 
legislative analysis recommended by the FCSC of the Federal Magistrates Act 
and other statutes, and was originally published in February 1995. An updated 
edition of the Legislative History was issued in September 2009.24 
In preparing these publications, the staff at the Administrative Office, 
which supports the Magistrate Judges Committee,25 monitored, collected, and 
summarized court decisions that involved magistrate judge authority. The staff 
of the Administrative Office, which includes the authors of this paper, continue 
to do so up to the present. In the process, they observed the changes and expan-
sions of magistrate judge authority that have occurred over the past twenty-five 
years and were often asked to advise the Magistrate Judges Committee on these 
changes. Similarly, Administrative Office staff have also monitored the various 
ways district judges have utilized magistrate judges over the past quarter centu-
ry and are often asked to describe and analyze such utilization techniques for 
the Committee and for federal judges seeking information on different ways to 
utilize magistrate judges. Expansion of magistrate judges’ authority and utiliza-
tion were further facilitated, often in unanticipated ways, by Congress when it 
passed the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.26 
                                                                                                                                
Judges Division of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts under the subcommit-
tee’s supervision. 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra, at 1–2. 
22  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, INVENTORY OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE 
JUDGE DUTIES (4th ed. 2013). 
23  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 92; see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 
21. 
24  See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 92. 
25  The name was changed to the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges 
System from the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrates System after the offi-
cial title of the office was changed to United States magistrate judge in a provision of the 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. See infra Section I.B.1.a. For a more detailed explana-
tion of the role of the Magistrate Judges Committee, the Judicial Conference, and the Ad-
ministrative Office in the administration of the federal magistrate judges system, see Pro & 
Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1507–10. 
26  See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990). 
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B. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 
On December 1, 1990, President George H.W. Bush signed the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990. Title I of the Judicial Improvements Act was the 
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA). “Title III contained the Federal Courts Study 
Committee Implementation Act. Other titles created new Article III judgeships 
and revised judicial discipline and removal procedures. The Judicial Improve-
ments Act amended the Federal Magistrates Act, and had far-reaching effects 
on the Judiciary as a whole.”27 
1. Civil Justice Reform Act 
On January 25, 1990, Senators Joseph Biden and Strom Thurmond initially 
introduced the CJRA as S. 2027.28 “The stated purpose of the S. 2027 was to 
improve access to the courts by reducing costs and delays in civil litigation.”29 
The proposed legislation was based upon recommendations set forth in a report 
issued by the Brookings Institution in 1989.30 
a. CJRA and Magistrate Judges 
In its original form, “S. 2027 would have required that ‘a mandatory dis-
covery-case management conference, presided over by a judge and not a magis-
trate, be held in all cases,’ ” and in other ways would have explicitly limited the 
role of magistrate judges in the civil pretrial process.31 “In testimony before the 
[Senate] Judiciary Committee, several witnesses, including the Judicial Confer-
ence’s representative, favored reinstatement of a pretrial role for magistrate 
judges.”32 
On May 17, 1990, after several discussions between members of Congress 
and members of the Judicial Conference (including an April 1990 meeting be-
tween Chief Justice Rehnquist and Senator Biden) concerning Judicial Confer-
ence objections to the legislation, the bill was revised and resubmitted as S. 
2648.33 In his statement introducing the bill, Senator Biden observed that S. 
2648 contained numerous changes from the original proposed legislation.34 In 
                                                        
27  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 87. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. at 87–88. 
30  Id. at 88 n.288; see BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN 
CIVIL LITIGATION 12–33 (1989). 
31  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 88 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 20 (1990), as 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6823). 
32  Id.; see Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hear-
ings on S. 2027 and S. 2648 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 208, 212 
(1990) (statement of Aubrey E. Robinson, C.J., United States District Court for the District 
of Columbia, Washington, DC). 
33  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 88. 
34  Id. 
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particular, the revised legislation permitted magistrate judges to be involved in 
civil pretrial practice in response to concerns conveyed by the Conference and 
by witnesses who testified during the Judiciary Committee’s first hearing on 
the bill.35 
The Committee’s report on the bill gave several reasons for authorizing 
magistrate judges to take part in the preliminary phases of civil cases. First, the 
Committee expressed concern that fewer cases might settle if district judges 
were required to conduct all pretrial conferences because parties would be reti-
cent to reveal all aspects of their case to the judge who would finally resolve 
the matter at trial.36 Second, allowing magistrate judges to handle civil case 
management duties would provide district judges with more time to conduct 
other adjudicatory matters.37 Finally, noting that district courts faced growing 
civil and criminal caseloads, and that magistrate judges had increasingly im-
pressive credentials as judges, the Committee set forth its view that magistrate 
judges should be given significant authority to conduct pretrial and case man-
agement duties in civil cases.38 Interestingly, the Judiciary Committee, observ-
ing that the revised legislation would provide for the exercise of the “full role 
of magistrates in the pretrial process,” noted that “valid questions had been 
raised about the full extent of magistrates’ constitutional authority,” and it 
“therefore endorsed the recommendation of the [FCSC] that the Judicial Con-
ference conduct an in depth study of magistrate judge authority.”39 
The enactment of the CJRA in December 1990 acknowledged the im-
portant role of magistrate judges in the pretrial management of civil cases in the 
federal courts. This explicit acceptance of the use of magistrate judges in pre-
trial phases of federal civil litigation contributed directly to the expansion of 
magistrate judge authority in civil cases throughout the nation in the years fol-
lowing the CJRA’s enactment.  
b. Federal Court Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990 
The Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act appears in Title 
III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.40 “The [FCSCI] Act’s statement 
of purpose described the legislation as proposing ‘noncontroversial’ recom-
mendations of the Federal Courts Study Committee.41 The Federal Courts 
                                                        
35  See 136 CONG. REC. S6473 (daily ed. May 17, 1990). For a more detailed discussion of 
the Judicial Conference’s objections to the Civil Justice Reform Act and its response to the 
proposed legislation, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 88–89. 
36  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. at 89 & n.292. 
39  Id. at 89 n.292 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6823 n.10). 
40  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89; see Federal Courts Study Committee Imple-
mentation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5104 (1990). 
41  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89. 
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Study Committee Implementation Act contained [two] significant amendments 
to the Federal Magistrates Act.”42 
i. Change of Title to “Magistrate Judge” 
Under section 321, the FCSCI Act changed the title from United States 
magistrate to “United States magistrate judge.”43 The section stated: 
After the enactment of this Act, each United States magistrate appointed 
under section 631 of title 28, United States Code, shall be known as a United 
States magistrate judge, and any reference to any United States magistrate or 
magistrate that is contained in title 28, United States Code, in any other Federal 
statute, or in any regulation of any department or agency of the United States in 
the executive branch that was issued before the enactment of this Act, shall be 
deemed to refer to a United States magistrate judge appointed under section 631 
of title 28, United States Code.44 
The title change applied equally to both full-time and part-time magistrate 
judges.45 
“The committee report noted that the title “judge” is commonly assigned to 
non-Article III adjudicators in the federal court system, and that the new title of 
magistrate judge is consistent with that of other judicial officers such as bank-
ruptcy judges, tax court judges and claims court judges.”46 It further stated that 
“[t]he provision is one of nomenclature only and is designed to reflect more ac-
curately the responsibilities and duties of the office,” and “[i]t is not intended to 
affect the substantive authority or jurisdiction of full-time or part-time magis-
trates.”47 In June 1991, “the Executive Committee of the Judicial Conference 
changed the name of the Magistrates Committee to ‘Committee on the Admin-
istration of the Magistrate Judges System.’ ”48 
ii. Relaxation of Judicial Notification of Consent to Trial By 
Magistrate Judges in Civil Actions 
Under section 308(a), the FCSCI Act “amended 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) to 
permit [district] judges and magistrate judges to advise civil litigants of the op-
                                                        
42  Id. See id. at 89–91 for the procedural history of Federal Courts Study Committee Imple-
mentation Act. 
43  H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 12 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860. 
44  Id. 
45  Interestingly, the title change was described in the statute’s legislative history as a “non-
controversial” recommendation of FCSC, although the FCSC did not recommend a change 
in the title and the Judicial Conference did not request that the title of United States magis-
trate be changed prior to the statute’s enactment. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, 
at 85, 89–90. 
46  Id. at 90. 
47  Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 31). 
48  See id. 
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tion to consent to trial by a magistrate judge.”49 In the committee report accom-
panying this provision, Congress expressed concern that its intent in enacting 
§ 636(c) in 1979 was being impeded by the existing language: 
Under present provisions, judicial officers may not attempt to persuade or 
induce any party to consent to reference of a civil matter to a magistrate. Many 
judges refrain entirely from mentioning to parties the option to consent to civil 
trial by a magistrate. Litigants in many jurisdictions often receive little more 
than a standardized written notification of this option with the pleadings in a civ-
il case. As a result, most parties in civil cases do not consent to magistrate juris-
diction. The present procedures have effectively frustrated the intent of the 1979 
amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act which authorized magistrates to try 
civil consent cases.50 
If the intent of this legislation was to further encourage the use of magis-
trate judges to dispose of civil cases with the consent of the parties, the effect 
was also to free district judges to experiment with new and novel ways of ex-
panding the utilization of magistrate judges in civil consent cases.  
c. Authorization of Additional District Judgeships 
Title II of the Act, known as the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, authorized 
additional Article III judgeships for the district courts and the courts of ap-
peals.51 Specifically, the provisions authorized sixty-one additional district 
court judgeships and eleven circuit court judgeships.52 In addition, the legisla-
tion converted eight temporary district judgeships into permanent status and 
converted four judgeships that were split between different districts into four 
permanent judgeships.53 
The significance of this legislation only became apparent after many years 
had passed. To date, this has been the last omnibus judgeship bill where Con-
gress authorized a significant number of Article III judgeships. In the subse-
quent twenty-five years, Congress authorized only twenty-seven additional 
permanent district judgeships: nine in 1999, ten in 2000, and eight in 2002.54 In 
short, the number of Article III judges has remained largely stable over the past 
quarter century.  
To deal with the demands of caseloads that continued to grow after 1990, 
district courts increasingly looked to the Judicial Conference to authorize addi-
                                                        
49  Id.; see H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 27. 
50  H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 27. 
51  S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 65–66 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6854–55. 
52  See Authorized Judgeships, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/auth 
orized-judgeships [https://perma.cc/P5AQ-ZXHL] (last visited Apr. 19 2015) (charting the 
total numbers of judgeships authorized for each district and appeals court in 1990). 
53  Id. 
54  See id.; see also Act of Nov. 29, 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 1000, 113 Stat. 1501, 
1501A-37; Act of Dec. 21, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-553 app. B, 114 Stat. 2762, 2762A-84 to 
85; 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
273, § 312, 116 Stat. 1758, 1786 (2002). 
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tional full-time magistrate judge positions. Between fiscal years 1990 and 2016, 
the Judicial Conference authorized 234 new full-time magistrate judge posi-
tions, while converting or eliminating 117 part-time magistrate judge positions 
and 5 clerk/magistrate judge positions.55 The contrast with the Article III judi-
                                                        
55  See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
26–31 (Mar. 1989) (authorizing seven full-time magistrate judge positions); REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 73–79 (Sept. 1989) (au-
thorizing six full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 28–37 (Mar. 1990) (authorizing ten full-time positions); REPORT OF 
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES at 95–101 (Sept. 
1990) [hereinafter JCUS-SEP 1990] (authorizing seven full-time positions); REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 21–31 (Mar. 1991) (au-
thorizing sixteen full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 67–71 (Sept. 1991) (authorizing nine full-time posi-
tions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
31–34 (Mar. 1992) [hereinafter JCUS-MAR 1992] (authorizing fifteen full-time positions); 
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 75–79 
(Sept. 1992) (authorizing five full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 19–22 (Mar. 1993) (authorizing seven full-
time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 52–56 (Sept. 1993) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23–27 (Mar. 1994) (au-
thorizing eleven full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 61–65 (Sept. 1994) (authorizing ten full-time posi-
tions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
24–28 (Mar. 1995) (authorizing seven full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 91–95 (Sept. 1995) (authorizing three 
full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 30–33 (Mar. 1996) (authorizing one full-time position); REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 65–68 (Sept. 1996) (au-
thorizing six full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 29–33 (Mar. 1997) (authorizing seven full-time positions); REPORT 
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 78–81 (Sept. 
1997) (authorizing three full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 25–28 (Mar. 1998) (authorizing four full-time posi-
tions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
82–85 (Sept. 1998) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 29–32 (Mar. 1999) (authorizing seven 
full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 70–73 (Sept. 1999) (authorizing seven full-time positions); REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23–26 (Mar. 2000) (au-
thorizing two full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 61–64 (Sept. 2000) (authorizing ten full-time posi-
tions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
28–30 (Mar. 2001) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 65–67 (Sept./Oct. 2001) (authorizing one 
full-time position); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES 26–28 (Mar. 2002) (authorizing six full-time positions); REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 54–57 (Sept. 2002) (au-
thorizing nine full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 22–24 (Mar. 2003) (authorizing one full-time position); 
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 32–34 
(Sept. 2003) (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
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ciary is startling. The number of full-time magistrate judges has increased by 
62 percent in the past twenty-five years.56 In the same time period, as noted 
above, the growth in the number of Article III judgeships has been negligible. 
At the same time, the role of part-time magistrate judges in the federal 
courts has declined, with a significant decrease in the number of these posi-
tions. In fiscal year 1990, there were 159 part-time magistrate judge positions, 
while in fiscal year 2014 only 36 part-time positions remained, a decline of 78 
percent.57 Much of this decline can be attributed to the long-standing preference 
of Congress and the Judicial Conference for establishing a system of full-time 
magistrate judges where feasible.58 Indeed, the Magistrates Committee made 
the following recommendation at its June 1990 meeting for the Judicial Con-
ference’s consideration in September 1990: 
Your Committee concluded that it must move faster in achieving a system com-
posed primarily of full-time magistrates. Consequently, your Committee con-
cluded that all part-time magistrate positions should be examined in the near fu-
ture, with a view towards expediting the process of eliminating, consolidating, 
or converting the positions. Some part-time magistrate positions will undoubted-
ly need to be retained at locations where the volume of district court business 
clearly does not warrant the authorization of a full-time magistrate position, but 
where other legitimate considerations exist. In this respect, your Committee is of 
the opinion that geographical considerations and the cost-savings generally as-
                                                                                                                                
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 23–26 (Mar. 2004) [hereinafter JCUS-MAR 
2004] (authorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 27–31 (Sept. 2004) (authorizing five full-time posi-
tions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
33–36 (Sept. 2005) (authorizing three full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 30–31 (Sept. 2006) (authorizing two full-
time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 30–32 (Sept. 2007) (authorizing two full-time positions); REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 30–33 (Sept. 2008) (au-
thorizing six full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE 
OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (Mar. 2009) (authorizing three full-time positions); REPORT OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 26–30 (Sept. 2009) (au-
thorizing four full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 26–27 (Sept. 2010) (authorizing four full-time posi-
tions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
32–33 (Sept. 2011) (authorizing three full-time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 25–26 (Sept. 2014) (authorizing three full-
time positions); REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES 27–28 (Sept. 2015) [hereinafter JCUS-SEP 2015] (authorizing two full-time posi-
tions). 
56  At the beginning of fiscal year 1990, there were 329 full-time magistrate judge positions 
authorized by the Judicial Conference, while in fiscal year 2014, there were 534 full-time 
magistrate judge positions authorized. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL 
FACTS AND FIGURES 2014 tbl.1.1 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-
facts-and-figures-2014 [https://perma.cc/FP4Y-ZMGS]. 
57  See id.; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS 43 tbl.30 (1990). 
58  See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 9–10, 24, 46, 51, 73, 77–78. 
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sociated with part-time magistrate positions are not sufficient in and of them-
selves to justify retention of individual part-time magistrate positions.59 
In response, the Conference reaffirmed its view that the federal magistrates 
system should as much as possible consist of full-time judicial officers, and 
therefore endorsed the Committee’s plan “to review each part-time magistrate 
position on an individual basis with a view towards eliminating as many part-
time positions as feasible, either by abolishing them, combining them, or con-
verting them to full-time status.”60 This is exactly what happened in the follow-
ing twenty-five years, with a large number of these part-time positions being 
converted into full-time magistrate judge positions.61 
C. Peretz v. United States 
The third significant anniversary occurred in 2016. June 27, 2016, was the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Supreme Court’s decision in Peretz v. United 
States,62 a case that has had an enormous impact on how magistrate judges are 
used in the district courts. Indeed, much of the expansion of magistrate judge 
duties in the past twenty-five years has resulted from the Court’s interpretation 
of § 636(b)(3) and its view that magistrate judges may handle many critical du-
ties in felony and other cases, with the defendant’s consent and with the availa-
bility of de novo review by an Article III judge. 
As in the Court’s earlier decision in Gomez v. United States,63 Peretz con-
cerned whether a magistrate judge could preside over voir dire in a felony 
case.64 Unlike the petitioner in Gomez, however, petitioner Rafael Peretz spe-
cifically consented to having a magistrate judge select the jury in his case.65 For 
the majority in Peretz, the defendant’s consent to the magistrate judge’s author-
ity was the critical factor that allowed the referral of voir dire to a magistrate 
judge without violating Article III of the Constitution.66 
                                                        
59  Id. at 77. 
60  Id. at 78; accord JCUS-SEP 1990, supra note 55, at 93. 
61  For example, at its June 2015 meeting the Magistrate Judges Committee voted to recom-
mend “the conversion of the part-time magistrate judge position at Wichita Falls in the 
Northern District of Texas to a full-time magistrate judge position designated as Wichita 
Falls or Fort Worth.” JCUS-SEP 2015, supra note 55. The recommendation was subsequent-
ly adopted by the Judicial Conference at its September 2015 session and the last part-time 
magistrate judge position in the Fifth Circuit will be discontinued with the appointment of 
the newly-authorized full-time magistrate judge position. Id. 
62  Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991). 
63  Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874–76 (1989) (holding that § 636(b)(3) did not 
authorize a magistrate judge to conduct voir dire in a felony case as an additional duty if the 
defendant objected to the magistrate judge’s involvement); see also CONSTITUTIONAL 
ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 12–14. 
64  Peretz, 501 U.S. at 925. 
65  Id. 
66  See id. at 936. 
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Peretz was charged with importing heroin in the Eastern District of New 
York.67 At a pretrial conference attended by Peretz and his attorney, the district 
judge asked Peretz’s attorney if he had any objection to a magistrate judge se-
lecting the jury for the trial.68 Counsel responded, “I would love the opportuni-
ty.”69 Before beginning jury selection, the magistrate judge also received assur-
ances from counsel that there was no objection to her involvement.70 The 
magistrate judge selected the jury, and the district judge was not asked to re-
view any ruling made by the magistrate judge during voir dire.71 
The case proceeded to trial and Peretz was convicted.72 Only on appeal to 
the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (and after the Supreme Court had 
released its opinion in Gomez) did the defendant raise an objection to the mag-
istrate judge’s involvement in voir dire.73 The court of appeals rejected the peti-
tioner’s argument and upheld the conviction.74 Recognizing a split in the circuit 
courts’ interpretations of its Gomez decision,75 the Supreme Court granted 
Peretz’s petition for certiorari.76 
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, began his analysis by declaring, 
“Our holding in Gomez was narrow.”77 Justice Stevens emphasized that the 
question before the Court in Gomez was limited to whether a magistrate judge 
could conduct felony voir dire over a defendant’s objection.78 Even while the 
Court had held in Gomez that felony voir dire without the defendant’s consent 
was not an “additional duty” that could be delegated to magistrate judges under 
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), it also recognized that magistrate judges “play an inte-
gral and important role in the federal judicial system.”79 
The petitioner’s consent changed everything in Peretz. Unlike Gomez, 
where the Court deduced “an alternative interpretation of the additional duties 
clause” from the context of the statutory scheme to avoid constitutional ques-
                                                        
67  Id. at 925. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  See, e.g., United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 494 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 955 
F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Wey, 895 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1990); Virgin Islands v. 
Williams, 892 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Lopez-Pena, 912 F.2d 1542 (1st Cir. 
1989); United States v. Vanwort, 887 F.2d 375, 382–83 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. 
France, 886 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Mang Sun Wong, 884 F.2d 1537, 
1544 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Ford, 824 F.2d 1430, 1430–31 (5th Cir. 1987) (en 
banc). 
76  Peretz, 501 U.S. at 927. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. at 927–28 (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 869 (1989)). 
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tions,80 petitioner’s consent in Peretz removed many of the perceived constitu-
tional difficulties. Justice Stevens declared, “The absence of any constitutional 
difficulty removes one concern that motivated us in Gomez to require unam-
biguous evidence of Congress’ intent to include jury selection among a magis-
trate’s additional duties.”81 Consent thus provided the Court with greater lati-
tude to construe the “additional duties” clause and Congress’ intent. 
Under the majority’s reasoning, the reduction of constitutional concerns al-
lowed the Court to focus on the Federal Magistrate Act’s more general purpose 
of aiding the judiciary. The Act’s purpose thus became paramount to the Court: 
The generality of the category of “additional duties” indicates that Congress in-
tended to give federal judges significant leeway to experiment with possible im-
provements in the efficiency of the judicial process that had not already been 
tried or even foreseen. If Congress had intended strictly to limit these additional 
duties to functions considered in the committee hearings or debates, presumably 
it would have included in the statute a bill of particulars rather than a broad re-
siduary clause. Construing this residuary clause absent concerns about raising a 
constitutional issue or depriving a defendant of an important right, we should not 
foreclose constructive experiments that are acceptable to all participants in the 
trial process and are consistent with the basic purposes of the statute.82 
Although the Court acknowledged the importance of voir dire as a critical 
phase of a felony trial, the Court again viewed consent as the key factor.83 The 
Court revisited its statutory analysis in Gomez to determine whether there was a 
connection between consensual felony voir dire and other duties referred to 
magistrate judges under the Act.84 
The Court noted that “[b]ecause the specified duties that Congress author-
ized magistrates to perform without the consent of the parties were not compa-
rable in importance to supervision of felony trial voir dire . . . , we did not wa-
ver from our conclusion that a magistrate cannot conduct voir dire over the 
defendant’s objection.”85 Justice Stevens concluded, “However, with the par-
ties’ consent, a district judge may delegate to a magistrate supervision of entire 
civil and misdemeanor trials. These duties are comparable in responsibility and 
importance to presiding over voir dire at a felony trial.”86 Accordingly, felony 
voir dire with the defendant’s consent was a permissible additional duty under 
§ 636(b)(3).87  
Consent was also crucial to the Court’s constitutional analysis. Justice Ste-
vens began by stating flatly that “[t]here is no constitutional infirmity in the 
delegation of felony trial jury selection to a magistrate when the litigants con-
                                                        
80  Gomez, 490 U.S. at 864. 
81  Peretz, 501 U.S. at 932. 
82  Id. at 932–33. 
83  Id. at 931. 
84  Id. 
85  Id. at 932. 
86  Id. at 933. 
87  Id. 
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sent.”88 This position was based on a two-step Article III analysis. First, the 
majority observed that the Court in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. 
Schor,89 United States v. Gagnon,90 and other decisions had held that a litigant 
may waive his or her right to an Article III judge, as well as other fundamental 
rights in both civil and criminal cases.91 Accordingly, the Court concluded that 
with his consent the defendant in Peretz had waived any personal constitutional 
right to a district judge at voir dire.92 
Second, even if the “structural” protections of Article III, which guarantee 
the separation of powers between the three branches of the government, could 
not be waived by an individual litigant, the Court concluded that the district 
court’s procedures in supervising magistrate judges allayed any fears that Arti-
cle III had been violated.93 A district court’s overall control of its magistrate 
judges through its powers of appointment and removal, the referral of duties, 
and its ultimate power to review the magistrate judge’s actions in conducting 
the voir dire satisfied any separation of powers concerns regarding the inde-
pendence of the Judiciary from the other branches.94 
To reach its conclusion, the majority adopted Justice Blackmun’s concur-
ring opinion in United States v. Raddatz, where he concluded that the district 
court’s supervisory authority over magistrate judges satisfied lingering consti-
tutional questions: 
Under these circumstances, I simply do not perceive the threat to the judicial 
power or the independence of judicial decisionmaking that underlies Art. III. . . . 
[W]e confront a procedure under which Congress has vested in Art. III judges 
the discretionary power to delegate certain functions to competent and impartial 
assistants, while ensuring that the judges retain complete supervisory control 
over the assistants’ activities.95 
The majority finally addressed the issue of the appropriate standard of re-
view applicable to § 636(b)(3) that had troubled the Court in Gomez. While ac-
knowledging that the statutory provision contained no express standard of re-
view to be applied by the supervising court, the Court again cited Raddatz for 
the proposition that any standard of review under § 636(b) is only invoked 
when a party objects to the magistrate judge’s decision.96 Because Peretz did 
not object to the magistrate judge’s handling of voir dire at trial, the issue of the 
applicable standard of review did not arise in the case at bar.97 The Court noted, 
                                                        
88  Id. at 936. 
89  478 U.S. 833 (1986). 
90  470 U.S. 522 (1985). 
91  Peretz, 501 U.S. at 936. 
92  Id. at 937. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Peretz, 501 U.S. at 938–39 (quoting United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 685–86 
(1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
96  Id. at 939. 
97  Id. 
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however, that if review was requested, “nothing in the statute precludes a dis-
trict court from providing the review that the Constitution requires.”98 By im-
plication, the Court suggested that de novo determination might be applicable. 
The majority’s opinion in Peretz,99 with its emphasis on litigant consent 
and its reaffirmation of Congress’ purpose in enacting the Federal Magistrates 
Act to allow for constructive experimentation in referring duties to magistrate 
judges, would prove to have a significant impact on magistrate judge authority 
and utilization in succeeding years. As we shall explore in greater detail, dis-
trict courts have repeatedly applied the reasoning in Peretz as a basis for ex-
panding magistrate judge utilization in a variety of innovative ways. 
D. Three Anniversaries 
Taken together, the FCSC’s final report in April 1990, the enactment of the 
Judicial Improvements Act in December 1990, and the Supreme Court’s opin-
ion in Peretz in June 1991 set the stage for the significant expansion of magis-
trate judge authority and utilization that occurred in the following years. For the 
first time, pursuant to the FCSC’s recommendation, district judges and magis-
trate judges were provided with reference materials, particularly the Inventory, 
which provided a catalog of duties that could be referred to magistrate judg-
es.100 As we shall discuss in greater depth, the CJRA specifically encouraged 
district courts to use magistrate judges in pretrial case management.101 In addi-
tion, the FCSC implementation provisions enacted in 1990 changed the official 
title of the office to “magistrate judge” and made it easier for district judges and 
magistrate judges to discuss with litigants the option of consenting to have a 
magistrate judge dispose of civil cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).102 A year lat-
er, the Supreme Court in Peretz permitted magistrate judges to conduct critical 
duties in felony cases with the parties’ consent, and reaffirmed a basic purpose 
of the Federal Magistrates Act to encourage district courts to experiment with 
innovative ways with using magistrate judges.103  
Finally, although not recognized until years later, Congress’s reluctance to 
authorize significant numbers of Article III judgeships in the years following 
the Federal Judgeship Act of 1990 led district courts to seek the authorization 
of large numbers of additional magistrate judge positions to deal with growing 
caseloads.104 The result was profound growth in the authority and utilization of 
                                                        
98  Id. 
99  For a more detailed examination of the Peretz decision, including discussion of the dis-
senting opinions in the case, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 16–21. 
100  See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
101  See, e.g., R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil Jus-
tice Reform, 67 SAINT JOHN’S L. REV. 799, 814–18 (1993). 
102  See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 79–80. 
103  See Peretz, 501 U.S. at 940. 
104  See supra Part I.A. 
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magistrate judges in the subsequent twenty-five years.105 The following parts of 
our paper will describe examples of how courts expanded magistrate judge uti-
lization and the various ways federal courts extended the authority of magis-
trate judges.  
II. EXPANSION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE AUTHORITY 
A. Supreme Court Cases Discussing Magistrate Judge Authority Since Peretz 
Since the Peretz decision, the Supreme Court has decided two more cases 
dealing with magistrate judge authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636: Roell v. 
Withrow, concerning litigant consent in civil cases referred to magistrate judges 
under § 636(c),106 and Gonzalez v. United States, concerning consent to a mag-
istrate judge presiding over felony voir dire as an “additional duty” under 
§ 636(b)(3).107 While neither case deals directly with the constitutionality of 
magistrate judge authority under Article III, both cases have facilitated the ex-
pansion of magistrate judge authority in the district courts in recent years. 
1. Roell v. Withrow 
In Roell, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that consent to 
disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge may be inferred in certain cir-
cumstances “from a party’s conduct during litigation.”108  
Respondent Jon Withrow, a Texas state prisoner, filed an action under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 in the Southern District of Texas against several prisoner offi-
cials, alleging that the officials “deliberately disregarded his medical needs in 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”109 At a preliminary hearing, a magistrate 
judge informed Withrow that he could choose to have the magistrate judge ra-
ther than a district judge preside over the case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).110 
Withrow consented orally to disposition by the magistrate judge.111 But an at-
torney from the Texas attorney general’s office, who was not permanently as-
signed to the case, stated that she would need to talk to the attorneys assigned 
to the case concerning consent.112 
The district judge subsequently referred the case to the magistrate judge, 
indicating that “all defendants [would] be given an opportunity to consent” to 
disposition by the magistrate judge and that the referral would be withdrawn if 
                                                        
105  See supra Part I.A. 
106  See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003). 
107  See Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242 (2008). 
108  Roell, 538 U.S. at 582. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. at 582–83. 
111  Id. at 583. 
112  Id. 
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any of the defendants did not consent.113  After the clerk of court sent the refer-
ral order to all the defendants, which included a “summons directing them to 
include [i]n their answer” a statement either that the defendants consented or 
did not consent to disposition by the magistrate judge, only one defendant gave 
written consent, while defendants Roell and Garibay filed answers that were 
silent about consent.114 
The case proceeded to a jury trial before the magistrate judge and all of the 
parties voluntarily participated without raising any objections to the magistrate 
judge’s authority.115 After a verdict was reached in favor of the defendants, 
Withrow appealed to the Fifth Circuit.116 The circuit court sua sponte remanded 
the case, instructing the district court to determine whether all the parties had 
consented to trial before the magistrate judge.117 Only at this time did defend-
ants Roell and Garibay file formal written consents with the district court.118 
The district judge referred the remanded case back to the magistrate judge.119 
The magistrate judge issued a report finding that, although Roell and Garibay 
“by their actions [had] clearly implied their consent” to the magistrate judge’s 
jurisdiction, under Fifth Circuit precedent, consent to disposition by a magis-
trate judge could not be implied by the parties’ conduct.120 The magistrate 
judge therefore concluded that she did not have authority to try the case.121 Af-
ter the district judge adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommenda-
tion, the defendants again appealed to the Fifth Circuit.122 The appellate court 
concluded that (1) consent to disposition by a magistrate judge under § 636(c) 
must be express; (2) consent could not be implied by conduct; and (3) the two 
defendants’ post-judgment consent did not satisfy the statutory consent re-
quirement.123 After the court affirmed the district court’s ruling, the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari.124 
Justice Souter, writing for the majority, began by analyzing the text of 
§ 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b): 
The procedure created by 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) and Rule 73(b) thus envisions 
advance, written consent communicated to the clerk, the point being to preserve 
the confidentiality of a party’s choice, in the interest of protecting an objecting 
party against any possible prejudice at the magistrate judge’s hands later on.125  
                                                        
113  Id. (alteration in original). 
114  Id. (quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original). 
115  Id. at 583–84.  
116  Id. at 583. 
117  Id. 
118  Id. at 583–84. 
119  Id. at 584. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. 
123  Id. at 585. 
124  Id. 
125  Id. at 586. 
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After acknowledging that what occurred in Withrow’s case did not conform to 
these procedures, the majority stated: 
Nonetheless, Roell and Garibay “clearly implied their consent” by their decision 
to appear before the Magistrate Judge, without expressing any reservation, after 
being notified of their right to refuse and after being told that she intended to ex-
ercise case-dispositive authority. The only question is whether consent so shown 
can count as conferring “civil jurisdiction” under § 636(c)(1), or whether adher-
ence to the letter of § 636(c)(2) is an absolute demand.126 
The Court closely examined the text of § 636(c), noting the provision 
merely requires “the consent of the parties” for disposition of a case before a 
full-time magistrate judge.127 The Court contrasted this language with the pro-
vision allowing for consent to trial before part-time magistrate judges, noting 
that the statute required “specific written consent” in that situation.128 Focusing 
on this distinction, the majority reasoned that while the procedures set forth in 
§ 636(c) and Rule 73(b) should not be considered merely advisory, a defect in 
the referral of a civil consent case to a magistrate judge would not “eliminate 
that magistrate judge’s ‘civil jurisdiction’ under § 636(c)(1) so long as the par-
ties have in fact voluntarily consented.”129 
The Court then emphasized Congress’s practical concerns in relieving civil 
caseloads and granting “improve[d] access to the courts” as justification for 
permitting a defendant’s implied consent in certain circumstances.130 Balancing 
these considerations, Justice Souter noted that “the virtue of strict insistence on 
the express consent requirement embodied in § 636(c)(2) is simply the value of 
any bright line: here, absolutely minimal risk of compromising the right to an 
Article III judge.”131 He also noted, however, that application of such a rule ran 
the risk of wasting “a full and complicated trial . . . at the option of an unde-
serving and possibly opportunistic litigant.”132 Justice Souter reasoned that be-
cause “Withrow consented orally and in writing to the Magistrate Judge’s au-
thority following notice of his right to elect trial by an Article III district 
judge,” the plaintiff received the protection intended by the Federal Magistrates 
Act, and therefore Withrow did not deserve to receive an advantage from some 
of the defendants’ failure to expressly consent to the magistrate judge’s authori-
ty.133  
Under the situation in this case, the majority concluded, 
The bright line is not worth the downside. We think the better rule is to ac-
cept implied consent where, as here, the litigant or counsel was made aware of 
                                                        
126  Id. at 586–87 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
127  Id. at 587. 
128  Id. 
129  Id.  
130  Id. at 588. 
131  Id. at 589–90. 
132  Id. at 590. 
133  Id. 
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the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to 
try the case before the Magistrate Judge. Inferring consent in these circumstanc-
es thus checks the risk of gamesmanship by depriving parties of the luxury of 
waiting for the outcome before denying the magistrate judge’s authority. Judicial 
efficiency is served; the Article III right is substantially honored.134  
Concluding that “Roell’s and Garbay’s general appearances before the 
Magistrate Judge” after being informed of their right to adjudication by a dis-
trict judge was sufficient to constitute consent to the magistrate judge’s authori-
ty under § 636(c), the Court reversed the appellate court’s judgment.135 
The Court’s reasoning in Roell has significantly altered the meaning of 
consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Whereas before, courts had routinely held 
that a party’s consent to disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge had to 
be “clear, unambiguous, explicit,” and on the record, if not necessarily in writ-
ing,136 Roell opened the door to the ambiguities of implied consent. Courts are 
still wrestling with the implications raised by Roell.137 Moreover, as we shall 
see, the majority’s reasoning in Roell was a major factor in the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision concerning the consensual authority of bankruptcy 
judges in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif.138 
                                                        
134  Id. 
135  Id. at 591. 
136  Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 223, 223 (7th Cir. 1987); see, e.g., Am. Suzuki Motor Corp. 
v. Bill Kummer, Inc., 65 F.3d 1381 (7th Cir. 1995); Hall v. Sharpe, 812 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 
1987); Archie v. Christian, 808 F.2d 1132 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Ambrose v. Welch, 729 
F.2d 1084 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). 
137  See, e.g., Yeldon v. Fisher, 710 F.3d 452 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that a pro se plaintiff in 
a prisoner civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, who explicitly indicated on the consent 
form at the beginning of his case that he did not consent to disposition of his case by a mag-
istrate judge, could not be found to have impliedly consented to the magistrate judge’s au-
thority under the reasoning of Roell, even though he participated in subsequent litigation be-
fore the magistrate judge); Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that 
a prisoner plaintiff’s execution of the district court’s form consenting to disposition by “a 
United States magistrate judge” was sufficient to constitute consent to have the case dis-
posed of by another magistrate judge after the case was reassigned from the magistrate judge 
who originally received the referral, and that the plaintiff’s conduct during litigation before 
the second magistrate judge also constituted implied consent to disposition of the case by the 
magistrate judge under the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Roell, even if the consent form 
signed by the plaintiff was in some way defective); Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 
481 F.3d 1345 (11th Cir. 2007) (applying the reasoning in Roell and holding the plaintiff’s 
original consent to disposition of her Title VII case by a magistrate judge under § 636(c), 
combined with her conduct during pretrial proceedings before the magistrate judge in her 
second, related civil rights employment case, together would be construed to constitute con-
sent to having the magistrate judge dispose of the second case); Phillips v. Beierwaltes, 466 
F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding magistrate judge did not have authority to make a final 
ruling on a foreign party’s application for assistance in obtaining discovery from non-party 
witnesses under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, where there was no evidence that the parties consented to 
the magistrate judge’s authority, and where there was no notification to the defendants or 
their counsel of the need to consent or the right to refuse consent, Roell does not permit the 
court to infer consent to the magistrate judge’s authority to act for the district court). 
138  135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015). For a detailed analysis of the Wellness decision, see infra Section 
II.C.1.b. 
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2. Gonzalez v. United States 
In Gonzalez v. United States, the Supreme Court held, in an eight to one 
decision, that the express consent by a defendant’s attorney is sufficient to 
permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial under 
§ 636(b)(3).139 
As in Gomez and Peretz, the Supreme Court focused on magistrate judge 
authority to conduct felony voir dire proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) 
to explore the nature of litigant consent to a magistrate judge.140 Defendant 
Homero Gonzalez was charged in the Southern District of Texas with felony 
drug offenses.141 During the selection of the jury at trial, Gonzalez’s counsel 
consented on the defendant’s behalf to have a magistrate judge preside over 
voir dire.142 Gonzalez made no objection and was subsequently convicted on all 
charges.143 On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, Gonzalez contended “for the first 
time” that the district court erred in not obtaining his personal consent to have 
the magistrate judge preside over voir dire.144 The appellate court concluded 
that there was no error, holding that the right to have a district judge preside 
over jury selection could be waived by a defendant’s attorney, and thus af-
firmed the convictions.145 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari 
to resolve a split among courts of appeals on this issue.146 
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy began by examining the Federal 
Magistrates Act, particularly the “additional duties” provision at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b).147 Restating the Court’s earlier reasoning in Gomez and Peretz, he 
framed the question before the Court as follows: 
Taken together, Gomez and Peretz mean that “the additional duties” the 
statute permits the magistrate judge to undertake include presiding at voir dire 
and jury selection provided there is consent but not if there is an objection. We 
now consider whether the consent can be given by counsel acting on behalf of 
the client but without the client’s own express consent.148 
The majority acknowledged that there are some instances in federal crimi-
nal proceedings where only the defendant can waive the right in question, cit-
ing as the primary example the felony plea colloquy under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 11, where the presiding judge must determine whether the 
defendant understands the rights he or she is waiving by pleading guilty.149 The 
                                                        
139  Gonzalez v. United States, 553 U.S. 242, 253 (2008). 
140  Id. at 243. 
141  Id. at 244. 
142  Id. 
143  Id. 
144  Id. 
145  Id. 
146  Id. at 244–45. 
147  Id. at 245. 
148  Id. at 246. 
149  Id. at 247. 
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Court also noted that some statutes mandate explicit consent by the defendant, 
such as the waiver of adjudication by a district judge in Class A misdemeanor 
cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b).150 Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) lacks 
such clarity, the majority observed that “for now it suffices to note that we have 
acknowledged that some rights cannot be waived by the attorney alone.”151 
At the same time, however, the Court also observed that other rights in a 
criminal trial may be waived by a defendant’s attorney as a matter of trial man-
agement.152 After noting the pragmatic necessity for counsel to make many de-
cisions at trial on behalf of their clients, the Court observed that the question of 
who should preside over voir dire in a felony trial was similar to other tactical 
decisions that the Court had recognized could be left to the attorney without the 
defendant’s express consent.153 The majority thus concluded “that express con-
sent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selec-
tion in a felony trial, pursuant to the authorization in § 636(b)(3).”154 The Court 
further observed: 
Although a criminal defendant may demand that an Article III judge preside 
over the selection of a jury, the choice to do so reflects considerations more sig-
nificant to the realm of the attorney than to the accused. Requiring the defendant 
to consent to a magistrate judge only by way of an on-the-record personal state-
ment is not dictated by precedent and would burden the trial process, with little 
added protection for the defendant.155 
The Court therefore held that, under § 636(b)(3), a magistrate judge may 
preside over voir dire in a felony case where either the defendant or his counsel 
consented.156 After noting that it did not decide the question of whether such 
consent might be inferred from either the party’s or his or her counsel’s failure 
to raise an objection to participation by the magistrate judge, the Court affirmed 
the court of appeal’s ruling.157 
The Gonzalez decision is significant because it reaffirmed the Court’s ear-
lier reasoning in Peretz that a defendant’s consent was sufficient to permit a 
magistrate judge to conduct a critical stage of a felony criminal trial as an “ad-
ditional dut[y]” under § 636(b)(3).158 Moreover, in rejecting the defendant’s ar-
gument that consent under § 636(b)(3) must be express and personal, the Court 
also reaffirmed its holding in Roell that a party may authorize the disposition of 
his civil case by a full-time magistrate judge via implied consent.159 Lower 
                                                        
150  Id.  
151  Id. at 247–48. 
152  Id. at 249. 
153  Id. at 250. 
154  Id. at 250. 
155  Id. at 253. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. at 246. 
159  Id. at 252. 
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courts have applied the Court’s reasoning in Gonzalez to permit counsel to con-
sent on behalf of defendants in other critical stages of a felony case.160 
B. Judicial Expansion of Magistrate Judge Authority 
The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990161 did not end congressional ex-
pansion of magistrate judge authority. In the years following 1990, Congress on 
several occasions amended the Federal Magistrates Act to increase magistrate 
judge authority in both civil and criminal cases.162 Nevertheless, federal courts 
have remained at the forefront in expanding magistrate judge authority (and 
debating the nature of such expansion), often in ways unanticipated when the 
Act was first enacted. 
1. Felony Guilty Plea Proceedings Under Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 11 
Perhaps the most dramatic expansion of magistrate judge authority in the 
past twenty-five years has been in the referral of guilty plea colloquies in felo-
ny cases under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 to magistrate judges. 
Applying the Supreme Court’s holding in Peretz that critical stages in felony 
cases may be referred to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) with 
the defendant’s consent, district judges throughout the country began to refer 
guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges in increasing numbers.163 
It is notable that courts increased the referral of felony Rule 11 plea pro-
ceedings to magistrate judges despite early disapproval of the practice by the 
Magistrate Judges Committee. At its December 1991 meeting, the members of 
the Committee expressed the “strong view that judicial duties in critical stages 
of a felony trial, particularly the acceptance of guilty pleas and conducting sen-
                                                        
160  See, e.g., United States v. Gamba, 541 F.3d 895, 900 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying Gonzalez 
and holding that defense counsel’s consent to having a magistrate judge preside over closing 
arguments in a felony trial without the defendant’s express personal consent was lawful).  
161  See supra Part I.B.  
162  For detailed discussion of amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act that expanded 
magistrate judges’ authority after 1990, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 93–97. 
163  In the year ending on September 30, 2000, the first year that specific statistics on the 
number of felony guilty plea proceedings were collected, magistrate judges reported con-
ducting 10,614 felony guilty plea proceedings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, at tbl.M-4 (2000) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2000 [https://perma.cc/AQL7-
7KVS]. In the year ending on September 30, 2014, magistrate judges reported conducting 
29,536 felony guilty plea proceedings. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL 
BUSINESS 2014, at tbl.M-4 (2014) [hereinafter JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2014 [https://perma.cc/23MR-
DZRN]. Although the number of guilty plea proceedings reported by magistrate judges in 
2014 was down somewhat from the high of 33,334 felony guilty plea proceedings reported 
in 2011, the number of these proceedings conducted by federal magistrate judges between 
2000 and 2014 still almost tripled. See infra Section III.D.1 (analyzing the utilization of 
magistrate judges in felony guilty plea proceedings). 
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tencing proceedings, as well as presiding over the felony trial itself, are funda-
mental elements of the authority district judges under Article III of the Consti-
tution.”164 The Committee further stated that felony guilty plea proceedings 
should not be referred “to magistrate judges as a matter of policy, regardless of 
whether the parties consent to the delegation.”165 This position concerning fel-
ony guilty pleas “was originally proposed for Judicial Conference considera-
tion, but was withdrawn for further consideration at the Committee’s June 1992 
meeting.”166 
At its June 1992 meeting, the Magistrate Judges Committee, in an infor-
mation item in its report to the September 1992 session of the Judicial Confer-
ence, reiterated its earlier position “that judicial duties in certain ‘critical stages 
of felony cases, including accepting guilty pleas, conducting sentencing pro-
ceedings, and presiding over the trial of a felony case,’ ” are fundamental ele-
ments of the “authority of Article III judges and, therefore, were not appropri-
ate for delegation to magistrate judges,” regardless of whether a defendant 
consents to a Magistrate Judge’s involvement.167 Nevertheless, “[t]he Commit-
tee did not seek Judicial Conference endorsement of its position at that 
time.”168 
During long-range planning discussions, the majority of the Committee’s 
members stated that the parties’ consent to magistrate judge authority in felony 
proceedings reduced constitutional questions about such authority. By contrast, 
a smaller number of the Committee’s members disagreed with this view and 
reiterated concerns about the constitutionality of magistrate judges conducting 
certain critical proceedings in felony cases.169 Accordingly, “the Committee 
agreed that ‘it would be prudent to proceed cautiously, expanding the involve-
ment of magistrate judges in felony matters on an experimental basis.’ ”170 Af-
ter sessions devoted to the discussion of long-range planning for the federal 
magistrate judges system, the Committee issued a report, where the Committee 
wrote, “[t]he projected growth of the criminal caseload of the federal courts 
makes the delegation of expanded consensual felony authority to magistrate 
judges an increasingly acceptable alternative for courts attempting to manage 
growing felony and civil dockets.”171 The Committee therefore suggested that 
pilot programs might be set up in certain district courts where magistrate judges 
would be permitted to conduct guilty plea proceedings and sentence felony de-
                                                        
164  See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 56–57. 
165  Id. at 57. 
166  Id. 
167  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 66 (quoting JCUS-MAR 1992, supra note 55, at 
16–17); accord CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 57. 
168  See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 66. 
169  Id. 
170  Id. (quoting COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYS., JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE MAGISTRATE JUDGES SYSTEM 5 (Supp. 
June 1994) [hereinafter MAGISTRATE JUDGES PLAN]). 
171  Id. at 66 (quoting MAGISTRATE JUDGES PLAN, supra note 170, at 4–6). 
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fendants, with the parties’ consent and under the supervision and control of dis-
trict judges.172 It also recommended that if federal courts found these programs 
to be constitutional, “an additional experimental pilot program be established to 
permit magistrate judges to try felony cases with consent.”173 
The Committee, however, included these recommendations merely as in-
formation items to the September 1994 session of the Judicial Conference, and 
the full Conference did not express any views on them.174 In addition, although 
these recommendations were included in the Supplement to the Long Range 
Plan, no district court set up any pilot programs.175 But the referral of felony 
guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges expanded in numerous courts re-
gardless of the changing views of the Committee.176  
Every circuit court of appeals that has examined the issue of the referral of 
felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges has concluded that the prac-
tice does not violate the Constitution and that “plea colloquies under [Federal 
Rule of Criminal Procedure] 11 in felony cases are additional duties that may 
be delegated to magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) with the defend-
ants’ consent.”177 At the same time, however, courts have disagreed over 
whether the magistrate judge may only issue a report recommending whether or 
not the plea should be accepted by the district judge, or whether the magistrate 
judge may actually accept the defendant’s plea. Cases on both sides of this dis-
agreement are analyzed below. 
a. Report and Recommendation with the Defendant’s Consent 
Most circuit courts have held that a magistrate judge may conduct a felony 
guilty plea proceeding under Rule 11 with the defendant’s consent, after which 
the magistrate judge must prepare a report recommending whether the district 
judge should accept the defendant’s plea.178 Several of these cases are dis-
cussed below. 
                                                        
172  Id. at 66–67. 
173  Id. at 67. 
174  Id.  
175  Id. 
176  See infra Part III.D.1 for further analysis of the utilization of magistrate judges in felony 
guilty plea proceedings. 
177  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 67 n.228; see United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 
424, 433 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Vega-Martinez, 425 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 2005); 
United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Reyna-
Tapia (Reyna-Tapia II), 328 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States v. 
Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 791–92 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 269 (5th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1251 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 629 (2d Cir. 1994); see also United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 
891 (7th Cir. 2014) (addressing the defendant’s statutory, not constitutional, claim). 
178  See Harden, 758 F.3d at 891; Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d at 1122; Torres, 258 F.3d at 796; 
Dees, 125 F.3d at 269; Williams, 23 F.3d at 634. 
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i. United States v. Williams 
In 1994, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Williams, became the first 
federal appellate court to address whether a magistrate judge could constitu-
tionally be referred a felony guilty plea proceeding with the defendant’s con-
sent on a report and recommendation basis.179 The Second Circuit held that a 
magistrate judge could administer the colloquy under Rule 11 to accept a de-
fendant’s guilty plea in a felony case with the defendant’s consent without vio-
lating Article III of the Constitution or the Federal Magistrates Act.180 The 
court further endorsed a procedure whereby the magistrate judge conducted the 
Rule 11 allocution with the defendant’s consent and submitted a recommenda-
tion to the district judge regarding whether to accept the guilty plea.181 
After defendant Lloyd Williams was arrested in 1991 and charged with 
felony drug importation offenses in the Eastern District of New York, he con-
sented in writing to have a magistrate judge conduct the proceeding to accept 
his guilty plea.182 Following the district’s standard practice, a magistrate judge 
conducted the plea allocution, made a finding that the guilty plea was made 
knowingly and voluntarily by the defendant, and submitted a recommendation 
to the district judge that Williams’s guilty plea be accepted.183 The district court 
agreed, accepted Williams’s guilty plea, and sentenced him to 292 months of 
imprisonment.184 Williams appealed to the Second Circuit, arguing that allow-
ing a magistrate judge to conduct the guilty plea colloquy under Rule 11 violat-
ed Article III of the Constitution and the Federal Magistrates Act, notwithstand-
ing his consent to the procedure.185 
The appellate court first examined whether the referral of felony guilty plea 
proceedings to magistrate judges was permissible under the Federal Magistrates 
Act.186 Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) was the provision of the Act that ap-
plied in this case, the court acknowledged it was bound by Gomez and 
Peretz.187 The court further stated: 
In order for a Rule 11 allocution properly to fall within the sphere of “addi-
tional duties” authorized by Congress in the Magistrates Act, it must bear some 
relationship to those duties already assigned to magistrates by the Act. An allo-
cution is an ordinary garden variety type of ministerial function that magistrate 
judges commonly perform on a regular basis. The catechism administered to a 
defendant is now a standard one, dictated in large measure by the comprehensive 
provisions of Rule 11 itself, which carefully explain what a court must inquire 
                                                        
179  See Williams, 23 F.3d 629. 
180  Id. at 630. 
181  Id. at 634. 
182  Id. at 630. 
183  Id. at 631. 
184  Id. 
185  Id. at 632. 
186  Id. 
187  Id. 
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about, what it should advise a defendant and what it should determine before ac-
cepting a plea. Further, administrating an allocution is less complex than a num-
ber of duties the Magistrates Act specifically authorizes magistrates to perform. 
For example, such judicial officers may hear and determine pretrial matters, oth-
er than eight dispositive motions. In addition, a magistrate may conduct hear-
ings, including evidentiary hearings, and submit to the district court recom-
mended findings of fact for the eight dispositive motions, and do the same with 
habeas petitions.188 
The court also noted that even if guilty plea proceedings were of greater 
importance than other duties specifically assigned to magistrate judges, “the 
consent requirement—fulfilled in this case—saves the delegation. Consent is 
the key.”189 The panel therefore held “that the ‘additional duties’ clause of the 
Magistrates Act authorizes a district court judge in a felony prosecution to del-
egate to a magistrate judge the task of administering a Rule 11 allocution, pro-
vided the defendant consents.”190 
Turning to the defendant’s constitutional argument, the court again relied 
on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Peretz to conclude that the defendant’s con-
sent was crucial to the constitutional analysis “because a defendant may waive 
even his most basic rights.”191 The panel also cited the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor192 to conclude 
the structural protections of Article III are not implicated. Because the district 
court remains in control of the proceeding, and the matter is reported to that 
court for its approval, there should be no concern that the use of a magistrate 
judge to allocute a defendant accused of a felony will tend to devitalize Article 
III courts.193 
The court observed that the district judge was free to review the transcript 
of the Rule 11 colloquy and could re-administer the allocution if infirmities 
were discovered.194 The court therefore concluded that the referral of the felony 
guilty plea proceeding to the magistrate judge in Williams’s case did not con-
travene Article III of the Constitution and affirmed the district court’s judg-
ment.195 
As the first court of appeals case to address the issue of whether felony 
guilty plea proceedings could be referred to magistrate judges without violating 
the Federal Magistrates Act or the Constitution, the Williams decision has been 
                                                        
188  Id. at 632–33 (citations omitted). 
189  Id. at 633. 
190  Id. at 634. 
191  Id. 
192  478 U.S. 833 (1986). See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 32–37, for a de-
tailed analysis of Schor. 
193  Williams, 23 F.3d at 634. 
194  Id. 
195  Id. at 634, 636. 
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cited by almost all the courts of appeals that have addressed the question.196 In-
deed, the Second Circuit’s analysis has served as a template for other courts ex-
amining the issue.  
ii. United States v. Reyna-Tapia I & II 
The panel of the Ninth Circuit that issued the first opinion in United States 
v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia I), came close to effectively ending the referral of 
felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges in the Ninth Circuit by re-
quiring district judges to conduct de novo review every time a magistrate judge 
issued a report and recommendation after conducting a Rule 11 plea colloquy, 
even in cases where the defendant did not object to the recommendation.197 On 
rehearing en banc, however, the Ninth Circuit backed away from the original 
panel’s view and held that de novo review was only required when an objection 
was made.198 Both decisions are discussed below. 
In Reyna-Tapia I, a panel of the Ninth Circuit held that a magistrate judge 
could, with the defendant’s consent, conduct a Rule 11 plea colloquy and rec-
ommend that a district judge accept a defendant’s guilty plea in a felony case, 
provided that the district court conducted de novo review of the proceeding.199 
Defendant Jose Reyna-Tapia was charged in the District of Arizona with il-
legal re-entry into the United States after being deported in 1999.200 After 
agreeing to plead guilty to this charge, the defendant agreed to have a magis-
trate judge administer the Rule 11 plea colloquy.201 The magistrate judge con-
ducted the proceeding and recommended that the defendant’s plea be accepted. 
The district judge reviewed the record de novo before accepting the defendant’s 
plea.202 After sentencing, Reyna-Tapia appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing 
that the district court erred in permitting a magistrate judge to conduct the Rule 
11 colloquy proceeding.203 
The panel affirmed, but not without voicing numerous concerns about the 
referral of felony guilty plea colloquies to magistrate judges. Noting that the 
Supreme Court had observed in Gomez that the Federal Magistrates Act pro-
vides no jurisdiction for a magistrate judge to preside over an entire felony trial 
                                                        
196  See, e.g., United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. 
Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1331 
(11th Cir. 2004); Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d 1114, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United 
States v. Torres, 258 F.3d 791, 795 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Dees, 125 F.3d 261, 263 
(5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247, 1250 (10th Cir. 1996). 
197  United States v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia I), 294 F.3d 1192, 1201 (9th Cir. 2002), 
reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated by 315 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002). 
198  Reyna-Tapia II, 328 F.3d at 1122. 
199  Reyna-Tapia I, 294 F.3d at 1201. 
200  Id. at 1194. 
201  Id. at 1194–95. 
202  Id. at 1195. 
203  Id. at 1194–95. 
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simply because a defendant consents to that authority,204 the Ninth Circuit stat-
ed that “a felony plea colloquy constitutes a sensitive and critical stage of a 
criminal prosecution where the same rights are at stake as with felony trials and 
the court must exercise similar discretion.”205 Emphasizing the importance of a 
judge’s observations and impressions of a defendant in evaluating voluntariness 
of the defendant’s guilty plea, the panel noted, “De novo review, which entails 
a reading of a cold transcript, acts as a poor substitute for these first-hand im-
pressions.”206 It further opined that “[c]onsent may be insufficient to cure the 
problems involved with the delegation of Rule 11 duties to a non-Article III 
judge.”207 
The court was particularly concerned with the delegation of the duty to in-
quire into the factual basis of the guilty plea under Rule 11(f): 
Rule 11(f) is designed to protect defendants who do not realize that their 
conduct does not actually fall within the charge. Only the sentencing judge has 
the benefit of the presentence report, which may reveal additional facts showing 
that the defendant’s conduct does not fall within the charge to which he is plead-
ing. To delegate this responsibility to a magistrate judge, who will conduct the 
inquiry without the benefit of the presentence report, dilutes the important safe-
guard in Rule 11(f).208 
In light of these concerns, the court placed particular importance on having 
the district judge conduct de novo review in all circumstances where a magis-
trate judge conducted the Rule 11 colloquy.209 
Even with these reservations, the court acknowledged that four other cir-
cuits had already concluded that the duty of conducting a Rule 11 plea colloquy 
was a duty comparable in responsibility to other duties assigned to magistrate 
judges under the Federal Magistrates Act.210 The panel however specifically 
departed from the reasoning used by the Second Circuit in Williams to justify 
the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judges: 
We disagree with the Second Circuit that a Rule 11 plea colloquy is a “gar-
den variety ministerial function.” . . . [A] plea colloquy is a highly critical stage 
of a criminal prosecution. However, we recognize the weight of authority hold-
ing that magistrate[ judges] may perform this function with the defendant’s con-
sent, and we join our sister circuits in acknowledging that Congress intended to 
give district courts significant leeway to experiment with the use of magistrate[ 
judges]. Therefore, we hold that, when a defendant explicitly consents, a magis-
trate judge may administer the Rule 11 plea colloquy in a felony case, so long as 
the district court reviews the proceedings de novo.211 
                                                        
204  See Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 872 (1989). 
205  Reyna-Tapia I, 294 F.3d at 1199. 
206  Id. 
207  Id. 
208  Id. at 1200 (citations omitted). 
209  Id. at 1201. 
210  See id. at 1200. 
211  Id. at 1200–01. 
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The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea, concluding that Reyna-Tapia had not provided an ad-
equate reason for withdrawing his plea and that the district court’s referral of 
Rule 11 duties to the magistrate judge “was proper under the circumstances of 
this case.”212 Nevertheless, the court appeared to mandate that de novo review 
must occur whenever a magistrate judge conducted a Rule 11 guilty plea pro-
ceeding. 
The Ninth Circuit panel’s decision in Reyna-Tapia I cast doubt on the effi-
cacy of district judges referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate 
judges by emphasizing the need for de novo review every time a magistrate 
judge conducted a Rule 11 colloquy, even when a defendant did not object. By 
suggesting that de novo determination was mandatory in all cases, the panel 
undermined the time-saving rationale for such referrals. If a district judge was 
required to conduct de novo review of every plea allocution handled by a mag-
istrate judge, what was the purpose of, or efficiency in, delegating such duties? 
While we do not know whether these concerns were brought to the attention of 
the judges of the Ninth Circuit, six months after the panel issued the opinion in 
Reyna-Tapia I, the Ninth Circuit en banc granted rehearing of the case and va-
cated the first decision.213 
In May 2003, the Ninth Circuit issued its en banc opinion in United States 
v. Reyna-Tapia (Reyna-Tapia II).214 The court held that Rule 11 plea colloquies 
in felony cases are additional duties that may be delegated to magistrate judges 
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) for findings and recommendations with the de-
fendants’ consent.215 The court further held that de novo review of the magis-
trate judge’s findings and recommendations in a guilty plea proceeding is man-
dated only when a party specifically objects to them.216 
Noting that a defendant has at least three procedural safeguards available 
when a magistrate judge conducts a guilty plea proceeding (consent to the mag-
istrate judge, objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, 
and the right to withdraw the guilty plea prior to its acceptance by the district 
court), the court reasoned: 
[I]t merits re-emphasis that the underlying purpose of the Federal Magistrates 
Act is to improve the effective administration of justice. A rule requiring auto-
matic de novo review of findings and recommendations to which no one objects 
would not save time or judicial resources. It would do just the opposite, and de-
feat the whole purpose of referring the plea to the magistrate judge.217 
                                                        
212  Id. at 1201. 
213  See United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 315 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002). 
214  328 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003). 
215  Id. at 1116, 1122. 
216  Id. at 1116. 
217  Id. at 1121–22 (citation omitted) (citing Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 
(1991)). 
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The Ninth Circuit once again affirmed the district court’s denial of the de-
fendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
iii. United States v. Harden 
The Seventh Circuit, in United States v. Harden, is the latest court to ad-
dress the issue of referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judg-
es.218 In Harden, the court held that a magistrate judge conducting a Rule 11 
guilty plea colloquy could not accept the defendant’s guilty plea at the conclu-
sion of the colloquy, but was required to issue a report to the district judge rec-
ommending whether to accept the plea.219 
Defendant Stacy Harden agreed to plead guilty in the Southern District of 
Illinois to a drug charge and consented to a magistrate judge conducting the 
plea colloquy.220 Following the colloquy, the magistrate judge accepted Hard-
en’s guilty plea.221 The district judge then conducted a sentencing hearing and 
imposed a within-guidelines sentence.222 Harden appealed his conviction, rais-
ing for the first time his objection to the magistrate judge’s authority to accept a 
guilty plea in a felony case.223 
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the taking of a felony guilty plea is 
“too important to be considered a mere ‘additional duty’ permitted” under the 
Federal Magistrates Act.224 Because of the importance of this task, the court 
held that the Act “cannot be stretched to reach acceptance of felony guilty 
pleas, even with a defendant’s consent.”225 Noting that its view of the Act con-
flicted with several other circuits,226 the Seventh Circuit nonetheless concluded: 
[T]he prevalence of guilty pleas does not render them less important, or the pro-
tections waived through them any less fundamental. A felony guilty plea is equal 
in importance to a felony trial leading to a verdict of guilty. And without explicit 
authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate this vital task.227 
Noting that the conflicting authority had emphasized the Supreme Court’s 
statement in Peretz that “Congress intended to give federal judges significant 
leeway to experiment with possible improvements in the efficiency of the judi-
cial process,”228 the Seventh Circuit closed its decision by stating: 
                                                        
218  United States v. Harden, 758 F.3d 886 (7th Cir. 2014). 
219  Id. at 891. 
220  Id. at 887. 
221  Id. 
222  Id. 
223  Id. at 887–88. 
224  Id. at 888. 
225  Id. 
226  Id. at 891 (citing United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 432–32 (4th Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1332–33 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 
F.3d 1247, 1250–52 (10th Cir. 1996)). 
227  Id. 
228  Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932 (1991). 
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The desire to make more efficient the district courts’ management of large 
criminal caseloads is understandable. These days, over 97% of criminal convic-
tions are the result of guilty pleas. Truly, “criminal justice today is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” . . . A felony guilty plea is equal in 
importance to a felony trial leading to a verdict of guilty. And without explicit 
authorization from Congress, the district court cannot delegate this vital task. 
The authority to experiment set forth in Peretz is bounded; the Court has never 
suggested that magistrate judges, with the parties’ consent, may perform every 
duty of an Article III judge, regardless of the duty’s importance.229 
Acknowledging efficiency concerns, the appellate court held that a magis-
trate judge may conduct a Rule 11 guilty plea colloquy, but that the judge must 
issue a report to the district court with a recommendation on the plea.230 The 
court agreed with other circuits that “this is a permissible practice.”231 Because 
the magistrate judge in Harden had actually accepted his plea, the court re-
versed the judgment of the district court.232 
The main thrust of the decision in Harden was a rejection of the view that a 
magistrate judge may accept the defendant’s plea in a felony case after the Rule 
11 colloquy. Since Harden, other circuits have continued to adhere to their 
precedent that magistrate judges may accept a felony guilty plea.233 The Sev-
enth Circuit’s Harden decision emphatically highlights the disagreement exist-
ing among the courts of appeals as to whether a magistrate judge can accept a 
defendant’s guilty plea in a felony case. 
b. Magistrate Judge’s Acceptance of Guilty Plea 
At present, two courts of appeals have taken the position that magistrate 
judges not only may conduct felony guilty plea proceedings under Rule 11 with 
the consent of the defendant, but also that magistrate judges may accept de-
fendants’ pleas without preparing a report and recommendation to the district 
judge.234 The Ciapponi and Benton decisions are discussed below. 
                                                        
229  Harden, 758 F.3d at 891–92 (citations omitted) (quoting Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 
1376, 1388 (2012)). 
230  Id. at 891. 
231  Id. 
232  Id. at 892. 
233  See, e.g., United States v. Shropshire, 608 F. App’x 143, 143 (4th Cir. 2015); United 
States v. Farmer, 599 F. App’x 525, 526 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Ross, 602 F. App’x 
113, 114 (4th Cir. 2015). 
234  See United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2008); United States v. Ciapponi, 77 
F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 1996). 
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i. United States v. Ciapponi 
The Tenth Circuit was the first court of appeals to endorse the view that a 
magistrate judge may accept a felony defendant’s guilty plea with the defend-
ant’s consent.235  
Defendant George Ciapponi was arrested in the District of New Mexico 
and charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute.236 When 
Ciapponi agreed to a plea agreement, the district judge referred the guilty plea 
proceeding to a magistrate judge.237 After being informed that he had a right to 
appear before a district judge, Ciapponi, with the advice of counsel, executed a 
written consent to have his plea accepted by the magistrate judge.238 The mag-
istrate judge then conducted a Rule 11 plea colloquy and accepted the defend-
ant’s guilty plea.239 At the later sentencing proceeding before the district judge, 
Ciapponi did not object to the magistrate judge’s acceptance of the plea.240 
The defendant’s first objection to the plea proceeding was raised on appeal, 
where he argued that the magistrate judge’s acceptance of the guilty plea vio-
lated the Federal Magistrates Act and Article III of the Constitution.241 The 
Tenth Circuit rejected both arguments. The court observed that the defendant’s 
failure to object or otherwise request review of the plea in the district court un-
dercut his claim of a constitutional violation and that the court would review 
Ciapponi’s claim under the plain error standard.242 Citing with approval the 
Second Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Williams,243 the court held that 
“[c]onsistent with Peretz and Williams, . . . with a defendant’s express consent, 
the broad residuary ‘additional duties’ clause of the Magistrates Act authorizes 
a magistrate judge to conduct a Rule 11 felony plea proceeding, and such does 
not violate the defendant’s constitutional rights.”244 
The court further concluded that the district judge’s failure to conduct de 
novo review of the plea proceeding was insignificant, reasoning that “neither 
the Magistrates Act nor Article III requires that a referral be conditioned on 
subsequent review by the district judge, so long as a defendant’s right to de-
mand an Article III judge is preserved.”245 The court noted that the right to Ar-
ticle III review in a felony guilty plea proceeding is protected by Federal Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 32(d), which allows a defendant to move to withdraw a 
                                                        
235  See Ciapponi, 77 F.3d 1247. 
236  Id. at 1249. 
237  Id. 
238  Id. 
239  Id. 
240  Id. 
241  Id. 
242  Id. at 1249–50. 
243  23 F.3d 629 (2d Cir. 1994). 
244  Ciapponi, 77 F.3d at 1251. 
245  Id. at 1251–52. 
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guilty plea prior to sentencing.246 The Tenth Circuit concluded that the availa-
bility of the Rule 32 withdrawal procedure adequately protected a defendant’s 
rights under Article III.247 The court therefore held that the magistrate judge did 
not err in accepting Ciapponi’s guilty plea and affirmed the district court’s 
judgment.248 
ii. United States v. Benton 
In United States v. Benton, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Eleventh 
Circuit in holding that a magistrate judge had the authority to accept a defend-
ant’s felony guilty plea with the consent of the defendant without the prepara-
tion of a report and recommendation.249 
After defendant Cedric Benton was arrested in the Western District of 
North Carolina on drug charges, he entered into a plea agreement where he 
agreed to allow a “duly-qualified federal Magistrate Judge” to conduct his Rule 
11 plea colloquy.250 At the plea hearing, Benton affirmatively consented to the 
magistrate judge’s authority.251 He also stipulated that there was a factual basis 
for the plea and agreed to defer the district court’s confirmation of this stipula-
tion until the sentencing hearing before a district judge.252 After conducting the 
plea colloquy, the magistrate judge “accepted Benton’s plea, finding it to be 
both knowing and voluntary.”253 After the guilty plea proceeding, however, 
Benton changed counsel and moved to withdraw his guilty plea.254 The district 
judge denied Benton’s motion, concluding that the defendant “had not estab-
lished a fair and just reason for withdrawing his plea.”255 The district judge en-
tered a final judgment of conviction and sentenced Benton to 262 months in 
prison and a ten-year term of supervised release.256 Benton appealed to the 
Fourth Circuit.257 
On appeal, Benton argued that the magistrate judge did not have authority 
to “accept” his guilty plea under Rule 11 and that therefore the district court 
should have allowed him to withdraw his guilty plea for “any reason or no rea-
                                                        
246  Id. at 1252. 
247  Id. 
248  Id. at 1253. 
249  United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 431–33 (4th Cir. 2008). 
250  Id. at 426. 
251  Id. 
252  Id. 
253  Id. 
254  Id. at 427. 
255  Id. 
256  Id. 
257  Id.  
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son” under Rule 11(d)(1).258 The Fourth Circuit reviewed for plain error, noting 
that Benton failed to raise this argument before the district court.259  
Applying the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz, the court held that 
“magistrate judges possess the authority to bind defendants to their plea for the 
purposes of Rule 11, so long as district judges retain the authority to review the 
magistrate judge’s actions de novo.”260 On the question of whether a magistrate 
judge may actually accept the defendant’s plea, rather than issuing a report and 
recommendation, the court opined that the “distinction between plea colloquy 
and plea acceptance does not appear to necessitate different results under 
Peretz. . . . [T]he acceptance of a plea is merely the natural culmination of a 
plea colloquy.”261 
The court summarized its ruling: 
We thus find that the district court did not commit error in refusing to allow 
Benton to withdraw his plea “for any or no reason.” . . . [A]cceptance of a plea is 
a duty that does not exceed the responsibility and importance of the more com-
plex tasks a magistrate [judge] is explicitly authorized to perform, the parties 
have consented to the procedure, and the ultimate control of the district judge 
over the plea process alleviates any constitutional concerns. And just as a practi-
cal matter, allowing magistrate judges to accept pleas for the purposes of Rule 
11 preserves judicial resources—the very goal underlying the creation of the of-
fice of magistrate judge—and prevents litigants from exploiting bifurcated plea 
procedures.262 
The court affirmed the district court’s judgment and Benton’s conviction 
and sentence.263 
As noted earlier, the Fourth Circuit has recently reaffirmed its holding in 
Benton in three decisions issued after the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hard-
en.264  
iii. United States v. Woodard & Brown v. United States 
Eight years after the Ciapponi decision, the Eleventh Circuit also endorsed 
a procedure where a magistrate judge accepts the defendant’s guilty plea after 
conducting the Rule 11 colloquy. In United States v. Woodard, the court held 
that § 636(b)(3) authorized a magistrate judge to conduct a Rule 11 proceeding 
with the defendant’s consent and to accept the defendant’s guilty plea, and that 
the delegation of the authority to conduct such proceedings did not offend the 
principles of Article III.265 Ten years later, however, the Eleventh Circuit, in a 
                                                        
258  Id. 
259  Id. at 429. 
260  Id. 
261  Id. at 431. 
262  Id. at 433. 
263  Id. at 435. 
264  See supra note 233. 
265  United States v. Woodard, 387 F.3d 1329, 1329 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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footnote in Brown v. United States, clarified its holding in Woodard to con-
clude that a felony guilty plea proceeding conducted by a magistrate judge 
should always be considered “akin to a report and recommendation rather than 
a final adjudication of guilt.”266 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit has become 
the only circuit court to change its position concerning felony guilty plea pro-
ceedings from permitting magistrate judges to accept felony guilty pleas to re-
quiring the issuance of a report and recommendation in such proceedings. Both 
cases are discussed below. 
Defendant David Woodard was charged in the Southern District of Florida 
with being a felon in possession of a firearm.267 After Woodard signed a plea 
agreement, a magistrate judge conducted a change of plea hearing under Rule 
11. After Woodard expressly consented, the magistrate judge accepted his 
guilty plea and adjudged Woodard guilty of the firearm offense. When a district 
judge later sentenced him, Woodard did not object to the sentence or to having 
the plea colloquy conducted by a magistrate judge.268 On appeal to the Eleventh 
Circuit, however, Woodward asserted for the first time that, although he had 
specifically consented to having the magistrate judge conduct the guilty plea 
proceeding, the magistrate judge had no statutory or constitutional authority to 
accept Woodward’s guilty plea or to adjudicate him guilty of a felony.269 
The Eleventh Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) authorized a magis-
trate judge, with the defendant’s consent, to conduct a Rule 11 colloquy in a 
felony case and to accept the defendant’s guilty plea. Noting that several courts 
of appeals had addressed the statutory issue, the court noted: 
Like our sister circuits, we find that conducting a Rule 11 proceeding is 
comparable to the [Federal Magistrates Act]’s enumerated duties. Therefore, we 
join our sister circuits in similarly holding that a magistrate judge has the author-
ity under the “additional duties” clause of [the Act] to conduct Rule 11 proceed-
ings when the defendant consents.270 
Turning to Woodard’s constitutional argument, the court applied the Su-
preme Court’s reasoning in Peretz, focusing on whether delegating certain du-
ties to a magistrate judge would offend the structural protections provided by 
Article III.271 It noted that in Peretz, 
the Court held the structural protections of Article III are not jeopardized when 
magistrate judges conduct voir dire because district judges still exert ultimate 
control over magistrate judges. The Court explained that because district judges 
have supervisory power over magistrate judges, “there is no danger that use of 
                                                        
266  See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1071 n.53 (11th Cir. 2014). See infra Part 
II.B.2.b.i(b) for a detailed analysis of the Brown decision. 
267  Woodard, 387 F.3d at 1330. 
268  Id. at 1330–31. 
269  Id. at 1331. 
270  Id. at 1333. 
271  Id. 
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the magistrate involves a congressional attemp[t] to transfer jurisdiction [to non-
Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.”272 
The court further applied the Peretz analysis to conclude that the possibil-
ity of de novo review by a district judge removed any suggestion that Article III 
authority was being undermined when particular matters were referred to mag-
istrate judges.273 In response to Woodard’s argument that the procedure used in 
his case was improper because the magistrate judge accepted his guilty plea ra-
ther than issuing a report and recommendation, the Eleventh Circuit observed 
that the critical factor in all cases examining the referral of guilty plea proceed-
ings to magistrate judges “was that a district court, as a matter of law, retained 
the ability to review the Rule 11 hearing if requested.”274 Woodard did not re-
quest that the district judge review the guilty plea proceeding and therefore “the 
magistrate judge did not appropriate the district judge’s ultimate decision-
making authority.”275 The appellate court thus concluded that “there was no 
plain error, statutory or constitutional, with the magistrate judge accepting the 
Woodard’s guilty plea and adjudicating him guilty.”276 
Although the Eleventh Circuit panel that decided Brown held that a federal 
habeas corpus case arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not a civil matter that 
could be disposed of by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), the court, 
in a lengthy footnote at the end of its opinion, clarified its holding in Woodard 
regarding the procedures to be followed when magistrate judges conduct felony 
guilty plea proceedings.277 
Noting that the panel in Woodard had “described somewhat imprecisely 
the circumstances giving rise to the appeal, which thus slightly muddled our 
constitutional holding,” the court further reasoned, 
We held in Woodard that “there was no error, statutory or constitutional, in 
the magistrate judge accepting Woodard’s guilty plea and adjudicating him 
guilty.” But that holding overlooked the mechanics of the district court’s actions 
in that case. For although the magistrate judge purported to adjudge the defend-
ant guilty, it was the district court that actually entered judgment. That is, the 
magistrate judge did not make the final adjudication of guilt. 
We noted in Woodard that different magistrate judges categorized their ac-
tions as an acceptance of a plea or a report and recommendation, “reveal[ing] a 
lack of uniformity in the language used by magistrate judges.” . . . We believe 
that there is value in uniformity; thus we clarify today that the magistrate judge’s 
                                                        
272  Id. at 1333–34 (alterations in original) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 
937 (1991)). 
273  Id. at 1334. 
274  Id. 
275  Id. 
276  Id. 
277  Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1071 n.53 (11th Cir. 2014). See infra Part 
II.B.2.b.i(b) for a detailed discussion of the holding and reasoning in Brown. 
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action in such proceedings are akin to a report and recommendation rather than a 
final adjudication of guilt.278 
The Eleventh Circuit therefore appeared to back away from its earlier hold-
ing in Woodard that seemed to validate a procedure where a magistrate judge 
could accept a felony defendant’s guilty plea after conducting the Rule 11 col-
loquy with the defendant’s consent. It became the first circuit court to change 
its position on this issue. Interestingly, the court chose to do this in a footnote 
in a case that did not involve guilty plea proceedings under Rule 11. Moreover, 
to date this language has only been cited in one unpublished decision from the 
Eleventh Circuit.279 While the court intended to clarify the practical procedures 
to be followed by magistrate judges when referred Rule 11 proceedings, it re-
mains unclear to what extent magistrate judges are aware of this change in the 
circuit’s law. 
c. Conclusion 
Despite the disagreement among the courts of appeals concerning whether 
a magistrate judge may accept a defendant’s felony guilty plea after conducting 
the Rule 11 colloquy, the referral of felony guilty plea proceedings to magis-
trate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) is a widely accepted practice across 
the country. Of course, district judges do not uniformly favor this practice and 
there remain principled arguments against the delegation of these duties to 
magistrate judges. Nevertheless, the cases analyzed above demonstrate the 
wide application of the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz to justify a signifi-
cant expansion of magistrate judge authority throughout the nation. 
2. Issues in Civil Consent Cases 
Setting aside for a moment the broader issue of whether the civil consent 
authority of magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 626(c) violates Article III of 
the Constitution,280 courts have also dealt with several issues regarding the ex-
tent of magistrate judge authority in civil consent cases, including whether 
magistrate judges have authority to rule on issues involving parties who have 
not consented to the magistrate judge’s authority under § 626(c), whether mag-
istrate judges may dispose of federal and state habeas corpus cases with con-
sent, and whether district courts may use “opt out” procedures, where the liti-
                                                        
278  Brown, 748 F.3d at 1071 n.53 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
279  See United States v. Millender, No. 15-10024, 2015 WL 7750663 (11th Cir. Dec. 2, 
2015). 
280  For a detailed discussion of the appellate cases dealing with the constitutionality of 28 
U.S.C. § 626(c) that were issued after the initial enactment, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, 
supra note 21, at 41–54. For a detailed discussion of two recent Supreme Court cases dealing 
with the constitutionality of bankruptcy judge authority under Article III, see Wellness Int’l 
Network, Ltd. V. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015), Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011), 
and infra Section II.C.1. 
LEE - 16 NEV. L.J. 845 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:57 PM 
Summer 2016] “NOTHING LESS THAN INDISPENSABLE” 885 
gants’ failure to act may be deemed to be implied consent to disposition by a 
magistrate judge. 
a. Magistrate Judge Authority in Class Action Consent Cases to 
Issue Rulings that Are Binding on Non-Consenting Parties 
Several appellate courts have considered whether a magistrate judge pre-
siding in a class action case with the consent of the parties has the authority to 
issue rulings that are binding on litigants that have not individually consented 
to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). 
These cases are reviewed below. 
i. Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc. 
In Williams v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., the Seventh Cir-
cuit held that where the representative plaintiff in a class action case consented 
to a magistrate judge disposing of the case, the presiding magistrate judge had 
the authority to enjoin related litigation begun by an absent class member in 
another district.281 
Plaintiff Stacey Williams filed a class action suit against General Electric 
Capital Automobile Lease, Inc (GECAL) in the Northern District of Illinois 
challenging provisions of automobile leases issued by GECAL under the Con-
sumer Leasing Act.282 The named parties consented to have the case disposed 
of by a magistrate judge.283 The magistrate judge certified a national class and 
eventually approved a settlement.284 Unnamed plaintiffs filed a virtually identi-
cal class action suit against GECAL in the Middle District of Florida.285 
GECAL moved in the Northern District of Illinois to enjoin further prosecution 
of the case in Florida.286 The magistrate judge granted the injunction, and the 
Florida plaintiffs appealed.287 
On appeal, the Florida plaintiffs argued that the magistrate judge did not 
have the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) to enjoin them because they had 
not consented to have the magistrate judge preside over the case.288 The Sev-
enth Circuit, while noting that unanimous and voluntary consent is the constitu-
tional “linchpin” to magistrate judge authority under § 636(c), concluded that 
the Florida plaintiffs, as unnamed members of the class, were not full “parties” 
                                                        
281  Williams v. General Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269–70 (7th Cir. 
1998). 
282  Id. at 268. 
283  Id. 
284  Id. 
285  Id. 
286  Id. 
287  Id. 
288  Id. at 272. 
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to the Illinois lawsuit because they could not direct the litigation.289 Thus, the 
named class representative plaintiff’s consent to the magistrate judge’s authori-
ty was binding on other members of the class.290 The unnamed members did 
not challenge the class representative’s consent to magistrate judge disposition 
even after receiving notice of a proposed settlement that named the magistrate 
judge as the presiding judge.291 Accordingly, the court held that the magistrate 
judge had authority to enter the injunction and that the appellate court had ju-
risdiction to hear the appeal.292 The court also concluded that the injunction 
was properly granted on its merits.293 
ii. Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft 
In Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, the Third Circuit held that a 
magistrate judge who was presiding over a class action in the District of New 
Jersey with the consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not abuse 
her discretion by denying an absent class member’s motion to intervene in the 
case to challenge the magistrate judge’s authority in the case, even though the 
absent class member had not personally consented to disposition of the case by 
the magistrate judge.294 
Numerous plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit against defendants 
Volkswagen and Audi for alleged design defects in vehicles manufactured by 
the defendants that resulted in leaking sunroofs.295 After the magistrate judge 
initially approved a settlement of the class action and calculated attorney’s fees, 
the case was appealed to the Third Circuit and subsequently reversed and re-
manded.296 On remand, the magistrate judge approved a revised settlement 
agreement of the class action and once again calculated the attorney’s fees 
award.297 Absent class member Peter Braverman moved to intervene in the case 
to challenge the magistrate judge’s authority to approve the settlement and to 
award attorney’s fees.298 The magistrate judge denied the motion to intervene, 
and Braverman appealed to the Third Circuit.299 The appellees argued that 
Braverman should have objected to the magistrate judge’s ruling in the district 
court and had therefore waived the argument on appeal.300 Two other class 
                                                        
289  Id. at 268–69. 
290  Id. at 269. 
291  Id. at 274–75. 
292  Id. at 270, 275. 
293  Id. at 275. 
294  Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 558 F. App’x 191, 198–99 (3d Cir. 2014). 
295  Id. at 194. 
296  Id. at 194–95. 
297  Id. at 195. 
298  Id. at 194–95. 
299  Id. at 195. 
300  Id. at 198. 
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members also appealed, challenging the magistrate judge’s calculation of attor-
ney’s fee.301 
The Third Circuit began its analysis by noting that Braverman had not con-
sented to the magistrate judge’s authority and, following circuit precedent, had 
applied to the district judge originally assigned to the case to hear his motion to 
intervene under Rule 24(a).302 Nevertheless, the appellate court concluded that 
the magistrate judge had the authority under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) to rule on 
Braverman’s motion even absent the consent of the parties.303 The court, as-
suming without deciding that Braverman had not waived his right to appeal, 
further held that the magistrate judge did not err in denying the motion because 
Braverman failed to rebut the presumption that his interests were aligned with 
those of the named plaintiffs.304 The court reasoned, “The mere fact that he ob-
jected is insufficient to rebut the presumption of aligned interests.”305 The court 
also noted that Braverman could point to nothing in the record to suggest that 
there was “any conflict of interest between the plaintiffs and class counsel.”306 
The magistrate judge’s denial of the motion to intervene was therefore not an 
abuse of discretion, and Braverman’s lack of consent to the magistrate judge’s 
authority under § 636(c) did not prevent the magistrate judge from ruling on the 
motion.307 
iii. Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC 
In Day v. Persels & Associates, LLC, the Eleventh Circuit held that a mag-
istrate judge in the Middle District of Florida had authority under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c) to approve a settlement agreement and dispose of a class action case 
involving approximately 125,000 consumers, even though absent class mem-
bers did not consent to disposition of the case by the magistrate judge.308 
Plaintiff Miranda Day brought a class action lawsuit in the Middle District 
of Florida on behalf of herself and a class of 10,000 similarly situated Florida 
residents against several debt management companies and associated legal ser-
vice providers.309 The class alleged violations of the Florida Deceptive and Un-
fair Trade Practices Act, the Credit Repair Organization Act, and other com-
mon law provisions.310 Day and the legal service providers “consented to have 
a magistrate judge conduct all proceedings and . . . to enter a final judgment” 
                                                        
301  Id. at 195–96. 
302  Id. at 198 & n.6. 
303  Id. 
304  Id. at 199. 
305  Id. 
306  Id. 
307  Id. 
308  Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 F.3d 1309, 1316, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013). 
309  Id. at 1313. 
310  Id. 
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under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).311 After Day filed an amended complaint under Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), Day and the legal service providers “no-
tified the court that they had reached an agreement in principle on the resolu-
tion of the case.”312 The final settlement agreement “defined the class as all 
persons in the United States who had entered into agreements for legal advice 
concerning debt with the legal service defendants on or after April 28, 2008, 
except those consumers who were class members in a class action pending in 
the Eastern District of Washington.”313 The class included over 125,000 absent 
plaintiffs.314 
The settlement agreement limited the legal service defendants’ ability to 
collect fees from class members, placed other duties on these defendants, re-
quired the defendants to pay the costs of administering the settlement, provided 
for a $5,000 incentive payment to Day, and required the defendants to pay at-
torney’s fees up to $300,000.315 However, the agreement provided no monetary 
relief to the absent plaintiffs and released any claims by absent plaintiffs 
against the legal service defendants.316 Although five class members objected 
to the settlement, the magistrate judge, after a fairness hearing, approved the 
settlement agreement, “certified the class, awarded class counsel $300,000, and 
awarded Day $5,000.”317 The magistrate judge also made findings that six of 
the defendants were financially unable to satisfy the judgment.318 The magis-
trate judge’s judgment was subsequently appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.319 
The appellate court concluded that the consent of the representative party 
in the class action was binding on the absent class members and that the magis-
trate judge’s disposition of the class action case with the consent of representa-
tive parties did not violate Article III of the Constitution.320 The court rejected 
an argument that § 636(c) is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court’s rea-
soning in Stern v. Marshall, the 2011 case holding that a bankruptcy judge 
could not rule on a state court counterclaim arising in a “core” proceeding, 
which will be analyzed later in this paper.321 However, the panel further held 
that the magistrate judge had abused his discretion by concluding that six of the 
seven defendants were unable to satisfy the judgment.322 The court therefore 
                                                        
311  Id. 
312  Id. 
313  Id. at 1313–14. 
314  Id. at 1314. 
315  Id. at 1314. 
316  Id. 
317  Id. at 1314, 1316. 
318  Id. at 1312, 1326–27. 
319  Id. at 1316. 
320  Id. at 1324. 
321  See id. at 1323–24. For a detailed analysis of the Stern case, see infra at Section II.C.1.a. 
322  Day, 729 F.3d at 1326–27. 
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vacated the final judgment and remanded the case to the magistrate judge for 
further proceedings.323 
One panel member sitting by designation, Senior Judge Philip Pro from the 
District of Nevada, issued a lengthy opinion concurring in part and dissenting 
in part.324 He would have held that consent by the absent plaintiffs was required 
under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c): 
Day did not have the authority to consent to a magistrate judge on behalf of the 
unnamed class members before class certification. Following conditional class 
certification, Day consented to the magistrate judge on her own behalf through 
her litigation conduct by voluntarily appearing before the magistrate judge at the 
fairness hearing. Of the 125,011 class members, Day was the only non-objecting 
class member to appear personally or through counsel. However, Day’s post-
certification implied consent to the magistrate judge did not bind the unnamed 
class members because, upon certification, unnamed class members become lat-
er-added “parties” whose consent is required under § 636(c)(1).325 
Judge Pro also stated that he “would hold that the unnamed class members 
became ‘parties’ upon certification whose express or implied consent was re-
quired under § 636(c)(1),” and that “the magistrate judge lacked authority to 
approve the class action settlement because Day’s post-certification implied 
consent to the magistrate judge operated only on her own behalf, and the un-
named class members did not satisfy § 636(c)(1)’s consent requirement.”326 
At least one academic commentator focused on Judge Pro’s dissenting 
opinion in Day to argue that magistrate judges should not be involved in class 
action cases with the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).327 
iv. Stackhouse v. McKnight 
By contrast with decisions in the Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits, the 
Second Circuit, in Stackhouse v. McKnight, held that a magistrate judge did not 
have authority to rule on a motion to intervene in a class action case where the 
parties seeking to intervene had not consented to disposition of the case by a 
magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).328  
The plaintiffs brought a class action lawsuit in the Eastern District of New 
York asserting unfair lending practices in violation of federal and state stat-
utes.329 After the parties reached a proposed agreement to settle the law suit, 
they consented to have the case disposed of by a magistrate judge under 28 
                                                        
323  Id. at 1328. 
324  See id. at 1328 (Pro, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). 
325  Id. at 1338 (citation omitted). 
326  Id. at 1339. 
327  See Elizabeth French, Respecting the Linchpin: Why Absentee Consent Should Limit 
Magistrate Judge Jurisdiction, 3 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 32, 35 (2015). 
328  Stackhouse v. McKnight, 168 F. App’x 464, 466 (2d Cir. 2006). 
329  Id. at 465. 
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U.S.C. § 636(c).330 The presiding magistrate judge subsequently issued an order 
preliminarily approving of the settlement agreement and gave class members 
over two months to submit objections to the settlement.331 In response, several 
class members moved to intervene in the case and also moved to vacate the 
consensual reference of the case to the magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c).332 The magistrate judge denied the motions and the case was appealed 
to the Second Circuit.333 
The Second Circuit concluded that it could not review the magistrate 
judge’s decision because it was not a final judgment.334 Citing circuit prece-
dent, the court reaffirmed, “A magistrate judge’s decision can constitute a final 
judgment only on the consent of all parties to the dispute.”335 When only the 
original parties in a case have consented to disposition by a magistrate judge, “a 
district judge must rule on a motion to intervene brought by a third party.”336 
Examining the record, the court could not conclude that the objectors had given 
their consent to the disposition of their motion to intervene by a magistrate.337 
Although the court acknowledged that the objectors did not specifically object 
to the fact that the magistrate judge had made findings, it concluded—based on 
Roell—that “this by itself does not evidence consent.”338 The court thus con-
cluded that the magistrate judge’s order on the motion to intervene was the 
equivalent of a report and recommendation subject to de novo review by the 
district judge, not a final judgment that could be reviewed by the appellate 
court.339 The Second Circuit therefore vacated and remanded the magistrate 
judge’s judgment to the district court for further proceedings.340 
b. Authority in Habeas Corpus Cases Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254–
2255 
While the constitutionality of civil consent authority under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c) was affirmed by all courts of appeals that considered the issue in the 
years following the amendment of the Federal Magistrates Act in 1979,341 some 
                                                        
330  Id. 
331  Id. 
332  Id. 
333  Id. 
334  Id. at 467. 
335  Id. at 466. 
336  Id. 
337  Id. 
338  Id. (“At best . . . the evidence is inconclusive with respect to the parties’ intent. This is 
not enough to demonstrate consent.”). 
339  Id. at 467. 
340  Id.  
341  See Bell & Beckwith v. United States, 766 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1985); Gairola v. Va. 
Dep’t. of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma 
Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding an appeal that challenged the 
constitutionality of § 636(c) “abusive of the judicial process” and grounds for an award of 
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judges continue to express concerns about the constitutionality of magistrate 
judge consent authority with regard to federal habeas corpus petitions arising 
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254 and 2255. Decisions in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits 
demonstrate particular unease with magistrate judges disposing of motions to 
vacate sentences imposed by a district judge under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 with the 
consent of the parties. These cases are discussed below. 
i. Federal Habeas Corpus Cases Under § 2255 
(a) United States v. Johnston 
In United States v. Johnston, the Fifth Circuit held that the consensual dis-
position of a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a magis-
trate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) violated the constitutional doctrine of sep-
aration of powers set forth in Article III of the Constitution.342 
Defendant Edward Johnston was convicted in federal court on felony drug 
charges in the Southern District of Texas.343 After his conviction was affirmed 
on direct appeal, Johnston filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 challenging 
the validity of his trial and sentence.344 Both Johnston and the government con-
sented to have a magistrate judge dispose of the matter.345 “Johnston timely 
filed a notice of appeal” after “[t]he magistrate judge issued a memorandum 
and order denying Johnston’s § 2255 motion.”346 “The magistrate judge con-
strued the notice of appeal as a motion for a [Certificate of Appealability] and 
denied it . . . .”347 Johnston then filed another motion for a Certificate of Ap-
pealability with the Fifth Circuit.348 
The Fifth Circuit sua sponte raised the issue of whether the magistrate 
judge had proper jurisdiction to dispose of the § 2255 motion.349 The court first 
                                                                                                                                
attorney’s fees against the party raising the issue); Fields v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit 
Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 
F.2d 1037, 1038 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 
739 F.2d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Wainwright, 726 F.2d 702, 704–05 (11th 
Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 
F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, 
Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 
F.2d 922, 923 (3d Cir. 1983); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 41–53 
(analyzing Pacemaker, Wharton-Thomas, Collins, and Geras). See infra Section II.C.1 for a 
detailed analysis of recent Supreme Court cases concerning the constitutionality of bank-
ruptcy judge authority in certain “core” proceedings. 
342  United States v Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 2001). 
343  Id. 
344  Id. 
345  Id. 
346  Id. 
347  Id. 
348  Id. 
349  See id. at 363–64. Although federal habeas corpus petitions arising under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 are described as motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a criminal sentence, they are 
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explored the issue of whether motions under § 2255 should be considered civil 
or criminal matters, and held that, “for purposes of § 636(c), a § 2255 proceed-
ing is a civil matter over which Congress intended magistrate judges to exercise 
jurisdiction upon consent of the parties.”350 The court then confronted the con-
stitutional issue of whether the delegation of § 2255 matters to magistrate judg-
es with consent violated Article III. Applying the Supreme Court’s holding set 
forth in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, that Article III pro-
tects both litigants’ rights and structural guarantees that ensure respect for sepa-
ration-of-powers principles,351 the court recognized that the parties had waived 
their personal rights to Article III protection through their consent.352 The Fifth 
Circuit therefore concluded that the only issue before it was “whether the dele-
gation of the § 2255 motion pursuant to § 636(c) offended the structural guar-
antees of Article III.”353 
The court began by noting that “a § 2255 motion does not easily comport 
with the average civil case or even another quasi-civil proceeding such as a 
§ 2254 petition and, consequently, presents three major problems” under Arti-
cle III.354 First, unlike other civil matters, “a § 2255 motion directly questions 
the validity of a prior federal court ruling.”355 The court found this troubling: 
“If the parties to a § 2255 motion consent to proceed before a magistrate judge, 
that magistrate judge could attack the validity of an Article III judge’s rulings. 
Such an act clearly raises Article III concerns because judges without lifetime 
tenure and undiminishable compensation would have controlling authority.”356 
The second problem the court articulated was the fact that the consensual 
disposition of a § 2255 motion by a magistrate judge may embroil the magis-
trate judge in an integral part of a federal felony trial, namely sentencing, which 
is not ministerial in nature, and “may need the shield of independence afforded 
Article III jurists.”357 Finally, the court, noting that only the court of appeals 
can review a magistrate judge’s ruling in a case heard with consent, concluded 
that the district court lacked sufficient supervision and control over the magis-
trate judges’ rulings in § 2255 matters heard on consent.358 
                                                                                                                                
generally considered to be civil rather than criminal proceedings. See id. at 364 (citing Hilton 
v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770 (1987)). While magistrate judges have the authority to dispose of 
any civil matter with consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), there is no similar statutory consent 
provision concerning criminal proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Act besides magistrate 
judge authority to dispose of Class A misdemeanor cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(5) and 18 
U.S.C. § 3401(b). See generally LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10. 
350  Johnston, 258 F.3d at 366. 
351  See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). See 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 32–37, for an analysis of Schor. 
352  Johnston, 258 F.3d at 367. 
353  Id. 
354  Id. at 368. 
355  Id. 
356  Id. at 369. 
357  Id. at 370. 
358  Id. at 371 & n.6. 
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In view of these problems, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the consensual 
delegation of § 2255 proceedings “exact[s] a deadly blow” to an independent 
judiciary and was thus unconstitutional.359 The court reasoned that the delega-
tion to magistrate judges would violate the separation of powers as it would 
give Congress “the capability to direct the affairs of Article III courts” through 
its legislative powers over “the term, the salary, the qualifications, the duties, 
and the establishment of magistrate judges.”360 
The court therefore vacated the magistrate judge’s judgment and remanded 
the case for further proceedings.361 Judge Higginbotham wrote a concurring 
opinion, stating that the court did not need to reach the constitutional issue, but 
also calling into question the very practice of referring any civil cases to magis-
trate judges under § 636(c) in an era where the number of trials conducted by 
district judges has declined.362 
(b) Brown v. United States 
Thirteen years after the Johnston decision, the Eleventh Circuit, in Brown 
v. United States, held that a federal habeas corpus petition arising under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 is not a “civil matter” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and therefore 
could not be disposed of by a magistrate judge with the parties’ consent.363 The 
court invoked the canon of constitutional avoidance in reaching this holding.364 
In dicta, however, the court went further to express “serious concerns as to the 
facial constitutionality of § 636(c),” particularly whether the civil consent au-
thority of magistrate judges and the petty offense jurisdiction of magistrate 
judges under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 violate Article III of the Constitution as exercis-
es of “the judicial Power of the United States” by non-Article III judicial offic-
ers.365 
In 2005, petitioner James Brown pled guilty in the Southern District of 
Florida to “using a computer . . . to knowingly persuade, induce, entice and co-
erce an individual who had not attained the age of eighteen years, to engage in 
sexual activity under circumstances [that] would constitute a criminal offense 
. . . in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).”366 As a career offender, he was sen-
tenced to a term of 235 months imprisonment.367 In March 2011, Brown moved 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to have the district court vacate his conviction and sen-
tence.368 In April 2011, both Brown and the government consented to have a 
                                                        
359  Id. at 372. 
360  Id. 
361  Id. 
362  See id. at 372–73 (Higginbotham, J., concurring). 
363  Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1047 (11th Cir. 2014). 
364  Id. at 1059. 
365  See id. at 1068. 
366  Id. at 1047. 
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magistrate judge dispose of the matter under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).369 In July 
2011, the magistrate judge denied Brown’s § 2255 motion for failure to state a 
basis for granting relief and later denied Brown’s motion for reconsideration.370 
After appealing both rulings to the court of appeals, Brown moved to have the 
magistrate judge vacate his order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
60(b)(4), arguing that, under the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Johnston,371 “the consensual delegation of § 2255 motions to magistrate judges 
violates Article III of the Constitution.”372 Although the magistrate judge de-
nied Brown’s motion to vacate, the magistrate judge issued a Certificate of Ap-
pealability on this question.373 
The court of appeals began its analysis of Brown’s appeal with an exhaus-
tive review of the history of the Federal Magistrates Act and the earlier United 
States commissioner system, stating in summary, 
[M]agistrate judges (and their predecessors, the commissioners) are not—and 
have never purported to be—Article III judges. Instead, magistrate judges “draw 
their authority entirely from an exercise of Congressional power under Article I 
of the Constitution.” Although Congress considered magistrate judges to be “ad-
junct[s] of the United States District Court, appointed by the court and subject to 
the court’s direction and control,” the fact is that when magistrate judges exer-
cise their authority to try petty offenses and to enter final judgment in civil cas-
es, they are exercising the essential attributes of “judicial Power.” They do not 
function as mere adjuncts. They are puisne judges acting as courts. But Article 
III is clear . . . . As previously recounted, magistrate judges do not hold life-
tenure, nor is their compensation undiminishable. Therefore, these puisne judges 
cannot exercise “the judicial Power of the United States.” Thus, a magistrate 
judge who exercises final judgment on a § 2255 motion implicates a potentially 
serious constitutional problem.374 
The court further suggested that earlier decisions directly or indirectly up-
holding the constitutionality of § 636(c) under Article III, including the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Roell,375 and its own recent opinion, Day,376 had been 
called into question by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Stern.377 The Eleventh 
Circuit therefore invoked the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to resolve the 
issue, concluding that “although § 636(c) could plausibly be read to authorize a 
                                                        
369  Id. 
370  Id. 
371  258 F.3d 361 (5th Cir. 2001). See supra Section II.B.2.b.i(a) for an analysis of Johnston. 
372  Brown, 748 F.3d at 1048–49. 
373  Id. at 1049. 
374  Id. at 1057–58 (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (cita-
tions omitted) (first quoting Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998); then 
quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96-287, at 8 (1979); and then quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
375  Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003). See supra Section II.A.1 for a detailed analysis 
of Roell. 
376  See Day v. Persels & Assocs., LLC, 729 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2013); supra Section 
II.B.2.a.iii. 
377  See Brown, 748 F.3d at 1072. For an analysis of Stern, see infra Section II.C.1.a. 
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magistrate judge to enter final judgment in a § 2255 proceeding, to avoid Arti-
cle III concerns we hold that it does not because such a reading is equally plau-
sible.”378 Accordingly, the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does not authorize 
magistrate judges to enter final judgments on § 2255 motions because such mo-
tions are not “civil matters” under § 636(c).379 
Because the Eleventh Circuit panel deliberately avoided making a decision 
on the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and based its holding on statutory 
grounds, the opinion’s lengthy discussion of the panel’s “serious concerns” 
about whether aspects of magistrate judge authority violate Article III is dicta. 
Nevertheless, the court expressed doubts about the constitutionality of § 636(c) 
and even suggested that a magistrate judge’s authority in a petty offense case 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 may violate Article III.380 The dicta in Brown is a strik-
ing reminder that some judges retain doubts about the constitutionality of ex-
panded magistrate judge authority under the Federal Magistrates Act. 
ii. State Habeas Corpus Petitions Under § 2254 
Prior to the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Johnston, at least two appellate courts 
had held that magistrate judges could dispose of state habeas corpus petitions 
arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with the parties consent.381 After Johnston, 
however, there were attempts to apply the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning to argue 
that magistrate judges also were not permitted to dispose of habeas corpus mat-
ters under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. To date, however, courts have rejected these ar-
guments. 
For example, in White v. Thaler, the Fifth Circuit held that a magistrate 
judge had authority to dispose of a state habeas corpus petition with the consent 
of the parties and that this authority did not violate the separation of powers 
under Article III.382  
After petitioner Wendell White was convicted of murder and aggravated 
assault charges in a Texas state court, he filed a petition for habeas corpus un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Southern District of Texas, claiming that his attor-
ney at trial rendered ineffective assistance.383 After White and attorneys for the 
State of Texas consented to disposition of the case by a magistrate judge, the 
magistrate judge denied White’s petition, concluding that the trial court’s deci-
sion was not objectively unreasonable under federal law.384 The magistrate 
                                                        
378  Brown, 748 F.3d at 1072. 
379  Id. 
380  See id. at 1057–58. For further discussion of constitutional arguments concerning the au-
thority of magistrate judges to dispose of petty offense cases without the defendant’s con-
sent, see infra Section II.C.2. 
381  See Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 326 (6th Cir. 1998); Orsini v. Wallace, 913 F.2d 
474, 483 (8th Cir. 1990). 
382  White v. Thaler, 610 F.3d 890, 898 (5th Cir. 2010). 
383  Id. at 892, 894–95. 
384  Id. at 895. 
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judge also granted White’s request for a Certificate of Appealability to the Fifth 
Circuit only on the issue “whether counsel was ineffective.”385 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit sua sponte addressed the issue of “whether the 
consensual delegation of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 proceeding to a magistrate judge 
violates Article III of the Constitution,” noting that it had previously held in 
Johnston that the consensual delegation of a proceeding under § 2255 to a mag-
istrate judge for disposition violated Article III.386 The court acknowledged, 
however, that it had distinguished between § 2254 and § 2255 matters in John-
ston in that a § 2255 motion “questions the validity of a prior federal court rul-
ing,” while a § 2254 proceeding attacks a state court’s judgment.387 After not-
ing that three other circuits had concluded that the consensual delegation of 
petitions under § 2254 to magistrate judges under § 636(c) did not violate the 
Constitution, the court concluded that, as a § 2254 proceeding does not raise 
separation of powers concerns, the consensual delegation of these matters to 
magistrate judges did not violate Article III.388 
Turning to the merits of the case, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the mag-
istrate judge’s findings, concluding that White was prejudiced by the deficient 
performance of his trial attorney.389 It therefore reversed “the district court’s 
judgment denying habeas relief” and remanded the case to the district court 
“with instructions to grant the writ and require a retrial of White.”390 
In a footnote in her opinion dissenting on the merits of the panel’s decision, 
then-Chief Judge Edith Jones agreed with the majority’s view that Article III 
was not violated when the magistrate judge decided the merits of this case on 
consent, but was nevertheless disturbed by that result: 
While I concur in the conclusion that Article III of the Constitution was not 
violated when the parties consented to proceed in this federal habeas action be-
fore a United States Magistrate Judge, this result is somewhat troubling. When 
federal courts exercise our habeas corpus jurisdiction to overturn the decisions 
of a state’s highest court, we directly interfere with state sovereignty. Article III 
judges should assume ultimate responsibility for deciding these consequential 
cases, although they may choose to accept a report and recommendation from a 
magistrate judge.391 
Judge Jones’ view that the use of magistrate judges to dispose of state ha-
beas corpus matters under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with consent is a “troubling” de-
velopment reflects the unease some judges continue to have with the expansion 
of magistrate judge authority. 
                                                        
385  Id.  
386  Id.  
387  Id. at 896. 
388  Id. at 896, 898. 
389  Id. at 912. 
390  Id. 
391  Id. at 916 n.2 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
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Eight years before White, the Seventh Circuit, in Farmer v. Litscher, also 
held that the consensual delegation of a state prisoner’s habeas corpus petition 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for disposition by a magistrate judge did not violate 
Article III.392  
Appellants James Farmer and Emmett White were state prisoners who filed 
petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the Eastern Dis-
trict of Wisconsin.393 The parties consented under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and a 
magistrate judge denied both “petitions and refused to issue certificates of ap-
pealability.”394 After the prisoners appealed to the Seventh Circuit, the court 
asked the parties to brief the issue of whether “a magistrate judge acting with 
the parties’ consent ha[d] the authority under § 636(c) to issue a final judgment 
in a § 2254 proceeding.”395 
The Seventh Circuit noted that answering the question required the court to 
consider two issues: (1) whether Congress intended to give magistrate judges 
authority to dispose of § 2254 matters on consent; and, if so, (2) whether the 
delegation of such authority to magistrate judges violated Article III.396 The 
court held that because state habeas corpus matters are considered civil cases in 
federal court, magistrate judges can dispose of them under § 636(c).397 The 
court rejected the appellants’ argument that § 636(b)(2)(B) limited the reach of 
§ 636(c), concluding that the two sections are “independent provisions that ad-
dress different circumstances.”398 The Seventh Circuit also concluded that Arti-
cle III does not prohibit magistrate judges from entering final judgments in 
§ 2254 proceedings with the consent of the parties.399 
c. “Opt Out” Consent Procedures 
As noted elsewhere in this paper, district courts have used a variety of ap-
proaches and procedures to encourage parties to consent to the disposition of 
civil cases by magistrate judges.400 One of these procedures is the assignment 
of a share of civil cases to magistrate judges, rather than district judges, as the 
presiding judge in the case. In the mid-1990s, however, several district courts 
implemented “opt out” consent procedures, where, after a case was assigned to 
a magistrate judge, parties who did not act within a specific time period would 
be deemed to have consented to disposition of the case by the magistrate 
                                                        
392  Farmer v. Litscher, 303 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2002). 
393  Id. at 842. 
394  Id. 
395  Id. 
396  Id. 
397  Id. at 843. 
398  Id. 
399  Id. 
400  See supra Section II.B.2.a. 
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judge.401 “Opt out” consent procedures thus allowed for implied consent by the 
parties by interpreting a litigant’s failure to object as acquiescence to disposi-
tion of the case by a magistrate judge.402 
Beginning in 1994, appellate courts held in several cases that these proce-
dures were impermissible under the Federal Magistrates Act. These cases are 
discussed below. The Supreme Court’s decision in Roell, however, holding that 
in some situations a litigant’s actions might constitute consent under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c), which was analyzed earlier in this paper, once again raises the ques-
tion of whether “opt out” procedures might once again be feasible in the district 
courts.403 
The Ninth Circuit ruled in three separate opinions that “opt out” procedures 
implemented in the Northern District of California, the District of Idaho, and 
the District of Montana violated 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).404 In Nasca, the Ninth Cir-
cuit examined an “opt out” consent procedure adopted by local rule in the 
Northern District of California, whereby parties were deemed to have consent-
ed to disposition of their civil case by the magistrate judge if they did not object 
to the assignment within a set period of time.405 The court held that the magis-
trate judge did not have proper jurisdiction over the case.  
The case began “as a divorce proceeding in California Superior Court.”406 
After the husband joined his pension plan, Peoplesoft, as a defendant in the ac-
tion, Peoplesoft removed the case to the Northern District of California under 
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).407 The 
magistrate judge assigned to the case remanded it to state court and ordered 
Peoplesoft to pay the plaintiffs’ attorney’s fees.408 Peoplesoft appealed these 
orders to the Ninth Circuit, which raised sua sponte the issue of the magistrate 
judge’s authority to hear the case.409 
Restating the reasoning it expressed previously in its Aldrich decision,410 
the Ninth Circuit concluded that the magistrate judge had no jurisdiction to hear 
the case without the parties’ consent under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3) and Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b).411 The court stated that consent “must be explic-
it, clear, unambiguous, and cannot be inferred from the conduct of the parties, 
                                                        
401  See, e.g., Nasca v. Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d 578, 579 (9th Cir. 1998), overruled by Wilhelm 
v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113 (9th Cir. 2012). 
402  See id. 
403  See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003); supra Section II.A.1. 
404  See Nasca, 160 F.3d 578 (Northern District of California); Aldrich v. Bowen, 130 F.3d 
1364 (9th Cir. 1997) (District of Idaho); Laird v. Chisholm, 85 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 1996) (un-
published table decision) (District of Montana). 
405  Nasca, 160 F.3d at 579. 
406  Id. at 578. 
407  Id. 
408  Id. 
409  Id. at 578–79. 
410  See Aldrich, 130 F.3d at1365. 
411  Nasca, 160 F.3d at 580. 
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general orders by the district court to the contrary notwithstanding.”412 It held 
that the general order adopted by the Northern District of California, which 
provides for “consent by failure to object” to the assignment of the case to a 
magistrate judge, did not constitute adequate consent under the Federal Magis-
trates Act.413 Noting that magistrate judge authority is “strictly circumscribed 
by statute,” the court concluded that “courts, whether by general order or oth-
erwise, are not at liberty to disregard or modify the statutory prerequisites to a 
magistrate[ judge]’s jurisdiction.”414 Because the magistrate judge had no juris-
diction to enter the remand order or the award of attorney’s fees, the appellate 
court concluded that it had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.415 It therefore 
dismissed the appeal.416 
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit issued two opinions involving “opt out” 
procedures in the Southern District of Alabama.417 In Rembert v. Apfel, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that a magistrate judge presiding in a social security ap-
peal assigned under an “opt out” consent procedure lacked authority to render a 
judgment and therefore the appellate court did not have jurisdiction to consider 
the appeal.418 
Plaintiff Rachel Rembert filed a complaint in the Southern District of Ala-
bama contesting the denial of supplemental security income benefits.419 Under 
a standing order of the court, the case was automatically assigned to a magis-
trate judge and the parties were notified that unless they requested reassignment 
to a district judge by returning a form within thirty days, the parties would be 
deemed to have consented.420 Neither party filed the form and the magistrate 
judge then entered a final judgment against Rembert.421 On appeal, the Elev-
enth Circuit “sua sponte asked the parties to address whether they had consent-
ed the magistrate[ judge]’s authority, [rendering the] . . . judgment final and 
appealable.”422 
Citing with approval the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Nasca, the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded that consent to disposition by a magistrate judge through the 
district’s “opt out” standing order was not proper.423 Noting that Rembert, “did 
nothing, either before or after judgment, to indicate her express consent to final 
disposition of her case before a magistrate judge,” the court treated the magis-
                                                        
412  Id. 
413  Id. at 579. 
414  Id. at 579–80. 
415  Id. at 580. 
416  Id. 
417  See McNab v. J & J Marine, Inc., 240 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 2001); Rembert v. Apfel, 213 
F.3d 1331 (11th Cir. 2000). 
418  Rembert, 213 F.3d at 1335. 
419  Id. at 1333. 
420  Id. 
421  Id. 
422  Id. 
423  Id. at 1334–35 (citing Nasca v. Peoplesoft, 160 F.3d 578, 578 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
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trate judge’s order as “in essence . . . a nonfinal, nonappealable report and rec-
ommendation not yet adopted by the district court.”424 It therefore dismissed 
the case for lack of jurisdiction.425 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Roell v. Withrow, holding that consent to 
disposition of a civil case by a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) may 
be inferred in certain situations from a party’s conduct during litigation, has 
cast doubt on the reasoning applied in Nasca, Rembert, and other decisions.426 
To the extent that these pre-Roell decisions held that consent under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c) must be express and on the record, later decisions by both the Ninth 
and Eleventh Circuits have acknowledged that Roell clearly abrogated the rea-
soning in those opinions.427 While no court has formally enacted local rules or 
standing orders reviving “opt out” consent procedures after Roell, some magis-
trate judges have expressed the view in unpublished opinions that parties, by 
failing to make timely responses to consent deadlines, have opted to consent to 
disposition of their case by the magistrate judge.428 
C. Remaining Issues Under Article III of the Constitution 
1. Does Civil Consent Authority Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) Violate Article 
III of the Constitution? 
As noted earlier, the question of whether the civil consent authority of 
magistrate judges under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) violates Article III of the Constitu-
tion had not been seriously considered by courts since the numerous circuit 
court opinions issued in the early 1980s.429 Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
has never directly addressed the question of whether § 636(c) violates Article 
III. In the early 1980s, however, every court of appeals that had considered the 
question concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not violate Article III.430 Apart 
                                                        
424  Id. 
425  Id. 
426  See Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 582 (2003); supra Section II.A. 
427  See Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1120 (9th Cir. 2012) (“To the extent that we 
have previously held that we can never infer consent, we have been overruled by the Su-
preme Court in Roell.” (citing Nasca, 160 F.3d 578)); Chambless v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., 
481 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that the reasoning in Rembert has been abro-
gated by Roell). 
428  See, e.g., Little Bend River Co. v. Molpus Timberlands Mgmt., L.L.C., No. CA 05-0450-
C, 2005 WL 2897400, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 3, 2005) (citing Roell and holding that the 
parties had implicitly consented to the magistrate judge’s jurisdiction under § 636(c) by fail-
ing to object to the referral of the case to a magistrate judge within the time period provided 
under the district’s consent procedure); Alicea v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 10-1967 (CVR), 
2011 WL 4753451, at *1 (D.P.R. Oct. 5, 2011). 
429  See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 31–36. 
430  See Bell & Beckwith v. United States, 766 F.2d 910, 912 (6th Cir. 1985); Gairola v. Va. 
Dept. of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985); D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma 
Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding an appeal that challenged the 
constitutionality of § 636(c) “abusive of the judicial process” and grounds for an award of 
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from the Fifth Circuit’s 2001 decision in Johnston, holding that the consensual 
disposition of a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by a 
magistrate judge under § 636(c) violated Article III,431 it appeared that this is-
sue was well settled. 
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Stern v. Marshall, however, revived ques-
tions about the extent that non-Article III judges could handle state common 
law claims without violating the Constitution. Although Stern involved the au-
thority of bankruptcy judges (and the Court’s majority opinion never mentioned 
magistrate judges), much of the majority opinion’s language appeared to impli-
cate the authority of magistrate judges, particularly in consent cases.432 
a. Stern v. Marshall 
In Stern, the Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, held that a final 
judgment issued by a bankruptcy judge on a state law tort counterclaim, de-
fined as a “core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C),433 violated the 
separation of powers principles set forth in Article III of the Constitution.434 
                                                                                                                                
attorney’s fees against the party raising the issue); Fields v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit 
Auth., 743 F.2d 890, 893 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 
F.2d 1037, 1038 (7th Cir. 1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 
739 F.2d 1313, 1315 (8th Cir. 1984); Campbell v. Wainwright, 726 F.2d 702, 704–05 (11th 
Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 34 (1st Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 
F.2d 108, 109–10 (2d Cir. 1984); Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, 
Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 540 (9th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 
F.2d 922, 923 (3d Cir. 1983); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 41–53 
(analyzing Pacemaker, Wharton-Thomas, Collins, and Geras). 
431  See supra Section II.B.2.b.i(a) for a detailed analysis of the Johnston case. 
432  See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
433  As the Supreme Court described in its Wellness decision,  
[D]istrict courts have original jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and related proceedings. 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1334(a), (b). But “[e]ach district court may provide that any or all” bankruptcy cases 
and related proceedings “shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district.” § 157(a). 
Bankruptcy judges are “judicial officers of the United States district court,” appointed to 14–
year terms by the courts of appeals, and subject to removal for cause. §§ 152(a)(1), (e). “The dis-
trict court may withdraw” a reference to the bankruptcy court “on its own motion or on timely 
motion of any party, for cause shown.” § 157(d).  
When a district court refers a case to a bankruptcy judge, that judge’s statutory authority de-
pends on whether Congress has classified the matter as a “[c]ore proceedin[g]” or a “[n]on-core 
proceedin[g],” §§ 157(b)(2), (4) . . . . Congress identified as “[c]ore” a nonexclusive list of 16 
types of proceedings, § 157(b)(2), in which it thought bankruptcy courts could constitutionally 
enter judgment. Congress gave bankruptcy courts the power to “hear and determine” core pro-
ceedings and to “enter appropriate orders and judgments,” subject to appellate review by the dis-
trict court. § 157(b)(1); see § 158. But it gave bankruptcy courts more limited authority in non-
core proceedings: They may “hear and determine” such proceedings, and “enter appropriate or-
ders and judgments,” only “with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding.” § 157(c)(2). 
Absent consent, bankruptcy courts in non-core proceedings may only “submit proposed findings 
of fact and conclusions of law,” which the district courts review de novo. § 157(c)(1). 
Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939–40 (2015) (alterations in origi-
nal) (footnotes omitted). 
434  Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600–01; see Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1959–60. 
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The majority opinion was written by Chief Justice Roberts, in which Justices 
Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined. Justice Scalia issued a concurring 
opinion. Justice Breyer issued a dissenting opinion in which Justices Ginsburg, 
Kagan, and Sotomayor joined. 
i. Case Summary 
The case arose from the well-publicized and convoluted legal dispute be-
tween the estates of Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie, more famously known as 
Anna Nicole Smith) and E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce) over the fortune of J. 
Howard Marshall (J. Howard), Vickie’s deceased husband and Pierce’s fa-
ther.435  
Before J. Howard passed away, Vickie filed suit in Texas state probate court, as-
serting that Pierce . . . fraudulently induced J. Howard to sign a living trust that 
did not include her, even though J. Howard meant to give her half his property. 
. . . . 
After J. Howard’s death, Vickie filed a bankruptcy petition in the Central 
District of California. Pierce filed a complaint in that bankruptcy proceeding, 
contending that Vickie had defamed him by inducing her lawyers to tell mem-
bers of the press that he had engaged in fraud to gain control of his father’s as-
sets. The complaint sought a declaration that Pierce’s defamation claim was not 
dischargeable in the bankruptcy proceedings. Pierce subsequently filed a proof 
of claim for the defamation action, . . . [seeking] to recover damages . . . from 
Vickie’s bankruptcy estate. Vickie responded to Pierce’s initial complaint by as-
serting truth as a defense to the alleged defamation and by filing a counterclaim 
for tortious interference with the gift she expected from J. Howard.436 
In 1999, “the Bankruptcy Court issued an order granting Vickie summary 
judgment on Pierce’s claim for defamation.”437 In making its decision, the 
bankruptcy court determined an issue of Texas state law that had not yet been 
addressed by the Texas Supreme Court.438  
[A]fter a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Court issued a judgment on Vickie’s coun-
terclaim in her favor, . . . [and] awarded Vickie over $400 million in compensa-
tory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.  
In post-trial proceedings, Pierce argued that the Bankruptcy Court lacked 
jurisdiction over Vickie’s counterclaim. In particular, Pierce renewed a claim he 
had made earlier in the litigation, asserting that the Bankruptcy Court’s authority 
over the counterclaim was limited because Vickie’s counterclaim was not a 
“core proceeding” under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).439  
                                                        
435  See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
436  Id. (citations omitted). 
437  Id. 
438  See id. 
439  Id. (citations omitted). 
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The bankruptcy court disagreed, “conclud[ing] that Vickie’s counterclaim was 
‘a core proceeding’ under § 157(b)(2)(C),” and that it “had the ‘power to enter 
judgment’ on the counterclaim under § 157(b)(1).”440 
On appeal, the district court “concluded that a ‘counterclaim should not be 
characterized as core’ when it ‘is only somewhat related to the claim against 
which it is asserted, and when the unique characteristics and context of the 
counterclaim place it outside of the normal type of set-off or other counter-
claims that customarily arise.’ ”441 Further,  
the court determined that it was required to treat the Bankruptcy Court’s judg-
ment as “proposed[,] rather than final,” and engage in an “independent review” 
of the record. Although the Texas state court had by that time conducted a jury 
trial on the merits of the parties’ dispute and entered a judgment in Pierce’s fa-
vor, the District Court declined to give that judgment preclusive effect and went 
on to decide the matter itself. Like the Bankruptcy Court, the District Court 
found that Pierce had tortiously interfered with Vickie’s expectancy of a gift 
from J. Howard, . . . and awarded Vickie compensatory and punitive damages, 
each in the amount of $44,292,767.33.442 
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the court reversed the district court on dif-
ferent grounds, and the Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit 
on that issue.443 On remand from the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit 
held that § 157 mandated “a two-step approach” under which a bankruptcy 
judge may issue a final judgment in a proceeding only if the matter both “meets 
Congress’ definition of a core proceeding and arises under or arises in title 11 
. . . .” The court also reasoned that allowing a bankruptcy judge to enter final 
judgments on all counterclaims raised in bankruptcy proceedings “would cer-
tainly run afoul” of [the Supreme] Court’s decision in Northern Pipeline.444 
The court therefore  
concluded that “a counterclaim under § 157(b)(2)(C) is properly a ‘core’ pro-
ceeding ‘arising in a case under’ the [Bankruptcy] Code only if the counterclaim 
is so closely related to [a creditor’s] proof of claim that the resolution of the 
counterclaim is necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim 
itself.”445  
Under this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit ruled that Vickie’s counterclaim 
did not constitute a “core” proceeding under § 157(b)(2)(C).446 The judgment 
of the Texas probate court was thus “the earliest final judgment entered ‘on 
                                                        
440  Id. at 2602. 
441  Id. (quoting Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609, 632 (C.D. Cal. 2001)). 
442  Id. (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting In re Marshall, 264 B.R. at 
633). 
443  Id. (citing Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 314–15 (2006); Marshall v. Marshall (In 
re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
444  Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1057 
(9th Cir. 2010)). 
445  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1058). 
446  Id. 
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matters relevant to this proceeding.’ ”447 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit “conclud-
ed that the District Court should have ‘afford[ed] preclusive effect’ to the Texas 
‘court’s determination of relevant legal and factual issues.’ ”448 The Supreme 
Court subsequently granted certiorari.449 
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts initially ruled that “Vickie’s 
counterclaim against Pierce for tortious interference [was] in fact a ‘core pro-
ceeding’ under the plain text of § 157(b)(2)(C).”450 Nevertheless, he further 
concluded that while “§ 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter fi-
nal judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does 
not.”451 
The majority noted that the Court had long recognized a “public rights” ex-
ception to the requirements of Article III,452 first articulated in Murray’s Lessee 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.453 The Supreme Court has explained that  
“the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understanding that when 
Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that could be con-
clusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches, the danger of 
encroaching on the judicial powers” [set forth in Article III] is less than when 
private rights, which are normally within the purview of the judiciary, are rele-
gated as an initial matter to administrative adjudication.454 
Emphasizing the Court’s earlier analysis of bankruptcy courts under the 
“public rights” exception in Northern Pipeline,455 Chief Justice Roberts stated: 
It is clear that the Bankruptcy Court in this case exercised the “judicial Power of 
the United States” in purporting to resolve and enter final judgment on a state 
common law claim, just as the court did in Northern Pipeline. No “public right” 
exception excuses the failure to comply with Article III in doing so, any more 
than in Northern Pipeline.456 
                                                        
447  Id. (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1064–65). 
448  Id. at 2602–03 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 1064–65). 
449  Id. at 2603. 
450  Id. at 2604. 
451  Id. at 2608. 
452  Id. at 2611. 
453  59 U.S. 272 (1856). 
454  See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853–54 (1986) (quot-
ing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985)). 
455  N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69–70 (1982). In North-
ern Pipeline, a majority of the Supreme Court declared that the portion of the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978 that conferred Article III powers on bankruptcy judges without the pro-
tections of life tenure and irreducible salaries violated Article III of the Constitution. In par-
ticular, Justice Brennan defined the “public rights” doctrine as, “matters of public right [that] 
must at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others’ . . . our precedents clearly 
establish that only [such] controversies . . . may be removed from Art. III courts and delegat-
ed to legislative courts or administrative agencies for their determination.” Id. For a detailed 
analysis of Northern Pipeline, see CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 23–30. 
456  Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611. 
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The majority therefore concluded that “Vickie’s counterclaim cannot be 
deemed a matter of ‘public right’ that can be decided outside the Judicial 
Branch,” and her counterclaim did not “fall within any of the varied formula-
tions of the public rights exception in this Court’s cases.”457 After discussing 
several Supreme Court decisions that analyzed the authority of particular non-
Article III tribunals under Article III, including Thomas v. Union Carbide Agri-
cultural Products Co.,458 Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,459 
and Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,460 Chief Justice Roberts summarized the 
Court’s Article III analysis: 
What is plain here is that this case involves the most prototypical exercise 
of judicial power: the entry of a final, binding judgment by a court with broad 
substantive jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the action nei-
ther derives from nor depends upon any agency regulatory regime. If such an 
exercise of judicial power may nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judici-
ary simply by deeming it part of some amorphous “public right,” then Article III 
would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of 
powers we have long recognized into mere wishful thinking.461 
The Court further rejected Vickie’s argument that the bankruptcy court’s 
final judgment was constitutional because bankruptcy courts under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1984 were deemed “adjuncts” of the district courts, stating that “a 
bankruptcy court can no more be deemed a mere ‘adjunct’ of the district court 
than a district court can be deemed such an ‘adjunct’ of the court of appeals.”462 
It also noted that its Article III analysis was not affected by the fact that judges 
of an Article III court, rather than the President, appoint that bankruptcy judges, 
concluding: “If . . . the bankruptcy court itself exercises ‘the essential attributes 
of judicial power [that] are reserved to Article III courts,’ it does not matter 
who appointed the bankruptcy judge or authorized the judge to render final 
judgments in such proceedings. The constitutional bar remains.”463 
The majority concluded by summarizing its holding: 
Article III of the Constitution provides that the judicial power of the United 
States may be vested only in courts whose judges enjoy the protections set forth 
in that Article. We conclude today that Congress, in one isolated respect, ex-
ceeded that limitation in the Bankruptcy Act of 1984. The Bankruptcy Court be-
low lacked the constitutional authority to enter a final judgment on a state law 
counterclaim that is not resolved in the process of ruling on a creditor’s proof of 
claim.464 
The Court therefore affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment. 
                                                        
457  Id. at 2611, 2614. 
458  Thomas, 473 U.S. 568. 
459  Schor, 478 U.S. 833. 
460  492 U.S. 33 (1989). 
461  Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615. 
462  Id. at 2619. 
463  Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 851). 
464  Id. at 2620. 
LEE - 16 NEV. L.J. 845 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:57 PM 
906 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:845  
ii. Potential Application of Stern Reasoning to Magistrate Judge 
Authority 
The majority’s ruling in Stern applied only to the “core” jurisdiction of 
bankruptcy judges under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C). Chief Justice Roberts de-
scribed the Court’s holding as applying only in “one isolated respect” where 
Congress exceeded the limitations of Article III in the Bankruptcy Act of 
1984.465 As noted above, magistrate judges were not mentioned in the majority 
or concurring opinions, and were only mentioned in passing in Justice Breyer’s 
dissenting opinion.466 Nevertheless, the Stern majority’s analysis of Article III 
arguably could be applied to limit the authority of magistrate judges. 
Prior to Stern, analysis of whether expansions of magistrate judge authority 
implicated separation of powers concerns under Article III had focused on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Peretz.467 As noted earlier, the Court stated in 
Peretz that a defendant’s right to have an Article III judge adjudicate certain 
proceedings in a felony case (in that case, voir dire) could be waived by the de-
fendant, and that referring such duties to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(3) did not violate Article III of the Constitution.468 In particular, the 
Court adapted its Article III analysis of the Federal Magistrates Act in Peretz 
from the analysis set forth in Schor.469 
In Peretz and Schor, the Supreme Court set forth a two-part analysis to de-
termine whether a statutory scheme granting judicial duties to non-Article III 
judicial officers violates Article III of the Constitution.470 Under that analysis, 
Article III protects two sets of values: (1) an individual’s right to have a claim 
adjudicated by an Article III judge, and (2) the court’s “structural” interest in 
maintaining an independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripar-
tite government.471 A statute must adequately protect both values to survive 
scrutiny under the Court’s Article III analysis. 
The continuing validity of the constitutional analysis set forth in Peretz and 
Schor was called into question by the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern. Al-
though the majority in Stern cited the Court’s earlier opinion in Schor as one of 
several Supreme Court opinions analyzing Article III challenges to non-Article 
III tribunals since the Northern Pipeline decision, it did not emphasize the sev-
                                                        
465  Id. 
466  See id. at 2627 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A]lthough Congress technically exercised its 
Article I power when it created bankruptcy courts, functionally, bankruptcy judges can be 
compared to magistrate judges, law clerks, and the Judiciary’s administrative officials, 
whose lack of Article III tenure and compensation protections do not endanger the independ-
ence of the Judicial Branch.”). 
467  See supra Part I.C. 
468  See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 935–39 (1991). 
469  See CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 18. 
470  See id. 
471  Id. 
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eral factors of the balancing test set forth in Schor in its analysis.472 Instead, the 
majority explicitly reasserted the narrower interpretation of the “public rights” 
exception to Article III originally stated in Northern Pipeline to conclude that a 
bankruptcy judge, as a non-Article III judicial officer, did not have authority to 
rule on the state law counterclaim at issue in the case.473 It was therefore un-
clear whether the balancing test in Schor, previously applied by the Court in 
Peretz and Gonzalez, would still be used by the Court in the future. 
A significant question left unresolved by the Court in Stern was whether 
litigant consent to the authority of a bankruptcy judge in a state common law 
claim might satisfy Article III concerns. Chief Justice Roberts noted that 
Pierce’s failure to consent to having the bankruptcy court resolve Vickie’s tor-
tious interference counterclaim was one factor in concluding that the bankrupt-
cy court’s exercise of jurisdiction violated Article III: “Pierce did not truly con-
sent to resolution of Vickie’s claim in the bankruptcy court proceedings. He 
had nowhere else to go if he wished to recover from Vickie’s estate.”474 In the 
footnote following this assertion, the majority emphasized this point: 
Contrary to the claims of the dissent, Pierce did not have another forum in 
which to pursue his claim to recover from Vickie’s prebankruptcy assets, rather 
than take his chances with whatever funds might remain after the Title 11 pro-
ceedings. . . . That is why, as we recognized in Granfinanciera, the notion of 
“consent” does not apply in bankruptcy proceedings as it might in other con-
texts.475 
At the time that the Court issued the Stern opinion, it remained to be seen 
whether litigant consent to disposition of a case by a magistrate judge under 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c) would constitute one of the “other contexts” suggested in foot-
note eight that would satisfy Article III concerns under this reasoning. Indeed, 
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals sua sponte raised the issue of whether 
§ 636(c) violated Article III under the reasoning in Stern three months after the 
decision was issued.476 That court, however, ultimately held that it was bound 
by its earlier precedent holding that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) did not violate the Con-
stitution.477 Uncertainties about the constitutionality of § 636(c), however, ap-
                                                        
472  See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613–15 (2011). 
473  Id. at 2614–15. 
474  Id. at 2614. 
475  Id. at 2615 n.8 (citation omitted). 
476  See Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 401 (5th 
Cir. 2012). On September 9, 2011, a panel of the Fifth Circuit sua sponte ordered the parties 
in an appeal of a civil case disposed of by a magistrate judge in the Southern District of Tex-
as to submit letter briefs addressing whether the reasoning in Stern applied to magistrate 
judges. In particular, the Fifth Circuit requested briefing on whether, under Stern, a magis-
trate judge can enter a final judgment in a case tried to a magistrate judge by consent under 
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) where jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship and state law pro-
vides the rule of decision. Id. 
477  See id. at 405 (citing Puryear v. Ede’s Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153, 1154 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
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pear to have been removed by the Court’s 2015 decision in Wellness Interna-
tional Network v. Sharif.478  
b. Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 
On May 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Wellness. In a 
six to three decision written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court held that Article 
III of the Constitution “is not violated when the parties knowingly and volun-
tarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy court.”479  
i. Case Summary  
The case arose from a litigant’s repeated attempts to enforce a judgment.480 
Petitioner Wellness, a manufacturer of health and nutrition products, entered 
into an agreement with respondent Richard Sharif whereby Sharif would dis-
tribute Wellness products.481 After the business arrangement soured, Sharif 
sued Wellness in the Northern District of Texas.482 “Sharif repeatedly ignored 
Wellness’ discovery requests and other litigation obligations,” so the court en-
tered default judgment and imposed sanctions against Sharif in the amount of 
$650,000.483 In February 2009, Sharif filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in 
the Northern District of Illinois, listing Wellness as a creditor.484 When Well-
ness discovered that Sharif had listed more than $5 million in assets on a 2002 
loan application, Sharif responded that the assets were controlled by the Soad 
Wattar Living Trust (Trust), an entity he administered on behalf of his mother 
and for his sister’s benefit.485 When Sharif failed to respond to requests for in-
formation about the Trust, “Wellness filed a five-count adversary complaint 
against Sharif in the Bankruptcy Court.”486 The first four counts of the com-
plaint objected to the discharge of Sharif’s debts on the grounds that he “had 
concealed property by claiming that it was owned by the Trust.”487 In the fifth 
count of the complaint, Wellness sought a declaratory judgment that the Trust 
was in fact Sharif’s alter ego and its assets should be included as part of the 
bankruptcy estate.488 In his answer to the complaint, Sharif conceded that the 
adversary proceeding was a “core” proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) over 
                                                        
478  See Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1948 (2015). 
479  Id. at 1939. 
480  Id. at 1940. 
481  Id. 
482  Id. 
483  Id. 
484  Id. 
485  Id. 
486  Id. 
487  Id. 
488  Id. 
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which the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction, and requested a judgment in his 
favor on all counts.489 
After Sharif again refused to respond to discovery requests, Wellness 
moved to compel discovery and for sanctions.490 Although the bankruptcy court 
warned Sharif that a default judgment might be entered against him if he did 
not comply with the court’s orders compelling discovery, Sharif failed to pro-
duce any documents regarding the Trust.491 The bankruptcy court subsequently 
ruled that Sharif had violated the court’s discovery order, “denied Sharif’s re-
quest to discharge his debts and entered a default judgment against him in the 
adversary proceeding.”492 In particular, the bankruptcy court ruled that the 
Trust’s assets at issue in the fifth count of the complaint were in fact the prop-
erty of Sharif’s bankruptcy estate.493 
Sharif appealed the bankruptcy court’s rulings to the district court.494 Six 
weeks before Sharif filed his opening brief, the Supreme Court issued its deci-
sion in Stern.495 “Sharif did not cite Stern in his opening brief. Rather, after the 
close of briefing, Sharif moved for leave to file a supplemental brief,” arguing 
that under Stern and In re Ortiz, the bankruptcy court’s ruling should be treated 
as a report and recommendation by the district court.496 After the district court 
denied Sharif’s motion as untimely and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judg-
ment, Sharif appealed to the Seventh Circuit.497 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. While acknowl-
edging that Sharif’s Stern claim was untimely, the court held that it must none-
theless consider the claim because it “concerned ‘the allocation of authority be-
tween bankruptcy courts and district courts’ under Article III” of the 
Constitution.498 It therefore concluded “that ‘a litigant may not waive’ a Stern 
objection.”499 As to the merits of the claim, the court agreed that the bankruptcy 
court had properly resolved the first four counts in Wellness’s adversary com-
plaint.500 It further held, however, that the fifth count of the complaint (reas-
signing the Trust’s assets to Sharif’s bankruptcy estate) alleged a Stern claim, 
and that the bankruptcy court lacked constitutional authority to enter a final 
                                                        
489  Id. at 1941. 
490  Id. 
491  Id. 
492  Id. 
493  Id.  
494  Id. 
495  Id. 
496  Id.; see Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906, 915 (7th Cir. 2011). 
497  Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1941. 
498  Id. 
499  Id.  
500  Id. 
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judgment on that claim.501 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiora-
ri.502 
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor stated: “This case presents the 
question whether Article III allows bankruptcy judges to adjudicate [Stern 
claims] with the parties’ consent. We hold that Article III is not violated when 
the parties knowingly and voluntarily consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy 
judge.”503 
The majority relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s reasoning in three cas-
es: Schor,504 Gomez,505 and Peretz.506 Applying the reasoning in these three 
cases to the case at bar, the majority stated: 
The question here, then, is whether allowing bankruptcy courts to decide 
Stern claims by consent would “impermissibly threate[n] the institutional integ-
rity of the Judicial Branch.” And that question must be decided not by “formalis-
tic and unbending rules,” but “with an eye to the practical effect that the” prac-
tice “will have on the constitutionally assigned role of the federal judiciary.” The 
Court must weigh 
the extent to which the essential attributes of judicial power are reserved 
to Article III courts, and, conversely, the extent to which the non-Article 
III forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and powers normally vested 
only in Article III courts, the origins and importance of the right to be 
adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the re-
quirements of Article III.507 
In its application of the Schor and Peretz factors, the majority determined 
that parties in bankruptcy cases could waive their rights to adjudication of Stern 
claims by an Article III judge without undermining the basic constitutional au-
thority of Article III courts.508 In particular, it noted that “[b]ankruptcy judges, 
like magistrate judges, ‘are appointed and subject to removal by Article III 
judges,’ . . . ‘serve as judicial officers of the United States district court,’ and 
collectively ‘constitute a unit of the district court’ for that district.”509 Moreo-
                                                        
501  Id. at 1941–42. 
502  Id. at 1942. 
503  Id. at 1939. 
504  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 834–35 (1986) (holding 
that a litigant’s consent to have claims disposed of by a non-Article III tribunal did not vio-
late Article III and was at most a “de minimis” infringement of the prerogatives of the feder-
al court); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 21, at 32–37. 
505  Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989) (holding that a magistrate judge could not 
conduct voir dire in a felony case as an additional duty under § 636(b)(3) if the defendant 
objected to the magistrate judge’s involvement); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra 
note 21, at 12–14. 
506  Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991); see also CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS, supra 
note 21, at 16–21. 
507  Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1944 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting Schor, 478 
U.S. at 851). 
508  Id. at 1944–45. 
509  Id. at 1945 (citations omitted). 
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ver, just as in Peretz the majority noted that the district court made the overrid-
ing decision to refer a matter to a magistrate judge in the first place, the Court 
here observed that bankruptcy courts only hear bankruptcy matters because dis-
trict courts refer those cases to them, and that the district court retains the au-
thority to withdraw such references sua sponte or at the request of a party under 
28 U.S.C. § 157(d).510 The majority therefore concluded, “ ‘[S]eparation of 
powers concerns are diminished’ when, as here, ‘the decision to invoke [a non-
Article III] forum is left entirely to the parties and the power of the federal ju-
diciary to take jurisdiction’ remains intact.”511 
The majority further observed there was “no indication that Congress gave 
bankruptcy courts the ability to decide Stern claims in an effort to aggrandize 
itself or humble the Judiciary.”512 Quoting language from the Peretz decision, 
the Court stated that “[b]ecause the entire process takes place under the district 
court’s total control and jurisdiction, there is no danger that use of the [bank-
ruptcy court] involves a congressional attemp[t] to transfer jurisdiction to [non-
Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating constitutional courts.”513 
The majority rejected an expansive reading of the Court’s Stern decision, 
stating that Stern “turned on the fact that the litigant ‘did not truly consent to’ 
resolution of the claim against it in a non-Article III forum.”514 The Court fur-
ther reasoned that “[b]ecause Stern was premised on nonconsent to adjudication 
by the Bankruptcy Court, the ‘constitutional bar’ it announced simply does not 
govern the question whether litigants may validly consent to adjudication by a 
bankruptcy court.”515 
The majority summarized the governing Supreme Court decisions on liti-
gant consent to disposition of claims by a non-Article III tribunal: 
In sum, the cases in which this Court has found a violation of a litigant’s 
right to an Article III decisionmaker have involved an objecting defendant 
forced to litigate involuntarily before a non-Article III court. The Court has nev-
er done what Sharif and the principal dissent would have us do—hold that a liti-
gant who has the right to an Article III court may not waive that right through 
his consent.516 
Noting Chief Justice Roberts’ strong dissent to the majority’s interpretation 
of Stern, the majority stated: 
The principal dissent warns darkly of the consequences of today’s decision. 
To hear the principal dissent tell it, the world will end not in fire, or ice, but in a 
bankruptcy court. . . .  
                                                        
510  Id. 
511  Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 855). 
512  Id. 
513  Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 937 (1991)). 
514  Id. at 1946 (quoting Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614). 
515  Id. (citation omitted). 
516  Id. at 1947. 
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Adjudication based on litigant consent has been a consistent feature of the 
federal court system since its inception. Reaffirming that unremarkable fact, we 
are confident, poses no great threat to anyone’s birthrights, constitutional or oth-
erwise.517 
The majority finally held that consent to adjudication by a bankruptcy 
court need not be express. Relying squarely on the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Roell,518 the majority concluded that the implied consent of the parties was 
sufficient to provide the bankruptcy court with authority to dispose of a claim 
under 28 U.S.C. § 157, provided the consent was also “knowing and volun-
tary.”519 After determining that the lower court record was insufficient to de-
cide whether the implied consent of Sharif was knowing and voluntary, the ma-
jority reversed the Seventh Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for 
further proceedings.520 
ii. Significance of Wellness for Magistrate Judge Authority 
Although the majority opinion in Wellness is of particular importance to 
bankruptcy judges, the decision has constitutional significance for magistrate 
judges. Notably, the majority opinion relies on the Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Peretz,521 thereby reaffirming the Court’s view that the consent of parties 
may overcome constitutional concerns when certain matters are referred to 
magistrate judges. Moreover, the majority relied heavily on the Court’s reason-
ing in Roell when it held that knowing and voluntary consent to disposition of 
Stern claims by a bankruptcy judge may be implied by the litigants’ conduct.522 
The majority opinion in Wellness thus clearly reaffirms that the reasoning set 
forth in Peretz and Roell remain the governing standards for evaluating whether 
the referral of particular matters to magistrate judges comply with the strictures 
of Article III.523 
It is also significant that the Court acknowledged, in a footnote, that 
“[c]onsistent with our precedents, the Courts of Appeals have unanimously up-
held the constitutionality of § 636(c).”524 This footnote is the closest the Su-
preme Court has come to an express declaration that 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does 
not violate Article III. 
                                                        
517  Id. 
518  Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580, 590 (2003). 
519  Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948. 
520  Id. at 1949. 
521  Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991). 
522  Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948. 
523  See, e.g., United States v. Underwood, 597 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying the rea-
soning in Roell and holding a defendant’s consent to have a magistrate judge conduct a 
guilty plea proceeding in a felony case under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) 
could be inferred from the defendant’s conduct when he failed to object to the magistrate 
judge conducting the plea colloquy). 
524  Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948 n.12. (emphasis added). 
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After Wellness, the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority to dis-
pose of civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) under Article III appears 
to be secure. With every circuit court to have considered the issue agreeing that 
§ 636(c) is constitutional,525 it appears unlikely that there will be a circuit split 
on the issue that would bring it before the Supreme Court for ultimate resolu-
tion.526 
Nevertheless, there remain at least two areas of magistrate judge authority 
under the Federal Magistrates Act where the constitutionality of particular pro-
visions of the Act remains untested. 
2. Does the Authority of Magistrate Judges to Dispose of Petty Offense 
Cases Without the Consent of the Defendant Under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 
Violate Article III? 
In 2000, Congress removed completely the requirement that defendants 
must consent to have magistrate judges dispose of petty offense cases.527 
Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) expanded magis-
trate judges’ authority “to try all petty offense cases without [a] defendant’s 
consent.”528 However, the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 left un-
changed “the requirement that a defendant must consent to magistrate judge ju-
risdiction to dispose of a Class A misdemeanor.”529 
The constitutional argument for eliminating consent in petty offense cases 
was based primarily on the common law reasoning used to explain why de-
fendants charged with petty offenses do not have a right to a jury trial. It has 
long been argued that because petty offense cases were not recognized as 
“crimes” at the common law, fewer constitutional protections, such as trial by 
jury and adjudication by an Article III judge, were required.530 Felix Frankfur-
ter and Thomas Corcoran, in a widely cited law review article published in 
1926, set forth an exhaustive history of the common law of England and the 
American colonies prior to the American Revolution and concluded that no 
right to trial by jury was recognized for minor offenses and therefore federal 
petty offense cases also did not require jury trials.531 At least two older Su-
                                                        
525  See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
526  But see Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014) (raising in dicta 
“serious concerns” about the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)); supra Section 
II.B.2.b.i(b). 
527  See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 203(b), 114 Stat. 
2410, 2414. 
528  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95; see 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3401(b) (2012). 
529  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95. 
530  See H.R. REP. NO. 96-287, at 18 (1979); Federal Magistrate Act: Hearing on S. 3475 
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
89th Congress 246–56 (1966) (memorandum of subcomm. staff). 
531  See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitu-
tional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. REV. 917 (1926). 
LEE - 16 NEV. L.J. 845 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:57 PM 
914 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:845  
preme Court cases followed this reasoning to conclude that petty offense cases 
in federal courts did not constitute “crimes” under the common law and thus 
did not mandate jury trials.532 
In addition, another law review article published in 1959, co-written by an 
assistant Attorney General of the United States, suggested that non-Article III 
magistrate judges should be authorized by Congress specifically to handle mi-
nor federal offenses in order to relieve Article III judges from the burden of 
disposing such cases.533 The authors argued that the disposition of petty offens-
es by non-Article III judicial officers would not violate Article III: 
An analysis of this constitutional objection to the proposed commissioners’ 
petty offense jurisdiction indicates that it does not constitute a barrier to the ac-
complishment of this salutary step. The historical background of the “good be-
havior” provision supports such a distinct treatment of petty offenses, and re-
view upon appeal to the district courts would provide for a sufficient exercise of 
judicial power to satisfy article III.534 
Interestingly, the authors did not discuss any need for the defendant to con-
sent to the jurisdiction of United States commissioners or proposed federal 
magistrate judges as part of their constitutional analysis. They concluded that 
the petty offense defendant’s right to appeal the judgment of the non-Article III 
judge to an Article III judge would be sufficient to ensure the constitutionality 
of their proposal: 
Summary proceedings by subordinate magistrates have traditionally character-
ized petty offense trials. The provision of life tenure for the judiciary in the regu-
lar courts of record, embodied in article III of the Constitution, carries an implic-
it exception for inferior tribunals which try minor crimes. And any possible 
demand of article III is satisfied by provision of review. It may be concluded 
that there are no substantial obstacles to the creation of federal petty offense tri-
bunals or the endowment of United States commissioners with such authority.535 
The subsequent legislative history of the 1996 amendment also concluded 
that there was no constitutional impediment to eliminating defendants’ consent 
in petty offense cases.536 
Until recently, the constitutionality of a magistrate judge’s authority to dis-
pose of petty offense cases without the defendant’s consent had not been seri-
ously questioned or analyzed in the federal courts.537 A 2015 Fifth Circuit case, 
                                                        
532  See District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72–73 (1930); Capital Traction Co. v. 
Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1899). 
533  See George Cochran Doub & Lionel Kestenbaum, Federal Magistrates for the Trial of 
Petty Offenses: Need and Constitutionality, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 443, 443 (1959). 
534  Id. at 456. 
535  Id. at 467. 
536  See S. REP. NO. 104-366, at 28 (1996). 
537  The most thorough analysis of the constitutionality of the amended provisions of 28 
U.S.C.§ 636(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) was by a magistrate judge in United States v. 
McCrickard, 957 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1996), which provided an in-depth review of the 
constitutional arguments concerning magistrate judges’ petty offense authority and conclud-
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however, raises questions about whether this authority might violate Article III 
under certain circumstances. 
In United States v. Hollingsworth, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held that a petty offense defendant did not have a constitutional right to a 
trial before an Article III judge where the offense took place on a federal en-
clave and the magistrate judge acted as an Article I judge pursuant to Congress’ 
authority to create territorial judges under Clause 17 of Article I of the Consti-
tution.538 In a strongly worded dissent, however, another member of the panel 
argued that magistrate judges, as adjuncts to Article III judges, do not have the 
authority to try, convict, or sentence a petty offense defendant without violating 
Article III of the Constitution, unless the defendant consents to the magistrate 
judge’s jurisdiction.539 
Defendant David Hollingsworth was charged in the Eastern District of 
Louisiana with a petty offense assault that occurred at a naval facility in Belle 
Chasse, Louisiana, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), a federal criminal 
statute that applies only “within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction 
of the United States.”540 While the defendant filed an objection to having the 
case tried by a magistrate judge, the magistrate judge concluded that she had 
authority under the Federal Magistrates Act to preside over the trial without 
Hollingsworth’s consent.541 After a bench trial before the magistrate judge, 
Hollingsworth was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment.542 Af-
ter being convicted before the magistrate judge, the defendant appealed to the 
district court, raising a new argument that he had a right to a jury trial in his 
case.543 The district judge, however, rejected this argument and affirmed the 
magistrate judge’s conviction and sentence.544 Hollingsworth then appealed to 
the Fifth Circuit, arguing “for the first time that he ha[d] a constitutional right 
to trial before an Art. III judge.”545 
Writing for a majority of the panel, Judge Clement rejected Hol-
lingsworth’s argument. The court began with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Palmore v. United States, where the Court held that “Congress was not required 
to provide an Art. III court for the trial of criminal cases arising under its laws 
                                                                                                                                
ed “that 18 U.S.C. § 3401 and 28 U.S.C. § 636(a) are well within constitutional bounds.” 
McCrickard, 957 F. Supp. at 1155. In two more recent cases where defendants challenged 
the magistrate judge’s authority to try their petty offense cases with consent, the courts simp-
ly held that the magistrate judges had proper authority without providing in-depth constitu-
tional analysis. See United States v. Zenón-Encarnación, 387 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Rivera-Negron, 201 F.R.D. 285, 287 (D.P.R. 2001). 
538  United States v. Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d 556, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2015). 
539  Id. at 567 (Higginson, J., dissenting). 
540  Id. at 558 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2012)). 
541  Id. 
542  Id. at 557–58. 
543  Id. at 558. 
544  Id. 
545  Id. at 558–59. 
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applicable only within the District of Columbia.”546 Noting that the defendant 
was tried for violating 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5), which applies only “within the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States,” the court con-
cluded that “under Palmore, Hollingsworth has no constitutional right to trial 
before an Art. III court.”547 The court further rejected the defendant’s argument 
that magistrate judges are not members of a territorial court created by Con-
gress under Clause 17 of Article I, noting that Hollingsworth did not cite any 
section of the Constitution that Congress presumably violated when it author-
ized federal magistrate judges to conduct trials in misdemeanor cases.548 The 
court further observed that under Clause 17, “Congress could have referred all 
trials for crimes committed at Belle Chasse to an Article I judge, including fel-
ony trials. But Congress chose to refer only trials for petty offenses to federal 
magistrate judges.”549 The court finally stated that although it was not certain 
from the constitutional text that the defendant was guaranteed even the right to 
appeal to an Article III court, Congress had in fact provided Hollingsworth the 
right to appeal to two Article III courts under the current statutory scheme.550 
The court therefore held that “Hollingsworth did not have a right to trial 
before an Art. III judge, and that his trial, conviction, and sentence before a 
federal magistrate judge was constitutional.”551 It applied its holding, however, 
“only to defendants tried for petty offenses committed on federal enclaves ob-
tained by Congress pursuant to Clause 17.”552 
Turning to address arguments raised in the dissenting opinion, the majority 
court further observed that historically Congress had “referred trials for misde-
meanors committed on certain federal lands” to United States commissioners 
without the defendant’s consent.553 The court further noted that it had found no 
case where a defendant in a petty offense case before a United States commis-
sioner had ever challenged the constitutionality the commissioner’s authority: 
“The fact that these statutes survived unchallenged for more than half a century 
ought to inform our constitutional analysis.”554 
Further comparing magistrate judges to judges on legislative courts created 
by Congress under Clause 17 of Article I, the majority concluded, 
Magistrate judges have the professional competence and resources found in the 
legislative courts. We discern no meaningful difference between the federal 
magistracy and the legislative courts. Indeed, because the federal magistracy’s 
members are appointed by federal judges instead of the President or the Presi-
                                                        
546  Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 410 (1973). 
547  Hollingsworth, 785 F.3d at 559. 
548  Id. 
549  Id. (citation omitted). 
550  Id. at 559–60. 
551  Id. at 560. 
552  Id. 
553  Id. at 560–61. 
554  Id. at 561. 
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dent’s appointees, we can have greater confidence in federal magistrate judges’ 
ability to fairly exercise federal judicial power and to avoid diminution of the 
separation of powers.555 
Finally, after further holding that Hollingsworth had no right to a jury trial, 
the court affirmed the district court’s judgment. 
In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Higginson argued that magistrate judg-
es are “adjuncts” to the Article III courts and therefore cannot render final deci-
sions on matters without the parties’ consent: 
Finding constitutional birthright in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18’s “other 
powers” phrase―instead of Clause 17’s Seat of Government Clause or its En-
clave Clause enhancement of Article I powers―enhances Article III courts’ dis-
cretion to refer matters to the federal magistracy for preliminary review and a 
recommended decision. Indeed, as Congress has revised and expanded matters 
that may be so referred, the Supreme Court repeatedly has tested each subse-
quent delegation, when there is no consent, according to one constant principle, 
namely, that case-dispositive matters may be handled by magistrate judges pro-
vided that Article III district courts retain full and ultimate authority “to make an 
informed, final determination” of the case.556 
Judge Higginson ended his dissenting opinion stating, 
It is said that a well-built house requires but little repairs. Article III federal 
district judges are not over-burdened in their most essential judicial function, 
trying federal criminal cases. Without consent, persons accused of federal of-
fenses should not lose their liberty except after trial in a constitutional court, un-
less an Article III judge reserves “the ultimate decisionmaking authority.”557 
Both opinions in Hollingsworth raise several questions. While the majority 
opinion affirms the authority of magistrate judges to dispose of petty offense 
cases arising from federal enclaves where the United States has sole territorial 
jurisdiction under Clause 17 of Article I, the court’s decision explicitly does not 
address whether magistrate judges have dispositional authority over petty of-
fenses that arise on federal lands where jurisdiction is shared with a state or an-
other entity. The authors of one treatise on public natural resources law esti-
mated that federal enclaves created pursuant to Clause 17 “comprise less than 5 
percent of federal land holdings.”558 The majority opinion would therefore ap-
pear to invite constitutional challenges to magistrate judge petty offense author-
ity under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 in most federal lands. 
In addition, Judge Higginson’s dissenting opinion embraces the view that 
magistrate judges are “adjuncts” to Article III judges, a view explicitly rejected 
                                                        
555  Id. at 563. 
556  Id. at 567 (Higginson, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Rad-
datz, 447 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1980)). 
557  Id. at 570 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 79 
(1982)). 
558  1 GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES 
LAW § 3:6 (2d ed. 2015). 
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by the Supreme Court as applied to bankruptcy judges in Stern.559 Moreover, 
Judge Higginson’s opinion repeatedly emphasizes that without consent “case-
dispositive matters may be handled by magistrate judges provided that Article 
III district courts retain full and ultimate authority ‘to make an informed, final 
determination’ of the case.”560 It therefore would appear that, should Judge 
Higginson’s argument prevail in the future, the restoration of defendant consent 
in petty offense cases, either by legislation or simply secured by a magistrate 
judge at trial, might arguably resolve the constitutional problem. 
Finally, none of the opinions in Hollingsworth, for all their extensive his-
torical analysis, address the fact that Congress specifically amended 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3401 in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 to remove the defend-
ant’s consent in all petty offense cases.561 Nor do they attempt to analyze the 
legislative history of this provision. 
Along with Judge Higginson’s dissent in Hollingsworth, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit also questioned in dicta the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority 
to dispose of petty offense cases in Brown v. United States, also discussed 
above.562 While the panel in Brown held that a federal habeas corpus matter 
arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was not a civil matter and thus could not be 
disposed of by a magistrate judge with the consent of the parties under 28 
U.S.C. § 636(c), the majority opinion’s lengthy dicta called into question the 
constitutionality under Article III of a magistrate judge disposing of any case in 
federal court, including Class A misdemeanor and petty offense cases.563 In 
particular, the majority stated, 
[M]agistrate judges (and their predecessors, the commissioners) are not—and 
have never purported to be—Article III judges. Instead, magistrate judges “draw 
their authority entirely from an exercise of Congressional power under Article I 
of the Constitution.” Although Congress considered magistrate judges to be “ad-
junct[s] of the United States District Court, appointed by the court and subject to 
the court’s direction and control,” the fact is that when magistrate judges exer-
cise their authority to try petty offenses and to enter final judgment in civil cases, 
they are exercising the essential attributes of “judicial Power.” They do not func-
tion as mere adjuncts. They are puisne judges acting as courts. But Article III is 
clear: 
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior 
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stat-
                                                        
559  See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610–11 (2011). 
560  Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d at 567 (quoting Raddatz, 447 U.S. at 682–83). 
561  Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-518, § 202, 114 Stat. 2410, 
2412–14. 
562  See Brown v. United States, 748 F.3d 1045, 1057–58, 1068 (11th Cir. 2014); see also 
supra Section II.B.2.b.i(b). 
563  Brown, 748 F.3d at 1057–58. 
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ed Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be 
diminished during their Continuance in Office. 
As previously recounted, magistrate judges do not hold life-tenure, nor is their 
compensation undiminishable. Therefore, these puisne judges cannot exercise 
“the judicial Power of the United States.”564 
The views expressed in Judge Higginson’s dissent in Hollingsworth and 
the majority’s dicta in Brown have so far not been followed by other courts, but 
serve as a reminder that the constitutionality of magistrate judge authority to 
dispose of petty offense cases without the consent of the defendant arguably 
remains unsettled. 
3. Does Summary Contempt Authority and Expanded Criminal and Civil 
Contempt Authority of Magistrate Judges Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) 
Violate Article III? 
a. Congressional Expansion of Magistrate Judge Contempt Authority 
The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 greatly expanded magistrate 
judge contempt authority.565 Section 636(e) of Title 28 was amended and com-
pletely changed by this legislation.566 Prior to these amendments, magistrate 
judges had no direct authority to impose contempt sanctions of any kind and 
could only certify a litigant or attorney’s contemptuous behavior to a district 
judge for further proceedings under § 636(e). These changes are summarized 
briefly below. 
The amended § 636(e)(1) gave magistrate judges “the power to exercise 
contempt authority as set forth in the other provisions of the amended § 636(e) 
within the territorial jurisdiction prescribed by their appointments.”567 Section 
636(e)(2) provided magistrate judges with summary criminal contempt authori-
ty to punish any misbehavior occurring in their presence “so as to obstruct the 
administration of justice.”568 “Summary criminal contempt authority [was] 
granted to magistrate judges to maintain order and to protect the court’s dignity 
in response to contumacious behavior by witnesses, parties, counsel, and others 
present at court proceedings.”569 Thus, “[w]hen presiding over cases or pro-
ceedings as the primary judicial officer for the district court, a magistrate judge 
is provided appropriate immediate authority to control activity in the court-
                                                        
564  Id. (second alteration in original) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) 
(first quoting Thomas v. Whitworth, 136 F.3d 756, 758 (11th Cir. 1998); then quoting H.R. 
REP. NO. 96-287, at 8 (1979); and then quoting U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
565  See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000 § 202, 114 Stat. at 2412–14. 
566  See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 95–97. 
567  Memorandum from Thomas C. Hnatowski, Chief, Magistrate Judges Div. of the Admin. 
Office of the U.S. Courts, to All U.S. Magistrate Judges attach. I, at 1 (Nov. 16, 2000) (on 
file with author); see 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(1) (2012). 
568  Id. § 636(e)(2); see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96. 
569  Hnatowski, supra note 567. 
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room. The limited penalties magistrate judges may impose for summary crimi-
nal contempts are set forth in § 636(e)(5),” which is summarized below.570 
Section 636(e)(3) “gave magistrate judges additional criminal contempt au-
thority in their civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and in misdemean-
or cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401.”571 The section gave magistrate judges “au-
thority to punish misbehavior occurring outside their presence that constitutes 
disobedience or resistance to the magistrate judge’s lawful writ, process, order, 
rule, decree, or command in civil consent and misdemeanor cases.”572 This au-
thority permits “a magistrate judge to enforce his or her orders and to vindicate 
the magistrate judge’s (and the court’s) authority over cases tried by the magis-
trate judge.”573 
Section 636(e)(4) “authorizes magistrate judges to exercise civil contempt 
authority in civil consent cases under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), and in misdemeanor 
cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401.”574 In such cases, this section enables the magis-
trate judge to “exercise civil contempt authority identical to the civil contempt 
authority of a district judge.”575 
Under § 636(e)(5), the penalties for criminal contempts that magistrate 
judges may impose are limited:  
Imprisonment for a summary criminal contempt committed in the magistrate 
judge’s presence, or for a criminal contempt occurring in a civil consent or mis-
demeanor case outside the magistrate judge’s presence, may not exceed [thirty] 
days incarceration (the maximum term of imprisonment for a Class C misde-
meanor, set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3581(b)(8)), and a fine may not exceed $5,000 
(the maximum fine that may be imposed upon an individual for a Class C mis-
demeanor under 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(6)).576  
These limits on the contempt penalties that magistrate judges could impose 
were intended to clearly differentiate magistrate judge criminal contempt au-
thority from that exercised by district judges. Moreover, these limits were mod-
eled after the penalty limits in petty offense cases that magistrate judges may 
dispose of without the defendant’s consent so that magistrate judge contempt 
authority would better withstand constitutional scrutiny. For example, 18 
U.S.C. § 401 “sets no limits upon [either] the fine or imprisonment penalties [a 
district judge] may impose when punishing contemptuous behavior.”577 By 
contrast, magistrate judge criminal contempt authority was strictly pre-
scribed.578 
                                                        
570  Id. 
571  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96. 
572  Id. 
573  Id.; accord Hnatowski, supra note 567. 
574  Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2. 
575  Id.; see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 96. 
576  Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2. 
577  Id. attach. II, at 3; see also 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012). 
578  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(5) (2012). 
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Congress recognized that some “contumacious conduct may be so egre-
gious as to require more severe punishment.”579 In such situations, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(e)(6) retained the certification procedure that existed “before enactment 
of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 2000”:  
If, in the opinion of the magistrate judge, a criminal contempt occurring in the 
magistrate judge’s presence, or a criminal contempt in a civil consent or misde-
meanor case, is sufficiently serious that [thirty] days incarceration or a $5,000 
fine would not be an adequate punishment, the magistrate judge has the option 
of certifying the facts to a district judge for further contempt proceedings.  
The section also provides that in any other case or proceeding referred to a 
magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(a) or (b), or any other statute, criminal 
contempts that occur outside the magistrate judge’s presence must [continue to] 
be handled through the certification procedure. Under this provision, the magis-
trate judge [certifies] the facts constituting the contempt to a district judge to 
show cause why that person should not be adjudged in contempt of court by the 
facts so certified.  
Finally, the section requires that certification procedures must also be used 
for civil contempts that occur in any other case or proceedings referred to a mag-
istrate judge under 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(a) or (b), or any other statute.580  
Finally, § 636(e)(7) provides that in civil consent cases under § 636(c), the 
court of appeals hears appeals from a magistrate judge’s contempt order under 
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).581 “The appeal of any other order of contempt issued 
under this section shall be made to the district court.”582 
b. Constitutional Questions 
To date, no federal court has analyzed whether the expanded magistrate 
judge contempt authority set forth in the amended § 636(e) violates Article III 
of the Constitution. Although one academic commentator suggested that the 
summary contempt provision in the 2000 amendments to § 636(e) violates sep-
aration of powers principles under Article III,583 no court has yet raised or dis-
cussed this issue directly.584 A review of cases since 2000 where the contempt 
provisions of § 636(e) have been cited shows that in most cases magistrate 
judges have used the certification procedure under § 636(e)(6) to recommend 
that district judges order contempt.585 At least one magistrate judge, however, 
                                                        
579  Id. § 636(e)(6). 
580  Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2. 
581  28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(7). 
582  Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I., at 3. 
583  See Mark S. Kende, The Constitutionality of New Contempt Powers for Federal Magis-
trate Judges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 567, 569 (2002). 
584  Cf. Kiobel v. Millson, 592 F.3d 78, 91–92 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring) (arguing 
that the 2000 amendment of the Federal Magistrates Act granting magistrate judges with 
limited contempt authority was a justification for considering a motion for sanctions under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 as a non-case-dispositive motion under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)). 
585  See, e.g., Stream Cos., Inc. v. Windward Advert., No. 12-cv-4549, 2013 WL 3761281, at 
*10 (E.D. Pa. July 17, 2013); Universitas Educ., LLC v. Nova Grp., Inc., Nos. 11 Civ. 1590 
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has exercised summary criminal contempt authority and imposed jail time on a 
contemnor under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(2).586 
An examination of cases before 2000 that discuss magistrate judge’s con-
tempt authority is instructive on how courts might approach challenges to the 
expanded magistrate judge contempt authority. In the Seventh Circuit’s deci-
sion on the constitutionality of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Geras v. Lafayette Display 
Fixtures, Inc., the majority opinion discussed contempt authority as a clear line 
demarcating the authority of Article III judges and non-Article III judicial of-
ficers. In particular, the majority stated: 
Unlike the relatively mechanical entry of judgment, the power to punish for con-
tempt of court is the means by which many court judgments, not including the 
collection of money judgments, are enforced. Despite the effort of the dissent to 
trivialize the significance of the contempt power, it remains the primary means 
of enforcing many court judgments, particularly injunctions. The vesting of this 
power exclusively in the hands of Article III judicial officers would seem, for 
present purposes at least, to provide an adequate distinction between such judges 
and non-Article III officers. This clear line also serves to limit the ultimate exer-
cise of judicial power to persons enjoying the constitutional guarantee of inde-
pendence.587 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion upholding the constitutional-
ity of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) in Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. 
Instromedix, Inc., noted that the authority of Article III judges was preserved 
under § 636(c) because “[d]istrict courts retain the power to adjudge a party in 
contempt.”588 
Four years before the amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) were enacted, the 
Ninth Circuit addressed whether a magistrate judge could exercise contempt 
authority in a civil consent case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). In Bingman v. Ward, 
the court ruled that a magistrate judge erred when he adjudicated a criminal 
contempt sanction against a litigant in a civil consent case.589 The panel assert-
ed that the exercise of contempt authority was an exclusive power of Article III 
                                                                                                                                
(LTS)(HBP), 11 Civ. 8726 (LTS)(HBP), 2013 WL 3487350, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2013), 
vacated by 784 F.3d 99 (2015); Reed v. A & A Stanley Constr., Inc., No. 12-869 
(MJD/LIB), 2013 WL 1065371, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 13, 2013); Lynch v. Southampton An-
imal Shelter Found., Inc., No. CV 10-2917(ADS)(ETB), 2013 WL 80178, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 7, 2013); Aetna Grp. USA, Inc. v. AIDCO Int’l, Inc., No. 1:11-mc-023, 2012 WL 
3309049, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2012).  
586  See United States v. Bryant, No. 2:14-CR-08, 2014 WL 2931051, at *3 (W.D.N.C. June 
30, 2014) (holding a defendant in summary contempt under 28 U.S.C. § 636(e)(1) and FED. 
R. CIV. P. 42(b) for appearing intoxicated at a felony initial appearance and sentencing the 
defendant to fourteen days in jail). 
587  Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984). 
588  Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 545 (9th 
Cir. 1984). 
589  Bingman v. Ward, 100 F.3d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1996). 
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judges absent a specific act of Congress giving magistrate judges contempt au-
thority.590 
Plaintiff James Bingman, a state prisoner in Montana, brought suit in the 
District of Montana against prison officials for alleged inadequate dental 
care.591 The parties consented to have the case heard by a magistrate judge un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).592 After receiving evidence, the magistrate judge issued 
a preliminary injunction ordering the prison officials to provide the plaintiff 
with necessary dental care and to submit a proposal to eliminate deficiencies in 
the prison’s dental care system.593 Dissatisfied with prison officials’ response to 
the injunction, Bingman moved to have the officials held in contempt.594 The 
magistrate judge granted this motion, ordering the prison officials to pay 
$1,450 to the Clerk of Court because they had not submitted a plan within the 
time allotted by the court, and $500 to the plaintiff because the officials had not 
given him the expeditious dental care required by the order.595 The magistrate 
judge stated that the sanctions were intended as punishment “for failing to time-
ly and expeditiously comply with the terms . . . of the injunction, and, further, 
to encourage adherence to this or other orders of [the] Court in the future.”596 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the magistrate judge had no authority 
to hold them in contempt.597 After finding that the magistrate judge’s ruling 
was a criminal contempt order that could be reviewed through an interlocutory 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendants’ view, holding that magis-
trate judges have no authority under the Federal Magistrates Act to adjudicate 
criminal contempts.598 Rejecting arguments that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Peretz somehow by analogy allowed magistrate judges to exercise contempt 
authority, the court stated, 
Moreover, criminal contempt proceedings are not the same as simple mis-
demeanor prosecutions or the conduct of voir dire in felony trials. Contempt 
proceedings implicate the authority, the discretion, and the dignity of Article III 
courts. They constitute “the ultimate exercise of judicial power . . . .” Congress 
has carefully avoided conferring that power upon magistrate judges. The mere 
fact that some analogies can be drawn between contempt proceedings and crimi-
nal proceedings does not mean that we should guard use of the contempt power 
any less jealously than Congress did.599 
                                                        
590  Id. at 657. 
591  Id. at 654. 
592  Id. at 655. 
593  Id. 
594  Id. 
595  Id. 
596  Id. (alterations in original). 
597  Id. 
598  Id. at 656. 
599  Id. at 658 (citation omitted) (quoting Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 
1037, 1044 (7th Cir. 1984)). 
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Nevertheless, the court specifically did not rule on whether Congress had 
authority under the Constitution to provide magistrate judges limited contempt 
authority, simply stating, “It has not done so.”600 The court therefore vacated 
the magistrate judge’s contempt order and remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings in which the magistrate judge was required to certify facts constituting 
contempt to a district judge under the procedures set forth in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(e).601 
Although as yet untested in a federal court, there are cogent arguments for 
concluding that expanded magistrate judge contempt authority set forth in the 
2000 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 636(e) does not violate Article III of the Con-
stitution. In particular, applying the “structural” interest analysis to Article III 
issues used by the Supreme Court in Schor, Peretz, and Wellness, it does not 
appear that Congress provided magistrate judges with expanded contempt au-
thority “in an effort to aggrandize itself or humble the Judiciary.”602 Moreover, 
in all other respects, district judges maintain their supervisory control over 
magistrate judges in the same way that bankruptcy judges remain under the 
control of Article III judges in a manner approved of by the Supreme Court in 
Wellness.603  
With regards to the “personal” interest prong protected under Article III, at 
first blush it might be argued that the limited summary contempt provisions of 
28 U.S.C. § 636(e) do not adequately protect individuals’ “personal” interests 
under Article III because those affected by a magistrate judge’s exercise of 
summary contempt authority do not consent to the magistrate judge’s actions. 
Congress, however, has provided magistrate judges with non-consensual dispo-
sitional authority in petty offense cases under 18 U.S.C. § 3401 that arguably 
does not offend the Constitution.604 Indeed, the strict limits on the summary and 
criminal contempt penalties that magistrate judges may impose under 
§ 636(e)(5) were intended to explicitly differentiate magistrate judge contempt 
authority from that of Article III judges.605 It stands to reason that if the non-
consensual referral of all petty offense cases to magistrate judges for final dis-
position does not offend the Constitution, the summary imposition of limited 
criminal contempt penalties by magistrate judges under § 636(e)(5) would also 
withstand constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court has declared that a “crim-
inal contempt is a petty offense unless the punishment makes it a serious [of-
fense].”606 Viewed in this context, granting magistrate judges summary non-
                                                        
600  Id. 
601  Id. 
602  Wellness Int’l. Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct.1932, 1945 (2015). 
603  See id. at 1945–46. 
604  See supra Section II.C.2 (concluding that while some courts question the constitutionali-
ty of the power granted magistrate judges to dispose of petty cases in 18 U.S.C. § 3401, it 
has not been held to be unconstitutional). 
605  Hnatowski, supra note 567, attach. I, at 2. 
606  Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968). 
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consensual criminal contempt authority with penalties limited to those for Class 
C misdemeanors arguably does not offend the “personal” interests embodied in 
Article III of the Constitution. 
It remains to be seen, however, how these arguments would fare in the fed-
eral courts if the expanded magistrate judge contempt provisions in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(e) were challenged on constitutional grounds.  
III. THE EXPANSION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE UTILIZATION SINCE 1990 
A. Magistrate Judge Utilization: An Introduction 
The nation’s federal magistrate judges perform more duties today than they 
did twenty-five years ago. To confirm this basic fact and to get an idea of how 
much “more,” one need look no further than the judiciary’s national statistics 
on magistrate judge workload. From 1990 to 2014, the number of total mat-
ters607 handled by all magistrate judges in the nation increased 146 percent 
(from 448,107 to 1,102,396).608 
Building on the discussion of the expansion of magistrate judge authority 
in Parts I and II of this article, Part III analyzes the growth in the utilization of 
magistrate judges from 1990 to 2015 and the causal factors contributing to that 
growth. It proposes to show that the expansion of utilization resulted not only 
from larger volumes of cases and duties generally, but also from a broader 
range of duties assigned to magistrate judges.  
The expansion of magistrate judge utilization609 since 1990 does not appear 
to have received much scholarly attention, with certain notable exceptions.610 It 
                                                        
607  “Total matters” is virtually every judicial proceeding regardless of type, including all 
cases terminated in which magistrate judges presided (e.g., civil consent cases and petty of-
fense cases), and all matters referred to magistrate judges in civil and criminal cases for de-
termination or reports and recommendations, including discovery motions, evidentiary hear-
ings, settlement conferences, initial appearances in felony cases, search warrants, etc. 
608  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.  
The court statistics for 1990, unless otherwise indicated, refers to the 12-month period 
ending June 30, 1990, and court statistics from 1992 onward unless otherwise indicated, re-
fers to 12-month periods ending September 30 (due to a change in the Administrative Of-
fice’s statistical reporting year). 
609  The “utilization” of magistrate judges is a term of art referring to the various types of 
judicial duties that district judges, individually, and district courts, collectively, delegate to 
magistrate judges throughout ninety-four district courts. The concept encompasses two sig-
nature qualities of the work of United States magistrate judges: (1) the extensive judicial au-
thority of the office conferred by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2012), and (2) the broad discre-
tion that Congress gave to district judges to determine which of these authorized duties to 
delegate to magistrate judges to meet local needs and conditions, 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(A). 
See PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 64 (2014), 
http://www.fedbar.org/PDFs/A-Guide-to-the-Federal-Magistrate-Judge-
System.aspx?FT=.pdf [https://perma.cc/99UK-8FY4]. 
610  See, e.g., MCCABE, supra note 609; CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE 
CASE STUDIES (1985); Tim A. Baker, The Expanding Role of Magistrate Judges in the Fed-
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has been the subject of occasional articles in legal periodicals611 and the print 
media.612 In Part III of this article, the authors approach the subject using the 
extensive statistics maintained by the Administrative Office on matters handled 
by magistrate judges and practical knowledge obtained through their work ex-
perience as senior attorneys in the Administrative Office. 
Congress and the Judicial Conference have promoted the full utilization of 
magistrate judges in the interest of responsible stewardship of judicial resources 
and to fulfill the purposes of the magistrate judges system. In 1983, the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded in its report to Congress 
that the utilization of magistrate judges should be expanded.613 In response to 
that report, the Judicial Conference endorsed actions “to encourage the further 
use of magistrates” at its March 1984 session.614 Nearly twenty-five years ago, 
the Committee on the Administration of the Magistrate Judges System of the 
                                                                                                                                
eral Courts, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 661 (2005); Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal 
Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J. L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 475 (2002); Dessem, supra note 101; George C. Hanks, Jr., Searching from Within: 
The Role of Magistrate Judges in Federal Multi-District Litigation, 99 JUDICATURE, May 
2015, at 46; Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21; James G. Woodward & Michael E. Penick, 
Expanded Utilization of Federal Magistrate Judges: Lessons from the Eastern District of 
Missouri, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 543 (1999). See generally JUSTIN CROWE, BUILDING THE 
JUDICIARY: LAW, COURTS, AND THE POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2012) (dis-
cussing institutional specialization in the judicial branch in the post-war period, including 
establishment of the modern magistrate judges system); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL 
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996) (providing background and analysis of the growth 
in the federal caseload since 1960 and the institutional reforms in response); Leslie G. Fos-
chio, A History of the Development of the Office of United States Commissioner and Magis-
trate Judge System, 1999 FED. CTS. L. REV. 4 (providing a detailed account of the historical 
origins of the office of magistrate judge and evolution of its judicial powers dating back to 
United States Commissioners); Jack B. Streepy, The Developing Role of the Magistrate in 
the Federal Courts, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 81 (1980) (discussing developments in magistrate 
judge authority and utilization nationally and particularly in the Northern District of Ohio 
during the author’s service there as a United States magistrate judge). 
611  See, e.g., Michael Newman, Magistrate Judges in the Federal Courts: A Special Issue, 
61 FED. LAW. May/June 2014, at 33. 
612  See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow & Craig Timberg, Low-Level Federal Judges Balking at Law 
Enforcement Requests for Electronic Evidence, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/low-level-federal-judges-balking-at-law-
enforcement-requests-for-electronic-evidence/2014/04/24/eec81748-c01b-11e3-b195-
dd0c1174052c_story.html [https://perma.cc/7F3X-46GQ]; Joe Palazzolo, Magistrate Judges 
Play a Larger Role, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 6, 2015, 5:20 PM), http://www.wsj.com/art 
icles/magistrate-judges-play-a-larger-role-1428355226. 
613  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-83-46, COMPTROLLER GENERAL’S 
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM CAN BE 
BETTER REALIZED 18–19 (1983). The GAO found that some district judges did not use mag-
istrate judges as extensively as they could, for various reasons. It recommended, among oth-
er things, that the Judicial Conference encourage courts to use magistrate judges “for all 
types of judicial and administrative duties, whenever possible and practical,” to have a posi-
tive impact on the courts’ caseloads. Id. 
614  REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 20 
(Mar. 1984). 
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Judicial Conference described the mission of the federal magistrate judges sys-
tem in these words: 
The mission of the magistrate judges system is to provide the federal district 
courts with supportive and flexible supplemental judicial resources. The magis-
trate judges system is available to cope with the ever-changing demands made 
on the federal judiciary, thereby improving public access to the courts, promot-
ing prompt and efficient case resolution, and preserving scarce Article III re-
sources.615 
Magistrate judge utilization has expanded greatly over the past quarter cen-
tury by any measure. For example, the volume of all matters handled by magis-
trate judges nationally surpassed one million for the first time in the 2000s,616 
and from 1990 to 2014, the Judicial Conference authorized over 200 new full-
time magistrate judge positions.617 Since 1990, magistrate judges have exer-
cised plenary authority with consent of the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) in 
more civil cases, including several high-profile cases.618 Also, Congress 
changed the title of the office from “magistrate” to “magistrate judge” to more 
accurately reflect the judicial duties of the office.619 Likewise, the Judicial Con-
ference agreed in March 2004 to include a magistrate judge observer at its ses-
sions for the first time.620 
At the same time, however, looking back at magistrate judge utilization 
since 1990 evokes in the observer the familiar saying that “the more things 
change, the more they stay the same.” There are several reasons for this im-
pression, but four are mentioned here. First, while the utilization of magistrate 
judges has expanded, the basic mission of the magistrate judges system “to 
                                                        
615  Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1526 (quoting MAGISTRATE JUDGES PLAN, supra 
note 170, at 3-1). 
616  Magistrate judges disposed of 1,065,413 total matters in 2004. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2013, at tbl.S-17 (2013), http://www.uscourts.gov/statis 
tics/table/s-17/judicial-business/2013/09/30 [https://perma.cc/9SBE-4W29]. 
617  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56. 
618  See, e.g., Dep’t of Fair Emp’t and Hous. v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., No. 12-
cv-01830-JCS, 2015 WL 4719613, at *25–26 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 7, 2015) (granting in part and 
denying in part appeal of report of panel of experts regarding application of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 to accommodations for disabilities while taking the Law 
School Admission Test); Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1086 (D. Idaho 2014) (holding 
Idaho’s marriage laws unconstitutional in prohibiting same-sex marriage and not recognizing 
legal out-of-state marriages of same-sex couples residing in Idaho); Martin v. PGA Tour, 
Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242, 1253 (D. Or. 1998) (holding that the requested use of a golf cart by 
a disabled professional golfer in a golf tournament is a required accommodation under the 
ADA).  
619  See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 101 Stat. 5089, 
5117. 
620  As approved by the Judicial Conference, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist selected a 
magistrate judge and a bankruptcy judge for two-year terms to attend sessions of the Judicial 
Conference as non-voting observers, a practice that has been continued by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist’s successor, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. See JCUS-MAR 2004, supra note 
55, at 22. 
LEE - 16 NEV. L.J. 845 - FINAL 6/20/2016  5:57 PM 
928 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:845  
provide the federal district courts with supportive and flexible supplemental ju-
dicial resources” has not changed.621 Second, decisions on how magistrate 
judges are to be used remain in the hands of district judges at the local district 
court level. Third, the utilization of magistrate judges varies widely from dis-
trict to district, and this variation still extends to some degree to disparities in 
the range of duties given to magistrate judges. Fourth, while this paper con-
cludes that while nationally magistrate judges are generally utilized for a 
broader range of duties today than in 1990, many courts continue to rely on 
magistrate judges as “specialists” in particular areas (for example, prisoner cas-
es and social security appeals).  
This part of the article has four sections. The first is a review of the nation-
al policies that favor flexibility and innovation in magistrate judge utilization. 
The second section analyzes the global expansion of magistrate judge utiliza-
tion and its causes from 1990 to 2015. The third section narrows the focus to 
examine three recent growth areas of magistrate judge utilization: (1) felony 
guilty plea proceedings, (2) search warrants and investigative orders, and (3) 
civil cases adjudicated to finality by magistrate judges on consent of the parties. 
The final section will attempt an initial inquiry into the institutional challenges 
posed by the ways magistrate judges are actually used compared with advice on 
best practices for the effective use of magistrate judges. The section will con-
sider, in particular, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters to magis-
trate judges for reports and recommendations and the role of magistrate judges 
as “specialists” in certain areas. 
B. National Policies Favoring Flexibility and Innovation 
“Flexibility has been the hallmark of the magistrate judges system 
throughout its development.”622 As acknowledged by Congress in 1979, the 
magistrate judges system is designed to “improve access to justice on a district-
by-district basis.”623 Reporting to Congress in 1981, the Judicial Conference 
observed that the Federal Magistrates Act “does not contemplate uniformity 
from district to district in the actual assignment of duties to magistrates,” but 
rather “[f]lexibility and diversity are a necessary part of the genius of the mag-
istrates system.”624  
Since the early years of the magistrate judges system, there have been wide 
variations in the duties assigned to magistrate judges from court to court and, 
even, from district judge to district judge within the same court.625 These varia-
                                                        
621  See supra note 615 and accompanying text. 
622  Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1527. 
623  S. REP. NO. 96-74, at 4 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S.C.C.A.N 1469, 1472. 
624  THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYSTEM: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 44 (1981). 
625  Id. (“Even within a given district court, the use of magistrates will not always be uni-
form.”). The 1981 Report to the Congress quoted a study conducted in the Southern and 
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tions are beneficial, but they result in differences in the range and volume of 
duties of magistrate judges system-wide.626 
Congress has also encouraged courts to be innovative in using magistrate 
judges. Innovative uses are impliedly authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3), 
which broadly states, “A magistrate judge may be assigned such additional du-
ties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United 
States.”627 The House Report to the 1976 jurisdictional amendments to the Fed-
eral Magistrates Act commented on the purpose of § 636(b)(3): 
This subsection enables the district courts to continue innovative experimenta-
tions in the use of this judicial officer. . . .  
. . . . 
If district judges are willing to experiment with the assignment to magis-
trates of other functions in aid of the business of the courts, there will be in-
creased time available to judges for the careful and unhurried performance of 
their vital and traditional adjudicatory duties, and a consequent benefit to both 
efficiency and the quality of justice in the Federal courts.628 
                                                                                                                                
Eastern Districts of New York that described individualized utilization of magistrate judges 
by district judges:  
Each judge determines how the magistrates can work most effectively. Since 
each judge has his own areas of competence and expertise, he can utilize magistrates 
to assist him in different ways, say, for all pretrial matters or a limited part of the 
case. The high degree of flexibility in magistrate use depending on the magistrate’s 
and judge’s expertise is an important element underlying the magistrates system.  
Id. (quoting Steven Puro, Roger L. Goldman & Alice M. Padawer-Singer, The Evolving Role 
of U.S. Magistrates in the District Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 437, 444 (1981) (footnote omit-
ted)). 
626  See MCCABE, supra note 609, at 23. Peter G. McCabe, the first chief of the Magistrate 
Judges Division of the Administrative Office, from 1972 to 1982, and Assistant Director for 
Judges Programs of the Administrative Office, from 1982 to 2013, noted that flexibility has 
resulted in “substantial disparity in usage” in his 2014 white paper on the magistrate judges 
system: “This flexibility has been beneficial, and most districts use their Magistrate Judges 
broadly and imaginatively. But it has also led to substantial disparity in usage of Magistrate 
Judges among the courts, based on differences in caseloads, local conditions, and the prefer-
ences of District Judges.” Id. 
627  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (2012). 
628  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1609, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6162, 6172. 
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C. Expansion of Duties of Magistrate Judges from 1990 to 2014 
FIGURE 1 
As noted above, the aggregate number of duties performed by magistrate 
judges nationally increased dramatically from 1990 to 2014, more than dou-
bling from 448,107 to 1,102,396 matters.629 (See Figure 1). The largest shares 
of additional matters disposed of were in referred matters in civil cases, re-
ferred matters in felony cases, and initial proceedings in felony cases.630 The 
growth in each of these areas are discussed in more detail below. Civil consent 
cases increased substantially from 1990 to 2014, growing 222 percent (from 
4,958 to 15,959).631 Reports and recommendations in prisoner cases also in-
creased, but by a much smaller margin—27 percent (from 20,583 to 26,140).632 
There were exceptions to the growth trend in some categories, however.633 
                                                        
629  See supra note 608 and accompanying text. 
630  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
631  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
632  Prisoner cases are comprised of prisoner civil rights cases, state habeas corpus cases, 
federal habeas corpus cases and motions to vacate sentence. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
633  The numbers of reports and recommendations in social security appeals rose only slight-
ly, by 15 percent (from 5,112 to 5,881), although filings in these appeals increased overall by 
almost 160 percent (from 7,439 to 19,146). This discrepancy is attributable, in part, to a 
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In general, the expansion in duties performed by magistrate judges was 
caused or enabled by four factors: (1) expansion of magistrate judge authority 
by statute and case law, (2) growth in case filings and workload in the district 
courts, (3) increased magistrate judge resources in the district courts, and (4) 
larger volumes of traditional magistrate judge duties and a broader range of du-
ties assigned to magistrate judges. The first factor, the expansion of magistrate 
judge authority, was discussed in Parts I and II. Clearly, a precondition to any 
growth in the duties of magistrate judges is the legal authority they have to 
conduct their assigned duties. As the expansion of authority has already been 
discussed, this section will focus on the other three factors.  
1. Caseload 
The statistics indicate that increases in district court caseload alone were 
less of a factor in the expansion of magistrate judge utilization than might be 
expected. From 1960 to 1985, the district courts experienced extraordinary 
growth in total filings (from 80,891 to 312,556).634 From 1990 to 2014, case 
filings continued to rise but at a much less rapid rate (from 284,220 to 
376,536).635 Despite the slower growth in caseload after 1985, however, the 
numbers of matters disposed of by magistrate judges rose dramatically from 
1995 to 2005 (from 512,741 to 1,063,907).636 In 2005, the rate of increase 
dropped off considerably, so that, from 2005 to 2014, the numbers increased 
slightly overall (from 1,063,907 to 1,102,396).637 As a result, from 1995 to 
2014, total matters disposed of by magistrate judges increased 115 percent 
while total case filings grew 20 percent.638 Therefore, the widening gap be-
                                                                                                                                
marked increase in social security appeals that were disposed of by magistrate judges on 
consent of the parties during the relevant period. Dispositions of Class A misdemeanors by 
magistrate judges decreased by 37 percent during this period (from 13,248 to 8,351). The 
reduction correlates with a decrease in filings of misdemeanor defendant offenses during that 
period (from 14,938 to 8,774). Dispositions of petty offense cases by magistrate judges in-
creased marginally from 1990 to 2014 (from 87,682 to 98,303). See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.4.4. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at 
tbls.D-1 & S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbls.D-1 & S-17. 
634  POSNER, supra note 610, at 56–64, 391–93 & tbl.A.2. 
635  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, tbls.4.1 & 5.1. From 1990 to 
2014, civil filings grew from 217,879 to 295,310 (up 77,000 filings, 36 percent), and crimi-
nal defendant filings grew from 66,341 to 81,226 (up almost 15,000 filings, 22 percent). Id. 
636  Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS 1999, at tbl.S-18 
(1999), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-1999 [https://perma.cc/ 
5RPA-M2K8], with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.  
637  JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. From 2010 to 2014, matters dis-
posed of by magistrate judges decreased slightly overall (from 1,103,649 to 1,102,396), after 
peaking in 2013 (1,181,874). Id. The cause of the overall decrease from 2010 to 2014 ap-
pears to have been a decrease in felony filings. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, su-
pra note 56, at tbl.5.1. 
638  This observation is made realizing that aggregate matters disposed of by magistrate judg-
es will always be greater than cases filed because “matters disposed of” include multiple 
proceedings arising from each case. Nevertheless, from 1995 to 2014, the ratio of the in-
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tween the growth in magistrate judge duties and case filings suggests that, al-
though rising case filings were a contributing factor, they were not decisive but 
were one of a number of factors leading to the increase in duties performed by 
magistrate judges after 1990. 
A more useful standard for assessing caseloads is the workload of judges, 
as measured by weighted caseload per district judgeship.639 The national statis-
tics on weighted caseload indicate that, on average, the workload of judges in 
all district courts increased over the past twenty-five years. From 1990 to 2015, 
the average number of weighted case filings per district judgeship in all district 
courts rose from 448 to 522.640 The authors of this paper conclude that the fol-
lowing caseload-related factors contributed to the increase in magistrate judge 
utilization from 1990 to 2015: (1) more time-consuming cases due to increased 
legal and evidentiary complexity; (2) the cumulative effects of the previous 
twenty-five year expansion in caseload; (3) and a continuing, albeit gradual, 
rise in the caseloads of district courts generally. As a result of these factors, it is 
hypothesized that district judges delegated more duties to magistrate judges to 
help them better manage their time and their caseloads.  
2. Magistrate Judge Resources 
As noted in Part I, the number of full-time magistrate judge positions in-
creased by 56 percent over the past twenty-five years.641 The number of new 
full-time magistrate judge positions authorized by the Judicial Conference in-
creased considerably in the five-year span from 1990 to 1995 from 329 to 416 
positions.642 From 1995 to 2005, the number of new positions continued to in-
                                                                                                                                
crease in “matters disposed of” to the increase in case filings was quite high, 6:1, indicating 
expansive use of magistrate judges. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 636; 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17; see also ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, supra note 56, at tbls.4.1 & 5.1. 
639  “Weighted caseload” is an Administrative Office statistic that  
account[s] for the different amounts of time district judges require to resolve various types of 
civil and criminal actions. The Federal Judiciary has employed techniques for assigning weights 
to cases since 1946. . . . Average civil cases or criminal defendants each receive a weight of ap-
proximately 1.0; for more time-consuming cases, higher weights are assessed . . . ; and cases 
demanding relatively little time from judges receive lower weights . . . .  
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, EXPLANATION OF SELECTED TERMS 1 (2015). Judge Pos-
ner has opined on the utility of weighted caseload statistics thusly: “Without statistics it 
would be impossible to know when a court should be enlarged. For this purpose, however, 
raw caseload statistics are inadequate. A case is not a uniform measure, like a dollar. The 
relevant statistic is not caseload but workload, which is to say, weighted caseload.” See 
POSNER, supra note 610, at 227–31. 
640  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL FACTS AND FIGURES 2015, at tbl.6.2 
(2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-facts-and-figures-2015 [https://per 
ma.cc/Q6B5-TX68].  
641  See discussion supra Section I.B.1.c and notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
642  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56. Under the Federal Magistrates 
Act, the Judicial Conference authorizes new magistrate judge positions, in the light of rec-
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crease, but at a lower rate spread over ten years (from 416 to 503 positions).643 
From 2005 to 2010, the growth in new full-time magistrate judge positions 
abated significantly (increasing by 24 new positions to 527), and from 2010 to 
2014 the new positions were authorized at an even lower rate (increasing by 7 
new positions to 534).644  
When the trend in creating new full-time magistrate judge positions is 
compared to the increase in total matters disposed of by magistrate judges, in-
teresting patterns emerge. From 1990 to 1995, during the greatest surge in new 
magistrate judge positions, the increase that occurred in matters disposed of 
was relatively moderate. However, from 1995 to 2005, the increase in duties 
performed “took off” (increasing from 512,741 to 1,063,907 matters). (See 
Figure 1). The upward trends in positions and matters disposed of did not con-
tinue after 2005. From 2005 to 2010, when the number of new magistrate judge 
positions sharply decreased, there was a parallel drop-off in the rate of increase 
in matters disposed of by magistrate judges.645  
It is difficult to know what to make of these parallel trends in the statistics 
on new magistrate judge positions and duties performed by magistrate judges, 
particularly with respect to the parallel upward trends from 1995 to 2005. There 
seems to be a correlation, but the real connections between these two variables 
are not clear without further study. There is a “chicken-or-the-egg” question 
whether more duties were performed because more positions were created, or 
whether more positions were created because more duties were performed.646 
There is also a question as to why there was an apparent delay in the steep in-
crease of duties performed until after 1995, especially when the period of the 
greatest increase in new positions occurred throughout the previous five years, 
1990 to 1995.647 In view of these issues, the question of the causal relationship 
                                                                                                                                
ommendations of the Director of the Administrative Office, the district courts, and the circuit 
judicial councils. See 28 U.S.C. § 633(b) (2012).  
643  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56. 
644  Id. 
645  See supra note 636 and accompanying text. 
646  Moreover, it cannot be inferred from the data that the increase in total matters disposed 
of by magistrate judges was caused solely by the increase in magistrate judge positions. If 
the increase in total matters disposed of was caused merely by the increase in new positions, 
it seems logical that the average number of total matters performed per full-time magistrate 
judge position would remain relatively constant. However, the national average of total mat-
ters performed per full-time magistrate judge position increased from 1990 to 2014 (from 
1,362 to 2,076), even as the numbers of new full-time magistrate judge positions were in-
creasing significantly (from 329 to 534 at the end of fiscal years 1990 and 2014, respective-
ly). Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. Therefore, while the increase in positions certainly con-
tributed to the increase in total matters disposed of, the large increase in matters disposed of 
seemed to be fueled by more than new magistrate judges doing the work. 
647  A possible explanation for the delay may be that from 1990 to 1995 the number of part-
time magistrate judge positions were decreasing as the number of full-time magistrate judge 
positions were increasing, therefore increases in duties performed due to the new full-time 
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between new magistrate judge positions and increased utilization of magistrate 
judges is beyond the scope of this paper. However, common sense suggests that 
the probable effect of adding new magistrate judge positions would be an in-
crease in the overall output of magistrate judges, assuming that the increase in 
capacity (new positions) satisfied an increasing demand for the services of 
magistrate judges (i.e., matters referred by district judges). Therefore, based on 
the parallel statistical trends described above, it can be conservatively conclud-
ed that, but for the great increase in new full-time magistrate judge positions 
from 1990 to 2005, the increase in total matters disposed of would not have 
been as large as it was.648 
3. More Duties and a Broader Range of Duties 
For purposes of this analysis, the expansion of magistrate judge utilization 
can be divided into at least two different types. The first type, which could be 
called “intensified utilization,” refers to an increased volume of duties in a type 
of duty that magistrate judges are already assigned, such as would occur, for 
example, if social security filings increased, causing an increase in the amount 
of social security appeals referred to magistrate judges. The second type, which 
might be called “broadened utilization,” refers to the broadening of assign-
ments into duty categories in which magistrate judges have not been utilized 
before, such as would occur if a court began referring discovery motions in civ-
il cases to magistrate judges where, previously, the court had only referred set-
tlement conferences. Broadened utilization indicates that magistrate judges are 
being used more extensively over a range of duties, which has been a national 
goal.649 The data from 1990 to 2014 suggests that the expansion of utilization 
during that period was a combination of both broadened and intensified utiliza-
tion.  
Statistical data indicate that from 1990 to 2014, the largest shares of the 
expansion in utilization were in three broad categories: (1) pretrial matters and 
additional duties in civil cases, (2) pretrial matters and additional duties in felo-
                                                                                                                                
positions may have been offset by immediate decreases in duties performed by part-time 
magistrate judges whose positions were abolished. See supra Section I.B.1.c. 
648  Another aspect of judicial resources, or lack thereof, which was discussed supra Section 
I.B.1.c, is the discrepancy from 1990 onward between the low number of new district judge-
ships created and the greater number of new magistrate judge positions. The lack of addi-
tional district judgeships led courts, particularly the busier courts, to seek additional magis-
trate judge positions. However, the Judicial Conference authorizes new magistrate judge 
positions based on the court’s need for magistrate judge resources and not in lieu of addi-
tional district judgeships. While there can be overlap between duties performed by district 
judges and magistrate judges, magistrate judges are non-Article III judges and their authority 
is not coextensive with the authority of district judges. For example, it is universally recog-
nized that magistrate judges have no authority to try felony cases or conduct sentencings in 
felony cases. Therefore, the two types of judges are not interchangeable. 
649  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 101 
(1995); cf. United States v. Benton, 523 F.3d 424, 433 (4th Cir. 2008). 
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ny cases,650 and (3) initial proceedings in criminal cases. Each of these catego-
ries is discussed below. 
a. Civil Cases: Pretrial Matters and Additional Duties 
The prime example of broader utilization of magistrate judges is the expan-
sion of pretrial matters and additional duties in civil cases referred to magistrate 
judges651 from 1990 to 2014. During this period, referred civil matters disposed 
of by magistrate judges increased from 114,968 to 371,672.652 
Using seventy or less as a baseline value denoting a small number of civil 
pretrial duties referred to magistrate judges (excluding evidentiary hearings) in 
a given court, the number of courts that reported seventy or less civil pretrial 
matters handled by magistrate judges decreased from nine courts to one court 
from 1990 to 2014.653 Therefore, the statistics suggest that in 1990 there were 
nine courts that were not utilizing magistrate judges to an appreciable extent in 
general civil cases, but by 2014, virtually all courts were using magistrate judg-
es to handle civil pretrial matters routinely, albeit in varying amounts. 
It should be noted that the use of magistrate judges for judicial settlement 
of cases was an important part of the expansion of magistrate judge utilization 
in civil cases after 1990. From 1990 to 2014, the numbers of settlement confer-
ences conducted by magistrate judges increased 63 percent (from 12,656 to 
20,641).654 
There were several causal factors that generated increased referrals of civil 
matters to magistrate judges. As discussed above, two factors were the gradual 
rise in civil filings and the increase in the number of authorized magistrate 
                                                        
650  The first and second categories are matters referred to magistrate judges in civil and fel-
ony cases that are assigned to district judges, as distinguished from cases assigned to magis-
trate judges as the presiding judge, such as civil consent cases and petty offense cases. 
651  These matters include referred non-case-dispositive pretrial motions, settlement confer-
ences and other pretrial conferences, evidentiary hearings, special masterships, and reports 
and recommendations on referred case-dispositive motions in non-consent civil cases, in-
cluding social security appeals but not including prisoner cases. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
652  The actual increase was not as large as the bare statistics indicate because certain types 
of matters, including uncontested non-case-dispositive motions, were added to this category 
for the first time in 2000, causing a large spike in the aggregate number that year. When the 
statistics are adjusted to take this change into account, the increase in referred civil matters 
from 1990 to 2014 is still estimated to have been substantial, about 70 percent. The reporting 
of these data for the first time in 2000 increased the total number of referred civil matters by 
about 100,000 in 2000. Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
653  The one court in 2014 was the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, which is 
the only court in the nation that has one magistrate judge who is in a combination clerk of 
court/magistrate judge position (receiving no additional salary or staff for judicial duties), 
and who reports few judicial duties. Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra 
note 57, at 283–84 tbl.M-4A, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-4A. 
654  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
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judge positions. But the main impetus in the early part of this period was the 
civil justice reform legislation of 1990, which is discussed in Part I of this pa-
per.655 The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 “actually enhanced the potential 
role and status of federal magistrate judges,” and Title I of that legislation, the 
CJRA of 1990, created an opportunity for each district court to review the role 
and utilization of its magistrate judges in civil cases.656 
The CJRA required all district courts to adopt a civil justice expense and 
delay reduction plan after considering recommendations of a local advisory 
group appointed by each chief district judge in consultation with the other 
judges.657 In general, these plans and recommendations recognized the signifi-
cant role of magistrate judges in civil pretrial management.658 The CJRA led to 
more extensive utilization of magistrate judges in civil cases, although many 
courts had already established case management practices involving magistrate 
judges before the CJRA.659 These reports and plans made a wide variety of rec-
ommendations regarding the use of magistrate judges, including promoting the 
referral of pretrial conferences and discovery motions to magistrate judges, re-
ferral of settlement conferences to magistrate judges, and taking steps to en-
courage parties to consent to full adjudication of consent cases by magistrate 
judges.660  
b. Felony Cases: Pretrial Matters and Additional Duties 
Another example of broadened utilization from 1990 to 2014 was referred 
pretrial and additional matters in felony cases,661 dispositions of which in-
creased from 35,576 to 182,230.662 To illustrate the effects of broadened utili-
                                                        
655  See supra Part I.B.1. 
656  Dessem, supra note 101, at 811. The Senate Judiciary Committee’s Report concluded: 
“[G]iven the increasingly heavy demands of the civil and criminal dockets and the increas-
ingly high quality of the magistrates themselves, . . . magistrates can and should play an im-
portant role, particularly in the pretrial and case management process.” LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89 (quoting S. REP. NO. 101-416, at 20 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6823). 
657  Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103, 104 Stat. 5089, 5090–96 
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012)). 
658  See Dessem, supra note 101, at 811. 
659  Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1521. 
660  Dessem, supra note 101, at 811–41; see also Pro & Hnatowski, supra note 21, at 1520–
22. 
661  Pretrial and additional duties in felony cases include non-case-dispositive motions, re-
ports and recommendations on case-dispositive motions, pretrial conferences, probation and 
supervised release revocation hearings, evidentiary hearings, felony guilty plea proceedings, 
and miscellaneous other matters. This category is distinguished from initial proceedings in 
felony cases, which refer to such proceedings as search warrants, initial appearances, and 
pretrial detention hearings. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
662  As with the statistics on civil matters, the actual increase in felony duties was not as large 
as indicated in the statistical data because certain types of matters, including uncontested 
non-case-dispositive motions and felony guilty plea proceedings, were added to this category 
for the first time in 2000, causing a large one-year increase in the aggregate number. When 
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zation, in 1990 there were twenty district courts that reported thirty or fewer 
felony pretrial matters handled by magistrate judges, but in 2014 that number 
had decreased to one (the Northern Mariana Islands).663 
Innovation is a theme in magistrate judge utilization in felony pretrial mat-
ters. One of the most significant examples of this is the referral of felony guilty 
plea proceedings to magistrate judges as an “additional duty” under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(b)(3).664 This was an innovative practice when it began in the 1980s in a 
few courts and became a routine practice in the southwest border courts and 
many other districts.665 The national expansion of referrals of felony guilty 
pleas is discussed in more detail below. More recently, an innovative duty for 
magistrate judges that has been adopted in a number of courts is presiding over 
“reentry court” proceedings. “Reentry courts” themselves are innovative pro-
grams in federal district courts, which offer community-based services, such as 
drug treatment and job skills training, with regularly scheduled appearances be-
fore a judge as a beneficial alternative to traditional post-conviction supervised 
release.666 
Another innovative use of magistrate judges in felony cases has been su-
pervised release revocation proceedings. In 1992, an amendment to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3401 allowed district judges to designate a magistrate judge to conduct hear-
ings to modify, revoke, or terminate supervised release, including evidentiary 
hearings, and to submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations to the 
district judge.667 Some courts had referred supervised release proceedings to 
magistrate judges for reports and recommendations before these amendments. 
The total number of probation and supervised release revocation proceedings 
conducted by magistrate judges nationally grew from 1990 to 2014 (from 529 
to 2,521).668 
                                                                                                                                
the statistics are adjusted to account for this change, the actual increase in referred felony 
matters from 1990 to 2014 is still estimated to have been quite large, about 280 percent. 
Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
663  Compare ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 57, at 281–82 tbl.M-4, with 
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163. 
664  See Baker, supra note 610, at 679. 
665  See infra Section III.D.1. 
666  See MCCABE, supra note 609, at 56–57. 
667  See 18 U.S.C. § 3401(i) (2012); MCCABE, supra note 609, at 55–56. 
668  See supra note 663. It is interesting to note that the innovative use that was the subject of 
a leading case on magistrate judge authority, Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991), 
the referral of voir dire in felony cases to magistrate judges, has not become a widespread 
practice, although there are a number of courts that refer felony voir dire to magistrate judg-
es occasionally on an ad hoc basis. In 2014, only 316 voir dires were conducted by magis-
trate judges, in civil and criminal cases. JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-
3A. Magistrate judges conducted these voir dires in varying numbers in 40 courts, but con-
ducted none of them in 54 courts that year. Id. 
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c. Initial Proceedings in Criminal Cases 
The third main area of expansion in magistrate judge utilization is initial 
proceedings in criminal cases.669 This is an example of intensified utilization. 
There is a long history in the federal courts of assigning felony preliminary du-
ties to subordinate federal officers, going back to the predecessors of magistrate 
judges, U.S. Commissioners.670 With some exceptions, all these proceedings 
are assigned to magistrate judges in all district courts, and therefore, the num-
ber of such duties performed by magistrate judges is closely related to the lev-
els of felony filings.671 
From 1990 to 2014, the number of felony preliminary proceedings con-
ducted by magistrate judges increased 119 percent (from 157,987 to 
346,318)672 which coincided with the 22 percent rise in felony defendant filings 
during the same period (from 66,341 to 81,226).673 A major factor in the in-
crease in felony preliminary proceedings conducted by magistrate judges was 
search warrants, which increased tremendously from 1990 to 2014 (from 
20,672 to 61,758).674 
In summary, the primary causes of the large expansion of magistrate judge 
utilization over the past twenty-five years appear to be the general broadening 
of magistrate judge utilization in district courts for various duties in civil and 
criminal cases and intensified utilization in initial proceedings in criminal cas-
es. The incremental increase in the caseload of the district courts during the rel-
evant period was a contributing factor, but not decisive; however, the rising 
overall national workload of the courts, as measured by weighted caseload and 
other factors, was an important factor. The significant number of new magis-
trate judge positions that were added to the system during the first half of the 
period led to a greater expansion of utilization than would have occurred with-
out the new positions. Therefore, the national trend from 1990 to 2015 was to-
ward full utilization of magistrate judges, consistent with the judiciary’s 1984 
endorsement of actions to “encourage the further use of magistrate[ judges].”675 
                                                        
669  Initial proceedings include search warrants, arrest warrants, initial appearances, prelimi-
nary examinations, arraignments, and pretrial detention hearings. As with civil case filings, 
the matters performed by magistrate judges in felony cases are always greater than the num-
ber of filings of cases. JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, tbl.S-17. 
670  Foschio, supra note 610, at ¶¶ [1]–[II.15]; see MCCABE, supra note 609, at 8–10. 
671  Even with initial proceedings, however, local variations exist that lead to differences in 
utilization from district to district, including variations in types of felony cases, variations in 
investigative activities, prosecutorial policies determining the frequency of pretrial detention, 
and variations in preliminary examinations. 
672  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
673  ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.5.1. 
674  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.  
675  See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10. 
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D. Growth Trends in Utilization of Magistrate Judges for Specific Types of 
Proceedings 
This section will highlight certain growth trends that contributed to the ex-
pansion of magistrate judge utilization since 1990 in felony guilty plea pro-
ceedings, search warrants, and civil consent cases. 
1. Felony Guilty Pleas 
The expansion of the authority of magistrate judges to conduct felony 
guilty plea proceedings with the consent of the parties was analyzed in Part II 
of this paper.676 As discussed, the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Peretz v. Unit-
ed States, decided in 1991, clarified the legal basis for the referrals of these 
proceedings to magistrate judges.677 After Peretz, felony-guilty-plea proceed-
ings became the largest growth area in magistrate judge utilization and are a 
good example of broader utilization during the period. From 2000, when the 
Administrative Office began capturing this data, to 2014, the number of felony 
guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges almost tripled, increas-
ing from 10,614 to 29,536.678 
Historically, most felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate 
judges have been in the five district courts along the southwest border—
Southern District of California, District of Arizona, District of New Mexico, 
Western District of Texas, and Southern District of Texas.679 The referrals are 
necessary in these courts to help the districts cope with extremely large num-
bers of immigration and drug cases.680 The felony guilty pleas in these courts 
are in the thousands,681 far more than in other courts. However, since 1990, the 
practice of referring felony guilty plea proceedings has expanded to many, but 
not all, district courts throughout the nation. In 2014, magistrate judges con-
ducted felony guilty plea proceedings in widely varying amounts in fifty-seven 
of ninety-four district courts, not including the southwest border courts.682 
The numbers of felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate 
judges increased 40 percent nationally from 2005 to 2014.683 From 2005 to 
2011, they rose 54 percent, with most of the increase occurring in the southwest 
                                                        
676  See supra Part II.B.1. 
677  Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 932–33 (1991). 
678  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra 
note 163. 
679  In 2014, more than one-half of felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate 
judges were in the five southwest border courts. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 
163. 
680  For example, the Southern District of Texas had 4,744 immigration defendant filings and 
1,082 drug defendant filings in 2014. See id. at tbl.D-3. 
681  For example, the magistrate judges in the Southern District of Texas conducted 2,911 
felony guilty plea proceedings in 2014. Id. at tbl.M-4. 
682  Id. 
683  See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.  
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border courts.684 The numbers peaked in 2011 at 32,682.685 Since then, the 
numbers have fluctuated slightly from year to year.686 
The practice of referring felony guilty plea proceedings to magistrate judg-
es is emblematic of the flexibility of the magistrate judges system. It is im-
portant to remember that, despite its growth nationally, acceptance of the prac-
tice by district judges is far from unanimous. To illustrate, thirty-two district 
courts of various sizes throughout all twelve geographic circuits reported no 
felony guilty plea proceedings conducted by magistrate judges in 2014.687 In 
the courts where these proceedings are referred, it is not uncommon for some of 
the district judges to refer them either routinely or on an ad hoc basis, while 
other district judges in the court choose not to refer them at all. 
2. Search Warrants 
One of the largest growth areas in magistrate judge utilization based on sta-
tistical data is one that has a relatively low public profile—search warrants, as 
that category is defined in Administrative Office statistics.688 In 1990, magis-
trate judges handled 20,672 search warrants (not an insignificant number 
then).689 By 2014, the number of search warrants had risen dramatically to 
61,758.690 Most of the growth occurred after the terrorist attack on September 
11, 2001. The number increased 75 percent from 2005 to 2014 (from 35,155 to 
61,758) and 42 percent from 2010 to 2014 (from 43,435 to 61,758).691 
Magistrate judges handle the vast majority of felony preliminary proceed-
ings in the district courts, including search warrants, arrest warrants, criminal 
complaints, initial appearances, arraignments, and pretrial detention hearings. 
But while the total number of felony preliminary proceedings conducted by 
magistrate judges nearly doubled from 1990 to 2014, the number of search war-
rants alone nearly trebled during that period.692 
                                                        
684  See id. at tbls.M-4 & S-17. 
685  Id. 
686  Id. 
687  See id. at tbl.M-4. 
688  “Search warrants,” as the term is used for statistical purposes in the Administrative Of-
fice, is a broad generic category that includes not only traditional search warrants issued un-
der FED. R. CRIM. P. 41, but also numerous other orders authorizing searches and seizures 
based on probable cause or a lesser standard, including pen registers, trap and trace devices, 
and newer kinds of searches and surveillance, such as mobile tracking devices, cell phone 
tracking techniques, and disclosure of stored electronic communications. See MCCABE, su-
pra note 609, at 26–28. 
689  See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17.  
690  See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
691  See id. 
692  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
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Magistrate judges have the authority to issue search warrants under the 
Federal Magistrates Act693 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b).694 
United States commissioners had the authority to issue search warrants for spe-
cific federal offenses,695 and magistrate judges inherited that authority through 
the Federal Magistrates Act, which, among other things, gave magistrate judges 
“all powers and duties conferred or imposed on United States commission-
ers.”696 
Several factors have led to the increase in search warrants, the most obvi-
ous being the intensified investigations of terrorist activity since September 11, 
but also the prevalence of electronic and audio communications via the internet 
and cell phones, continuing advancements in search and surveillance technolo-
gies, and the increased use of these technologies in criminal investigations.697 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and other rules and statutes have also 
required magistrate judges to grapple with multiple new surveillance technolo-
gies when deciding whether to issue search warrants. A review of recent cases 
reveals numerous examples where magistrate judges have considered applica-
tions for warrants or other search and surveillance orders involving cell phones, 
historic cell site information, electronic data under the Stored Communications 
Act,698 and other investigative technologies.699 
                                                        
693  See 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) (2012). 
694  FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 41(b)(1) provides: 
(b) Authority to Issue a Warrant. At the request of a federal law enforcement officer or an attor-
ney for the government: 
(1) a magistrate judge with authority in the district—or if none is reasonably available, a 
judge of a state court of record in the district—has authority to issue a warrant to search for 
and seize a person or property located within the district . . . . 
695  Foschio, supra note 610, at ¶ II.4. 
696  28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(1) provides: 
(a) Each United States magistrate judge serving under this chapter shall have . . . 
(1) all powers and duties conferred or imposed upon United States commissioners by law or 
by the Rules of Criminal Procedure for the United States District Courts . . . . 
697  See MCCABE, supra note 609, at 26–28. 
698  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2012). 
699  See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v. Thou-
sand, 558 Fed. App’x 666 (7th Cir. 2014); In re Application for Tel. Info. Needed for a 
Criminal Investigation, No. 15-XR-90304-HRL-1(LHK), 2015 WL 4594558 (N.D. Cal. July 
29, 2015); United States v. Scully, 108 F. Supp. 3d 59 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Application of 
U.S. for an Order for Authorization to Obtain Location Data Concerning an AT&T Cellular 
Tel., 102 F. Supp. 3d 884 (N.D. Miss. 2015); In re Application for Cell Tower Records Un-
der 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), 90 F. Supp. 3d 673 (S.D. Tex. 2015); In re Application of U.S. for 
an Order Authorizing Prospective and Continuous Release of Cell Site Location Records, 31 
F. Supp. 3d 889 (S.D. Tex. 2014); In re Nextel Cellular Tel., No. 14-MJ-8005-DJW, 2014 
WL 2898262 (D. Kan. June 26, 2014); In re [Redacted]@gmail.com, 62 F. Supp. 3d 1100 
(N.D. Cal. 2014); In re Application of U.S. for an Order Authorizing Disclosure of Histori-
cal Cell Site Info. for Tel. No. [Redacted], 40 F. Supp. 3d 89 (D.D.C. 2014); In re Search of 
Black iPhone 4, 27 F. Supp. 3d 74 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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3. Civil Consent Cases  
The use of magistrate judges to preside in civil cases with the consent of 
the parties under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)700 expanded broadly from 1990 to 2014. 
Civil consent authority was established in 1979 by amendments to the Federal 
Magistrates Act.701 By 1990, magistrate judges were handling civil consent 
cases in the majority of district courts, but in about a quarter of courts, magis-
trate judges had none or very few civil consent cases.702  
By 2014, the number of courts reporting no civil consent cases had de-
creased to four, and the number reporting five or less had decreased to five.703 
Therefore, the percentage of courts in which magistrate judges were utilized for 
more than a minimum of civil consent cases expanded from about 75 percent of 
courts to about 90 percent.704 The size of the expansion of civil consent authori-
ty is amply illustrated by the court with the largest number of civil consent cas-
es disposed of in 2014, which was the Northern District of California with 
1,623 civil consent cases.705 
Several factors have contributed to the expansion of civil consent cases. 
Perhaps the most significant was the statutory amendment to the Federal Mag-
istrates Act that allowed district judges and magistrate judges, after litigants are 
given initial notification of the consent option at the time of filing, to “again 
advise the parties of the availability of the magistrate” judge to exercise consent 
jurisdiction.706 After this statutory change in 1990, individual district judges 
and courts began using various methods for facilitating consent in civil cases, 
including reminding parties of the consent option at scheduling conferences and 
educating the bar on civil consent authority in speeches at bar association func-
tions. One of the court-wide methods, which has proved effective in a number 
of courts, has been the inclusion of magistrate judges on the civil case assign-
ment wheel for direct assignment of civil cases to the magistrate judge as the 
presiding judge, subject to affirmative consent of the parties at a later date.707 
                                                        
700  The statute authorizes full-time magistrate judges “upon consent of the parties . . . to 
conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judg-
ment in the case.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (2012). 
701  See The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643, 643–45 
(codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) (2012)). 
702  In 1990, there were eight courts that reported no civil consent cases and fourteen courts 
that reported five or fewer civil consent cases. The seventy other courts reported civil con-
sent cases in widely varying numbers throughout the circuits. The highest number reported 
was 487 in the District of Oregon. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 57, at 
285–86 tbl.M-5. 
703  See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-5. 
704  See supra notes 702–03. 
705  See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.M-5. 
706  Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 308(a), 
104 Stat. 5112 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2)); see also supra Section I.B.1.b.ii. 
707  See, e.g., Woodward & Penick, supra note 610. 
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Approximately one-third of district courts have implemented a “direct assign-
ment” system in one form or another.708 
An additional causal factor has been the efforts of courts to encourage con-
sents in social security and prisoner cases, which comprise a sizeable portion of 
civil consent cases. While it is still a common practice for magistrate judges to 
handle social security appeals on a report and recommendation basis, disposi-
tions on consent of the parties actually outnumbered reports and recommenda-
tions in these cases in 2014.709 
Parties consent to magistrate judges in various types of cases, from diversi-
ty cases such as motor vehicle accidents to more complex commercial litiga-
tion, including intellectual property cases. In the vast majority of civil cases in 
district courts, of course, district judges are the presiding judges, but magistrate 
judges preside on consent of the parties in a portion of civil cases. Civil consent 
cases were 6 percent of the total number of terminations of civil cases in district 
courts in the 12-month period ending September 30, 2013.710 
E. Questions Relating to Effective Utilization of Magistrate Judges 
The advice of the Magistrate Judges Committee to district courts on best 
practices for the effective and efficient utilization of magistrate judges is prof-
fered in a document originally adopted by the Committee in 1999, entitled Sug-
gestions for Utilization of Magistrate Judges (Suggestions).711 
Two practices that are beneficial to courts but that also raise practical ques-
tions about the most effective use of magistrate judges are examined below: (1) 
the practice of referring case-dispositive motions to magistrate judges for re-
ports and recommendations, and (2) the practice in many courts of using magis-
trate judges as “specialists” in certain types of cases and proceedings. 
There is no single model within the judiciary for the utilization of magis-
trate judges, but the Judicial Conference resolved many years ago to encourage 
“the full and effective utilization” of magistrate judges by the district courts.712 
The dynamic relationship between the general goal of full and effective utiliza-
tion and flexibility is adumbrated in the Long Range Plan for the Federal 
Courts, which was adopted by the Judicial Conference in 1995: 
                                                        
708  Statistics in possession of authors. 
709  Reports and recommendations in social security appeals increased 39 percent from 2010 
to 2014 (from 4,229 to 5,881), see JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, but 
the number of social security appeals disposed of on consent rose 53 percent during that pe-
riod (from 4,324 to 6,630) (statistics in possession of authors). 
710  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 56, at tbl.6.6. 
711  See Comm. on the Admin. of the Magistrate Judges Sys., Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., Suggestions for Utilization of Magistrate Judges (rev. ed. 2013) (unpublished docu-
ment) (on file with authors); see also MCCABE, supra note 609, at 24–25. 
712  See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(Sept. 1982). 
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Magistrate judges should perform judicial duties to the extent constitutionally 
permissible and consistent with sound judicial policy. Individual districts should 
retain flexibility, consistent with the national goal of effective utilization of all 
magistrate judge resources, to have magistrate judges perform judicial services 
most needed in light of local conditions and changing caseloads.713 
1. Reports and Recommendations 
The referral of case-dispositive motions by district judges to magistrate 
judges for proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition (i.e., 
reports and recommendations) is a statutorily authorized procedure.714 In effect, 
it allows district judges to refer such motions that magistrate judges are not au-
thorized by statute to adjudicate with finality absent consent of the parties. Af-
ter the magistrate judge’s submission of a report and recommendation, the par-
ties have fourteen days to file objections for “a de novo determination” by the 
district judge.715 From the perspective of considering the most efficient means 
of disposing of a motion, the report and recommendation procedure inserts ex-
tra procedural steps (and an additional judge) into the process of deciding a mo-
tion. To that extent, it tends to make the report and recommendation process a 
less efficient means of ruling on a motion than if the motion were decided by 
one judge with authority to make a final determination. 
The Magistrate Judges Committee advises in its Suggestions that referrals 
of case-dispositive motions for reports and recommendations may involve inef-
ficient duplication of judicial work and therefore should be limited.716 The 
Committee acknowledges that real benefits accrue to the court from the reports 
and recommendations process, such as saving district judges’ time to permit 
them to attend to other Article III duties, but concludes that the most efficient 
references are those that do not involve de novo review by a district judge.717 
However, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters for reports and 
recommendations continued much the same in certain types of cases and in-
creased in others during the expansion of utilization after 1990. From 1990 to 
2014, the largest segment of reports and recommendations was in prisoner cas-
es (state habeas corpus, federal habeas corpus and prisoner civil rights cas-
es).718 The number of reports and recommendations in prisoner cases grew by a 
                                                        
713  JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U. S., supra note 649. 
714  28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2012). 
715  Id. Section 636(b)(1) provides that “[w]ithin fourteen days after being served with a 
copy” of the report and recommendation, “any party may serve and file written objections 
. . . as provided by rules of court.” The district judge “shall make a de novo determination of 
those portions of the [report and recommendation] to which objection is made,” and “may 
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the [report and recommendation].” Id. 
716  See supra note 711. 
717  See supra note 711. 
718  See supra note 632. 
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relatively small margin from 1990 to 2014 (from 20,583 to 26,140).719 The sec-
ond largest segment is general civil cases (i.e., all civil cases other than prisoner 
cases and social security appeals), but the number of reports and recommenda-
tions in these cases more than doubled in the past twenty-five years (from 7,388 
to 19,081).720 The third largest segment of reports and recommendations is in 
social security appeals. They rose slightly from 1990 to 2014 (from 5,112 to 
5,881).721 Finally, the numbers of reports and recommendations in felony cases 
varied annually from 1990 to 2014, but declined overall (from 4,169 to 
3,200).722 
As the statistics indicate, the practice of referring case-dispositive matters 
for reports and recommendations continues to be used in virtually all district 
courts, with a few exceptions. Courts give valid reasons for local referrals for 
reports and recommendations.723 Some courts view reports and recommenda-
tions as a “necessary evil” for practical and equitable division of the court’s ju-
dicial workload among the court’s judges, often in the context of a heavy over-
all caseload. Many district judges find referrals of certain case-dispositive 
motions, especially if they are to require evidentiary hearings (e.g., motions to 
suppress evidence in felony cases), as extremely valuable time-savers. A sub-
stantial number of magistrate judges and district judges note that referral of 
case-dispositive motions provide magistrate judges with some of the most pro-
fessionally satisfying judicial work that they have. Finally, courts report that, 
typically, objections are not filed to reports and recommendations issued in par-
ticular types of cases, such as social security appeals, in which case the delay in 
adjudication of the motion is shortened to some degree. 
Interestingly, courts continue to refer motions to magistrate judges for re-
ports and recommendations at the same time that the numbers of civil consent 
cases have risen since 1990. This suggests that the courts’ continued referrals 
for reports and recommendations do not imply a lack of confidence in the use 
of magistrate judges to the fullest extent of their authority. However, in the au-
thors’ opinion, it does suggest that the report and recommendation process will 
continue to be used for some time to come. 
                                                        
719  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
720  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
721  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
722  Compare JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17, with JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
2014, supra note 163, at tbl.S-17. 
723  Although it is not verifiable by citation to any publication available to the public, the 
content is based on numerous interviews with judges about magistrate judge utilization prac-
tices in many district courts, and periodic written reports on individual courts’ practices 
which are made by the authors and other attorneys in the normal course of their work at the 
Administrative Office. 
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2. The Specialist-Generalist Question 
Carroll Seron, in her excellent 1985 study for the Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC) on magistrate judge utilization, identified three models of utilization 
from her empirical research on the district courts: (1) the “specialist,” (2) the 
“team player,” and (3) the “additional judge.”724 The specialist role is of inter-
est here. Using a magistrate judge as a specialist refers to the automatic referral 
of cases to magistrate judges in certain special areas of the civil docket, most 
commonly social security appeals and prisoner cases, for reports and recom-
mendations or disposition on consent, to allow magistrate judges to build up a 
special expertise in an area where there is an ongoing, large caseload. The spe-
cialist model is also implicated by the practice of referring all pretrial matters 
of a certain type, such as discovery motions or settlement conferences, to capi-
talize on the expertise that magistrate judges have developed.725 
As Carroll Seron’s study indicates, there is a long history of courts using 
magistrate judges in specialist roles.726 Many courts today refer all or most 
prisoner cases and social security appeals to magistrate judges for reports and 
recommendations or disposition on consent.727 Moreover, in many courts, mag-
istrate judges are heavily relied on to conduct settlement conferences in recog-
nition of their mediation skills.728 
However, with the establishment of the magistrate judges system, Congress 
sought to avoid creating a lower-tiered federal judicial position with jurisdic-
tion limited to certain types of litigation.729 The FCSC, likewise, recognized the 
need to “safeguard against undermining the institutional supplementary role” of 
magistrate judges, and against the “unintentional creation of a lower-tiered ju-
dicial office with separate and distinct responsibilities.”730 Legislation has been 
proposed from outside the judiciary from time to time that would carve out cer-
tain matters for assignment to magistrate judges. The Judicial Conference has 
disapproved in principle of legislation that mandates that a district court auto-
                                                        
724  SERON, supra note 610, at 35–46, 59–92. 
725  Id. at 35. 
726  See id. 
727  Magistrate judges issued 26,140 reports and recommendations in prisoner cases in the 
twelve months ending September 30, 2014. See JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2014, supra note 163, at 
tbl.S-17. 
728  Magistrate judges conducted 20,641 settlement conferences in the twelve months ending 
September 30, 2014. Id. 
729  See H.R. REP. NO. 96-287, at 11 (1979). As the House Committee on the Judiciary stated 
in rejecting jurisdictional limitations on civil consent authority in the committee report on 
H.R. 1046, the Federal Magistrate Act of 1979: 
If a magistrate is competent to handle any case-dispositive jurisdiction, he should be fully com-
petent to handle all case-dispositive jurisdiction. Such a rule preserves the generalist posture of 
the magistrate, as well as insures that . . . there is [not] an impetus to appoint “specialized” mag-
istrates to handle only narrow types of cases. 
Id. 
730  FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 8, at 79. 
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matically refer particular types of cases to magistrate judges.731 In addition, the 
Magistrate Judges Committee advises that courts benefit from using the full ar-
ray of its magistrate judges’ skills rather than assigning them only specified 
types of cases that consume most of their time.732 The generalist nature of mag-
istrate judge positions is, moreover, a recruitment asset, helping to attract top-
quality candidates with broad substantive knowledge and skills. 
Therefore, the question is, how can the longstanding practice in many 
courts of using magistrate judges as specialists be reconciled with the preferred 
policy of not limiting magistrate judge jurisdiction to certain types of cases? 
This “specialist-generalist question” usually arises with respect to courts that 
have heavy prisoner or social security caseloads and that find it most effective 
and efficient to use magistrate judges as specialists to adjudicate these cases. 
On the other hand, some courts with low overall caseloads appear to emphasize 
the use of magistrate judges as specialists for prisoner cases or social security 
appeals in lieu of referrals and consents in general civil cases. In a number of 
courts, the specialist-generalist roles appear to have been reconciled by using 
magistrate judges in both roles, that is, as specialists for certain narrow types of 
cases (e.g., state habeas corpus cases) but also as generalists in a range of other 
types of cases. This continues to be a complicated issue with no easy solutions. 
CONCLUSION 
It seems certain that the use of magistrate judges in the federal judiciary 
will continue to evolve and expand in the coming years. Just as district judges 
have expanded the authority of magistrate judges and courts have explored in-
novative ways of utilizing magistrate judges in the past twenty-five years, it is 
likely that these trends will carry over into the future. It is our hope that the 
analysis of the expansion of magistrate judge authority and utilization described 
in this paper has increased the readers’ overall awareness of these significant 
federal judges and convinced them of their indispensable role in the federal ju-
diciary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
731  See REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 
(Mar. 1980). 
732  See supra note 711, 723. 
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